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ABSTRACT 
TRANSFORMING THE PARADIGM FOR CRAFTING ACCEPTABLE USE 
POLICY: MANAGING THE ELECTRONIC COMMONS 
FEBRUARY 1997 
ROBERT A. REILLY, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.Ed., SPRINGFIELD COLLEGE 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by Professor G. Ernest Anderson 
There is a need to solidify the common folklore understanding of what 
acceptable behaviors are for computer network users. The process of solidification 
should provide for the development of a paradigm that will be utilized in the 
formulation of computer use policy. Those who craft computer use policy should 
move away from the model of a network as a superhighway to a model of a network 
as a commonly shared resource. 
The current process for formulating and reviewing an Acceptable Use 
Policy—an AUP—has generally not evolved as quickly as the rapidly expanding user 
base and changing demographics. Given the changes in user demographics on 
computer networks, there is a rapidly growing need to better understand the 
computer network and to create AUP’s based upon questions of social interaction. 
x 
Such questions might attempt to address the issues of cooperation and sharing of 
resources. For example, faced with the temptation to behave selfishly—to overuse 
the resources, how can a group of people (through its AUP) establish and maintain 
cooperative behavior? 
To begin the process of answering such questions, this dissertation suggests 
focusing on the question: “How do privacy aspects of the First and Fourth 
Amendments impact the formulation of Acceptable Use Policy for an on-line 
computer network?” This dissertation suggests that privacy is a foundational concept 
in developing an understanding of the nature of the social activities which are growing 
in cyberspace. This dissertation also chronicles the transition from informal 
gentleman’s agreement AUP’s toward more formalized ones. 
The research in this dissertation was accomplished by accessing a number of 
legal resources such as Lexis/Nexis, Westlaw, Web sites on the Internet, a law library, 
and several Mailing Lists involved in discussions of online legal issues. Other 
sources, such as government documents, existing and out of date Acceptable Use 
Policies, and legislative testimony, were reviewed. Personal communication with a 
number of eminent legal scholars also provided a valuable resource. 
This dissertation concludes that an Acceptable Use Policy should be in place 
to govern use of computer networks. The Acceptable Use Policy should become 
much more of a social contract in the manner of many campus faculty and student 
handbooks, and, even in the manner that the U.S. Constitution is a social contract for 
xi 
the U.S. population. AUP’s should be locally developed by those who have a 
foundational understanding of: 
• legal principles of privacy, search and seizure, and due process, and, 
• management theory involving the use of commonly shared resources. 
xi 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Author's Note: A number of citations contained in this dissertation refer to legal material. Legal 
citations vary somewhat, in form, from the traditional APA references. Legal materials are cited in 
conformance with the APA Publication Manual’s (p. 223) requirement to utilize the conventions in 
the Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (1991). 
Historically, Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) primarily regulates user-to- 
computer behavior with the use of the Internet. There has been a radical change and 
a demographic shift in both the nature of the network and its uses. The Net is fast 
becoming a mirror of the real world community. The Net is becoming a community 
rather than an information resource or an information superhighway. Those who craft 
policy should adjust their paradigm for formulating policy—a paradigm which seems 
to be based upon the network as a mechanical entity. The Net is a growing 
community and this dissertation suggests that the paradigm for AUP creation/revision 
should change to view the Net as a shared community resource. In order to 
reformulate the paradigm from its present situation to one which addresses the social 
and communal needs, those who craft AUP’s should have a foundational 
understanding of the legal concepts of privacy, search and seizure, and due process. 
They should also have a working understanding of the principles and theories of 
managing and setting policy for commonly shared resources. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM: THE POLICY CREATION PROCESS 
We are currently in a period of transition. More and more people are becoming 
aware that the computer is an extraordinary communicative device, are learning 
how to send and receive information via their computers, and are gaining access to 
computer based telecommunication networks. As this transition continues, we will 
not only develop a new understanding of the novel and powerful modes of 
distributing information electronically, but we will also realize more clearly that 
this powerful new medium of communication has significant implications for law.1 
Background of the Problem 
The press, the machine, the railway, the telegraph are premises 
whose thousand-year conclusion no one has yet dared to draw.2 
There is a need to solidify the common folklore understanding of what 
acceptable behaviors are for computer network users. Public institutions3 of higher 
education should begin to transition from an informal understanding of acceptable use 
to a more formal structure based upon a social-legal paradigm. The current process 
for formulating and reviewing an Acceptable Use Policy4—an AUP—has generally 
not evolved as quickly as the rapidly expanding user base and changing demographics 
(Figure 1). Prior to 1993, on-line computer systems were predominantly utilized by 
1 Ethan Katsh. Law in a Digital World, 38 Villanova L. Rev. 403, 407 (1993). See 
generally. Elizabeth Eisenstein, The printing press as an agent for change. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche. (1880). The philosophy of Nietzsche. New York: Modem Library. 
3 This study focuses upon state institutions. For private institutions, the ‘computer use 
policy’ question can be solely a question of contract law. With regard to state institutions, the 
question may still boil down to a matter of contract law; but other issues still exist given public 
institutions are extensions of the government where private institutions are not. 
4 An Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) refers to a document which defines what the computer 
user’s rights and responsibilities are to the system itself, other users, and to the administrators of that 
system. The AUP also defines what the administration’s rights and responsibilities are to the system 
itself, and to the users of that system. AUP’s also insure access to information and communication 
while ensuring that the resource use does not overburden the system’s capabilities. 
2 
academics and researchers, who tended to be very like-minded as to network use and 
etiquette—they seem to have a common understanding of online ethics, customs, and 
rituals. More recently, on-line systems are being utilized by a highly diverse general 
public, and usage is generating a need for rules in a digital world that accurately 
reflect the real world. The once held ‘common understanding of online ethics, 
customs, and rituals’ is no longer a commonly held understanding. 
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Figure 1 - Hosts on the Internet 1981-19955 
5 This document is Available as of July 1, 1996: http://NIC.MERIT.EDU/nsfnet /statistics 
/history.hosts. Anthony Rutkowski, Executive Director of the Internet Society, states that “a 
commonly used method of estimating the total number of Internet users is to multiply the number of 
host computers by 10. For example, in 1993, [there were] about 20 million users.” Id.; See also, 
John S. Quarterman. (1995, March 3). Internet communications services on NSFNET. Matrix 
News. 5(3) [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher: //akasha.tic.com:70/matrix /news 
/v5/ports.501. 
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The process of policy change has also not evolved6 as quickly as has the 
capabilities of technology. In their 1890 law journal article, Warren and Brandeis 
advocated that new developments in technology and business methods require the 
next step be taken to expand the right of privacy to be a right “to be let alone ”7 It 
was not until 1967 when the Supreme Court8 broadened the scope of privacy to 
recognize that, given the technology of the day, a physical intrusion or trespass into a 
given area was not the only way to invade a person’s privacy. Today, as Fulton 
noted, “[technological change often outpaces the law . . . [and that] [examining the 
legal implications of emerging technologies can help narrow this gap.”9 * * 
Currently, the process of crafting a university AUP is based upon a model of 
an on-line computer network as a superhighway. A superhighway metaphor may not 
be the best foundation from which to draw a model of social behavior. As Kollock 
and Smith note: 
6 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Haw. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). See generally. Anne M. Fulton. Cyberspace 
and the Internet: Who Will Be The Privacy Police?. 3 Comm. Law Conspectus 63 (1995). 
7 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
8 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Defendant Katz was, convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California, of a violation of statute proscribing 
interstate transmission of wire communication of bets or wagers, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 369 F.2d 130, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court held that 
government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the defendant Katz‘s words 
spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the 
defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. Thus this action constituted a ‘‘search 
and seizure14 within Fourth Amendment, and the fact that electronic device employed to achieve that 
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could have no constitutional significance. The 
Court further held that the search and seizure, without prior judicial sanction and attendant 
safeguards, did not comply with constitutional standards. Although, accepting the account of the 
government’s actions as accurate, the magistrate could constitutionally have authorized with 
appropriate safeguards the very limited search and seizure. 
9 Anne M. Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be The Privacy Police?, 3 
Comm. Law Conspectus 63 (1995); See also. The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on 
the Information Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
4 
with earlier technologies [which] promised freedom and power, the central 
problems of social relationships remain, although in new and possibly more 
challenging forms ... One of the most basic questions in the social sciences is the 
problem of cooperation. In the face of temptations to behave selfishly, how might a 
group of people ever manage to establish or maintain cooperative relations? The 
character and qualities of this problem are different when groups use [online 
computer systems].10 
The IETF’s (Internet Engineering Task Forces) AUP philosophy statement 
suggests a non-social model as the basis by which to craft AUP’s. It states that 
AUP’s are primarily used “to determine pricing, customer base, type and quality of 
service metrics, and a host of other provider services.”* 11 The IETF notes that the 
primary considerations are technical in nature when they state that: 
“[i]n defining your particular AUP there are three areas that must be addressed. 
They are where you get service from, who your peers are, and whom you provide 
service to. A good understanding of these concepts will make or break the AUP 
you formulate.12 
The IETF’s statement does note the need that future Acceptable Use Policies have a 
“better understanding of an AUP, [as] how to formulate one seems to be [an] 
1 "X 
increasingly important [need] as the global net encompasses new environments.” 
But this statement appears to be an after-thought on the part of the committee and 
does not appear to be a reflection of the position of the EETF AUP working group. 
There is a significant quantitative change in the number of users on the 
Internet and on campus networks (Figure 1). There is also increased functionality on 
the Net (e.g., growth of the World Wide Web to support political campaigns. 
10 Peter Kollock and Marc Smith. (1994). Managing virtual communities: Cooperation and 
conflict in computer communities [On-line]. Available as of November 1, 1996: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/csoc/vcommons.htm. 
11 AUP-Working Group of Internet Engineering Task Force. (1995, July). Acceptable use 
policy definition [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
12 AUP-Working Group of Internet Engineering Task Force. 
13 AUP-Working Group of Internet Engineering Task Force. 
5 
business, the entertainment industry). This two-fold change (more functionality of the 
network, and more users) appears to be occurring both on the Internet at large and on 
campus networks. To be more specific: 
• there are more varied users coming on line 
Given the increasing diversity of available services and an increasing number 
of users, there is a greater concern about conducting the business of the computer 
network in a fair and equitable manner. Administrators should now be knowledgeable 
in regard to basic legal issues (e.g., invasion of privacy, search and seizure, 
eavesdropping, copyright infringement, harassment) as these issues will become a part 
of the conceptual reform in regard to the construction of an AUP. 
• there is more socially diverse and anti-social behavior 
Where once the Internet was a group of like-minded scientists, educators and 
researchers, it is fast becoming a mirror image of society in general. This diverse 
population is being confronted with behavioral norms more familiar in a research lab 
or an academic classroom. What was fair, equitable and universally accepted on the 
Net some years ago, is not fair, or equitable, or universally accepted now. 
• there is a fuzzy legal area 
Currently the AUP in general is crafted such that typical users can not 
understand its mandates. Present AUP statements tend to assume that the user has a 
fairly sophisticated understanding of computers and network etiquette. AUP 
statements should go beyond ‘Ten Commandment’ brevity. 
6 
• there are simply more people on the Net and on campus networks 
There is a flood of people on campus networks (figure 2). The mere 
presence of this many people necessitates that rules, customs, and metaphors be 
formalized.14 
Figure 2 - UMassK12 Usage - September 1993 through August 199415 
14 Bruce Sterling. (1995). The hacker crackdown. New York: Bantam Books, page 247. 
15 Data available as of July 1, 1996: ftp://kl2.oit.umass.edu/statistics 
7 
Computer networks are rapidly becoming a mirror environment of the real world. 
Many of the things that one can do in the real world are now possible in the electronic 
world. But given the differences between the real and electronic world a number of 
real world laws lose their clarity and begin to warp when attempts are made to map 
them onto the electronic world. 
Toward a Solution and Reform 
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a 
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to 
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, 
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the 
demands of society.16 
University administrators should address a number of issues when computer 
networks are utilized by members of the university community. The university is faced 
with a need to create, codify, and enforce policy for a vaguely defined environment. 
This vague definition is due to the multiplicity of means which can be employed in 
regulating a wide variety of dissimilar services which all occur within the same 
medium—cyberspace. Intellectual property rights, legal liability, security, user privacy 
rights, matters of search and seizure, and accuracy of information, to name a few, are 
all important aspects of computer network use which should be addressed in the 
Acceptable Use Policy. 
The administrators of public institutions should have a doctrinal understanding 
of the issues (e.g., Constitutional level issues—privacy, search and seizure, due 
process) inherent in AUP development. Other overarching questions which will 
16 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
8 
impact on-line computer networks, but which will not be addressed in this study are: 
“What types of information and conversations can be suppressed? How can a 
university suppress inappropriate information—by restricting gathering, restricting 
distribution in general, restricting potential recipients, or restricting use? Who should 
have the right and who the duty to enforce the restrictions?”17 
Acceptable Use Policies need to address such questions as: 
• Are technologically illiterate users adequately informed of their 
responsibilities and rights on a computer network?, 
• How are computing resources allocated?, 
• How do the logistical/resource needs impact user’s rights?, 
• What are user’s rights and responsibilities?, 
• Who is entitled to use the system?, 
• What actual legal authority is vested in a system administrator? 
Given the demographic changes of users on computer networks, it is also 
important to investigate such questions as: can AUP statements facilitate community 
building, and thereby foster an understanding of social values and ethics on the 
network (of course, in addition to protecting the physical integrity of the computer 
network)? What will Acceptable Use Policy statements be in like in the future? What 
human behaviors should and can an AUP regulate? Can instilling privacy issues into 
an AUP facilitate a change in the AUP’s nature from a focus on the operational and 
17 Peter B. Maggs, John T. Soma and James A. Sprowl. (1992). Computer law, cases, 
comments, questions. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, page 490. 
9 
mechanical nature of the network to a focus on the community of users which 
populate the campus’s network and/or their societal needs? 
AUPs for public institutions can no longer be based upon the assumption that 
on-line computer systems are utilized exclusively for research and other academic 
purposes. More recently, on-line systems are being utilized by a diverse campus 
community which is generating a need for rules that reflect real world interactions 
occurring on the networks. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has cited a 
number of issues which need to be considered during framing of an Acceptable Use 
Policy. These issues include (but not limited to): “privacy, morals and ethics, 
freedom of expression, legal constraints, safety, harassment, plagiarism, resource 
utilization, indemnification, target areas of interest, and remedies and recourse.”18 
There are a number of other broad, inclusive issues that should also be 
considered. These issues address the very nature of a computer network. For 
example, “[liability for illegal activities in cyberspace is affected by how the particular 
computer information service is viewed.”19 If a computer system allows one entity to 
deliver messages to a large number of users, then the system may be viewed as a 
publisher. Many publishers are utilizing computer networks to supplement or publish 
editions of their product.20 Some scholars are already referring to computer 
18 AUP-Working Group of Internet Engineering Task Force. 
19 David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and 
System Operator Liability, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 88 (1993). 
20 See Generally. T.L. Johnson. (1990, April 10). Fred the computer: Electronic newspaper 
services seen as ad-ons. Comm. Daily, 4. 
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networks as the printing press of the 21st Century.”21 But Loundy argues that 
computer network “service are more like common carriers [(e g., the telephone 
company)] than publishers.”22 The nature of computer systems will vary greatly 
depending upon the ultimate legal definition of on-line computer networks. 
Each of these issues is of major importance to university administrators and 
could be the subject of a separate doctoral dissertation. Each is complex and not yet 
clearly defined by the law or by legal scholars. This study leaves these, and many 
other issues for other researchers to address. This dissertation will focus upon 
conceptual issues inherent in the formulation of an AUP as those issues pertain to a 
computer user’s right to privacy.22 This dissertation will also suggest that a paradigm 
shift is in order for those who craft an Acceptable Use Policy. 
As computer networks become “the media through which more and more 
public discourse takes place, the ways in which that discourse is socially organized 
21 Ithiel de Sola Pool, quoted in John Markoff. (1990, May 13). Some computer 
conversation is changing human contact. NY Times, page 1. 
22 David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and 
System Operator Liability. 3 Alb. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 79, 88 (1993). 
23 The Right of Privacy is a general right to be left alone. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). The Right of Privacy is a “generic term encompassing various rights recognized ... to 
be ‘inherent in the concept of ordered liberty’ ... including protection from governmental 
indifference.” Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board. 540 S.W.2d 
668, 679 (1976). The four forms of invasion of privacy are unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, 
appropriation of name or likeness, unreasonable publicity given to a person’s private life, and 
placing another in false light before the public.” 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 488. 
Although the term privacy is not mentioned in the US Constitution, it has been defined by the 
Supreme Court, through the years, in a line of decisions. The Court has held in Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create ‘zones of privacy’. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First 
Amendment is one...”); See also. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113(1972) (The Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however,... the Court has recognized 
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution.) 
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becomes more consequential.”24 Given this concept, this dissertation also suggests 
that in order to reformulate the paradigm by which AUP’s are created it may be 
necessary to address the issues of social interaction and social behavior on the 
network—the AUP would become a social contract25 similar to the staff handbook 
and the student handbook. This dissertation suggests that a new paradigm for 
formulating an AUP should be based upon the concept of Hardin’s “tragedy of the 
commons.”26 Hardin described a group of herders having open access to a common 
parcel of land—known as the Common—on which they could let their cows graze. It 
is in each herders interest to put as many cows as possible onto the land, even if the 
commons is damaged as a result. The herder receives all the benefits from the 
additional cows and the damage to the commons is shared by the entire group. Yet if 
all herders make this individually reasonable decision the commons is destroyed and 
all will suffer. 
Hardin’s model when coupled with a foundational understanding of the legal 
concepts of privacy, due process, and search and seizure appears to be a very 
powerful model by which to create a paradigm to craft Acceptable Use Policies in 
public higher education. 
24 Kollock and Smith. 
25 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line] states that a “social contract 
reflects the agreement between the people and the government on how much power the people 
consent for the government to have and exert. The social contract between the people and the 
government exists so long as the government uses its powers within the due process of law and the 
people agree to the outcome of the due process of law. With the due process of law as a vehicle for 
maintaining the social contract, the government uses its power without compromising certain 
natural and inalienable rights of the individuals in a way unspecified by the Constitution, our social 
contract.” 
26 Garrett Hardin. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science (162), page 1243-1248. 
Garrett Hardin. (1977). Managing the commons. San Francisco: W.H. Freedman and Co. 
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CHAPTER H 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: COMPUTER NETWORKS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, USER PRIVACY AND CHANGE 
It is inevitable that personal privacy will be one of the most significant pressure 
points in our national fabric for most of the 1990s. Advancing technology, 
depersonalization of the workplace and other social environments, a growing 
population ... all can be expected to create a greater personal need for a sense of 
space and dignity. 
Erwin Chemerinsky27 
Introduction 
This chapter will present the views and opinions of: 
• special interest groups (e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility, National School Board 
Association), 
• legal scholars (e.g., Louis Brandeis, Michael Godwin, Ethan Katsh, Carl 
Kadie, Philip Miller), 
• law school professors (e.g., Laurence Tribe, Dean Prosser, Daniel Burk, 
Frank Easterbrook, Henry Perritt), and, 
• authors from scholarly publications (e.g.. Harvard Law Review). 
An Overview 
Plans and Policies.28 a National School Board Association guide to 
formulating AUP statements, suggest that AUPs should foster “Intellectual Freedom 
27 Quoted in Josh Kratka. (1990). For their eves only: The insurance industry and consumer 
privacy. Boston: Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, page 1. 
28 Institute for Transfer of Technology to Education. (1995). Plans and policies for 
technology in education. Washington. DC: National School Boards Association. 
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... [as there is a need for a computer network to] be a free and open forum for 
expression that is strange, unorthodox, or unpopular.”29 However, this philosophy 
has already been pre-empted in other parts of the chapter where the authors advocate 
that an AUP should state that users should: 
• “Avoid offensive or inflammatory speech,”30 and, 
• “[Avoid s]ending material that is likely to be offensive or objectionable 
to recipients 
It becomes apparent in Plans and Policies that there has been a great deal of 
thought and effort put into justifying the use of computer networks in Education (e.g., 
parental permission forms, parental information advisories). But the policy concepts 
tend not to be based upon the U.S. Constitution, federal and state laws, judicial 
opinion, and institutional policy. It may be argued that “an AUP is a contract 
between the institution and the computer user. It may also be argued that if it is 
permissible for a person to waive or bargain away the right to privacy, then the only 
question that remains is whether the contractual negotiations were proper (e.g., was 
the user fully informed, not under coercion or duress, etc.)”32 
% 
Advocacy for AUP statements which lack a fair and equitable foundation is 
not limited to textbooks or existing institutional AUPs. The U.S. Supreme Court 
does not have a particularly strong record when dealing with Constitutional issues as 
29 Institute for Transfer of Technology to Education, page 36. 
30 Institute for Transfer of Technology to Education, page 33. 
31 Institute for Transfer of Technology to Education, page 38. 
32 Daniel Burk (personal e-mail, April 6, 1996). 
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they relate to new technologies.33 “In addition, [lower] courts sometimes have a 
disturbing tendency to treat regulations of the electronic media as principally 
structural economic regulations without recognizing the effects on [Constitutional] 
values.”34 
The Supreme “Court often succumbfs] to the temptation to analogize (map35) 
new electronic media to existing technologies for which they have already developed 
[Constitutional] models.”36 For example, in Los Angeles v. Preferred 
Communications Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, stated that: “In 
assessing [Constitutional] claims concerning cable access, the Court must determine 
whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to 
another medium to warrant application of an already existing standard, or whether 
those characteristics require a new analysis.”37 “Academic commentary also often 
sets out the existing regulatory models—print broadcasting, and common carrier— 
33 Compare Mutual Film Corn, v. Industrial Comm’n. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (stating 
that motion pictures “[are] not to be regarded ... as part of the press of the country”) with United 
States v. Paramount Pictures. Inc.. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (observing that “moving pictures . .. 
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment”). 
34 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
35 Since the inception of networked computer systems analysts have attempted to scrutinize 
the rights and duties of participants in these systems by analogizing an event in Cyberspace and 
applying a legal metaphor. This analysis is based upon the application of real life laws to a. more or 
less, equivalent, happening on a networked computer system. For example, one may consider e-mail 
to ‘map’ onto, or metaphorically be akin to, postal mail. Still others may consider e-mail to ‘map’ 
onto legal standards inherent to a telephone call. 
36 Note. The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
37 Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications. Inc.. 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986). 
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and then tries by analogy to fit a new media technology into one or more of the old 
models.”38 Marks and Johnson note: 
Any attempt to map territory that is unstable, unknown and changeable proves to 
be difficult, which is why metaphors, which are like maps, do not help in any 
consistent way. Instead one needs a guide to maneuver through the difficult 
areas... In other words, the best way to determine the rights and duties of the 
participants in electronic networking communities is not to pick a particular 
metaphor to be our map, but rather, to apply basic principles of fairness and justice 
and to use the existing ‘legal metaphors’ only for what they are worth as 
illuminators of a principled discussion.39 
On the other hand. Miller argues that: “computer electronic information 
services are analogous to print publishers”40 Indeed, sometimes the Constitutional 
treatment of the new medium hinges on which analogy the court adopts.41 
Often, the process of analogizing has focused on the technological similarities 
of the different media.42 “Technological characteristics, however, should not be the 
crucial factor in determining the protection a message receives under the [U S. 
Constitution].”43 The courts and those who craft AUPs “should ground [their] 
analysis in essential [Constitutional] interests and draw upon salient technological 
38 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto 
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (And Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?. 38 
Villanova L. Rev. 487, 488 (1993). 
40 Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology. Old Problem: Determining the First 
Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services. 61 Fordham L.Rev. 1147, 1190-91 (1993). 
41 Compare Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC. 571 F.2d 1025, 1056 (1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 
(1979) (overturning access regulations in part because cable television is indistinguishable from 
newspapers) with Berkshire Cablevision. Inc, v. Burke. 571 F.Supp. 976, 986 (1983), vacated. 773 
F.2d 382 (1985) (upholding access regulations in part because cable service is analogous to 
broadcasting). 
42 E.g.. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC. 801 F.2d 501 (1986), cert. 
denied. 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC could not refuse to apply 
regulations that are constitutionally permissible for broadcasting to teletext.) Teletext is the 
functional equivalent of print, except that the text appears on a television screen instead of a sheet of 
paper. The court, however, found the technological analogy to broadcasting to be dispositive: 
“Teletext, whatever its 
similarities to print media, uses broadcast frequencies, and that, given Red Lion, would seem to be 
that.” Id.; See also. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). 
43 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
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characteristics only as the factual background against which the real [Constitutional] 
concerns must be applied ... [and the] Constitution’s norms, at their deepest level, 
must be invariant under merely technological transformations.”44 
Judge Easterbrook,45 in his comments regarding how the legal community is 
trying to set doctrine in order to come to a conceptual understanding of a computer 
network, bemoans the “cross-sterilization of ideas”46 by combining the field of law 
with that of computer science. He states that doing this yields the “worst of both 
worlds.”47 Easterbrook notes that the belief “lawyers hold about computers, and the 
predictions they make about new technology, are highly likely to be false. This should 
make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace.”48 
The Executive Branch of the federal government has also taken action to 
confuse the legal concept of on-line computer networks. In 1987, for example, when 
“Congress tried to eliminate the NSA’s [(National Security Agency)] meddling with 
civilian computers by passing the Computer Security Act... [the Act] was subverted 
by a series of Presidential directives and agreements among [White House] 
departments.”49 
Given the changing demographics of the on-line community, developers, 
enactors, and enforcers of AUPs should have a firm conceptual and legal 
understanding of the scope and limits of privacy as defined by court decisions. 
44 Laurence H. Tribe. (1991, March). The Constitution in cyberspace: Law and liberty7 
bevond the electronic frontier. Keynote address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and 
Privacy, Boston, MA. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://vvww.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles 
/tribe-constitution, txt. 
45 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and 
Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago. 
46 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. Paper 
presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace, 
Chicago, Illinois. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www-law.lib.uchicago.edu 
/forum/easterbrook.doc. 
47 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. 
48 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. 
49 Press Release from the Electronic Freedom Foundation dated March 5, 1996. 
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legislation, and applicable campus policy. As a result of this change in the nature of 
the user base, a university now needs to set policy and provide a policing function in 
regard to the on-line computer network much in the same manner that it should set 
policy and provide policing of activities on the real life campus. 
The Right to Privacy—Warren and Brandeis’ Thesis 
The Harvard Law Review of December 1890 contained an article written by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,50 titled The Right to Privacy, which described the 
right to privacy as “the right to be let alone.”51 The writing of this article was 
prompted by Samuel Warren’s outrage in regard to a gossip column reporter’s 
comments about a family wedding.52 This article has been a widely quoted seminal 
contribution to the law. According to Shapiro, The Right to Privacy is the most cited 
law review article.53 
Warren and Brandeis touch upon principles which are being revisited today in 
regard to rights on computer networks. When Warren and Brandeis pondered the 
issues of their day the same legal tenets applied. In 1960, William L. Prosser 
strengthened Brandeis and Warren’s theory by publishing an article54 in the California 
Law Review tracing more than 300 cases germane to the evolution of the right to 
50 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, (1890). 
51 Warren and Brandeis at 193. 
52 Dianne L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L.Rev. 291, 295-96 (1983). 
53 Shaprio, Fred R. (1987). The most cited law review articles. Buffalo, NY: W. Hein Co. 
54 Dean Prosser, Privacy. 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960). 
18 
privacy.55 The influence of the works of Warren and Brandeis, and Prosser, 
contributed greatly to the recognition of the right of privacy. Today, we are dealing 
with computer technology moving beyond the current scope and understanding of 
existing statutes. In their day Warren and Brandeis were confronted with similar 
issues—expanding the understanding needed to craft/broaden statutes to 
accommodate new technology. It is therefore quite important to revisit this seminal 
law review article and follow Warren and Brandeis’s lines of reasoning so that we 
may apply their thinking to today’s quandaries and dilemmas. 
When our nation began, the law only provided legal remedy for actual 
“physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis”56 Warren 
and Brandeis believed that the concept that the “individual [should] have full 
protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law.”57 They 
also state that it is necessary “from time to time to define anew the exact nature and 
extent of such protection.”58 Warren and Brandeis were attempting to lay a 
foundation to allow the existing legal philosophy to grow to accommodate changing 
circumstances and specifics. “Gradually, the scope of these legal rights broadened 
and, now, the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life—the right to be let 
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the 
55 William C. Bier. (1980). Privacy: A vanishing value? New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 
page 93. 
>6 Warren and Brandeis at 193. 
57 Warren and Brandeis at 193. 
58 Warren and Brandeis at 193. 
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term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well 
as tangible.”59 
The Right to Privacy of the Modern Dav 
Uses of new technologies raise policy issues that are often defined in terms of 
invasion of privacy.60 
A problem in legislating policy to define and protect privacy is that it is 
difficult to conceptualize privacy. Authors of philosophical and legal works about 
privacy emphasize that their subject is difficult to define.61 Alan Westin’s book 
Privacy and Freedom begins: “Few values so fundamental to society as privacy have 
been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such vague and 
confused writing by social scientists.”62 Judith Jarvis Thompson’s article “The Right 
to Privacy” opens: “Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that 
nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.”63 Similarly, C. Herman 
Pritchett, in his forward to David O’ Brien’s book Privacy. Law, and Public Policy 
states: “Privacy is a confusing and complicated idea.”64 “These difficulties in 
conceptualizing privacy not only are of philosophical importance but also have 
profound implications for the formulation of public policy to protect privacy .”65 In 
the American tradition, there are “two types of rights—civil liberties and civil rights. 
Privacy is defined as a civil liberty—a right to be free of outside interference,”66 or as 
59 Warren and Brandeis at 193. 
60 Priscilla M. Regan, (1995). Privacy, technology, and public policy. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, page 2. 
61 Regan, page 3. 
62 Alan Westin. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York: Anthenum Press, page 3. 
63 Judith Jarvis Thompson. (1995, Summer). The right to privacy. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs. 4(4). page 4. 
64 David M. O’Brien. (1979). Privacy, law, and public policy. New York: Praeger, page 
vii. 
65 Regan, page 4. 
66 Regan, page 5. 
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Berlin terms it, a “negative liberty.”67 Vincent Samar also makes the point that “legal 
privacy is a species of negative freedom.”68 
Defining a problem in terms of rights has been a potential resource for many 
issues civil rights, women’s right, rights of the disabled-but these issues involve 
rights to some benefit of status and are defined not in terms of an atomistic individual 
but an individual as a member of a group.69 Because privacy is seen as an individual 
interest and choice, ambiguities about its meaning exist. It is assumed that different 
people define privacy differently. Tien notes that “[p]rivacy can be a huge can of 
worms .. .analyzing it as a conceptual problem .. .often becomes a mess of conflicting 
statements that everyone agrees on.”70 
Privacy, among other things, is a benchmark when dealing with search and 
seizure processes. Understanding the issue of search and seizure is also critical when 
attempting to develop an understanding of on-line computer networks, because 
search and seizure occupies an antithetical legal position71 to privacy. 
A number of advocacy groups have been formulated to address electronic 
issues. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),72 the Computer Professionals for 
67 Isaiah Berlin, Two concepts of liberty, in Four essays on liberty. (1969). London: Oxford 
University Press, page 118-172. 
68 Vincent Samar, (1993). The right to privacy: Gavs. lesbians, and the constitution. 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, page 53. 
69 Regan, page 4. 
70 Lee Tien (personal e-mail, March 17, 1996). 
71 John M. Junker. The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection. 
79 Crim. L. & Criminology 1105, 1177 (1989) (The Fourth Amendment balances and individual’s 
claim to privacy against society’s need to control crime or to generally its right to ‘know’). Also see. 
Jones v. United States. 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (Adopted the rule that the person challenging the 
legality of a search and seizure must have been a “victim.”); Rankas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 
(Tightened the Jones ruling to require that a person have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the 
area searched or the material seized). 
72 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was founded in July of 1990 to ensure that the 
principles embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are protected as new communications 
technologies emerge. EFF’s AUP archives are located at http://www.efiF.org/policy. 
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Social Responsibility (CPSR),73 and on a smaller scale, the National Center for 
Technology Planning74 maintain a compendia of AUPs and AUP related documents 
which provide an excellent starting point for research. The AUP documents located 
at these sites provide sources for investigation of the state of AUPs across the 
country. 
A preliminary review of these documents confirms the notion that AUPs have 
been, and continue to be, constructed based upon an outdated perception of the 
nature of an on-line computer network.75 There is a conspicuous lack of legal 
foundation (e.g., studies and discussions of Constitutional principles and laws, 
existing campus policy, and judicial decisions) in existing AUPs. Many of the AUP 
policy statements now being enacted look and feel as though they are legal. But upon 
examination they appear to lack substantive legal foundation. For example. Dr. Carl 
Kadie has overlaid a university’s AUP onto the rules of its real world campus, and 
wondered what an uproar there would be if the university rules paralleled the 
pronouncements within the AUP: 
* The University has the power to, without notice, inspect any assigned office 
space or dorm room. 
73 The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) was founded in 1981. The 
CPSR is a group of concerned computer scientists in Palo Alto, California, who worked to 
implement social responsibility among computer professionals by forming a discussion group and 
then a national network of computer professionals and users to advocate for the responsible use of 
computer technology and encourage all who use computer technology to participate in the public 
debate. 
74 The National Center for Technology Planning (not an agency of the federal government 
or any national organization) maintains a compendium of AUPs. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
http://www.scholastic.com. 
75 In past years, on-line computer systems were utilized for research by scientists. These 
scientists were very like-minded as to the uses and etiquette that were appropriate. More recently, 
on-line systems are being utilized by a highly diverse general-public. This usage by a diverse 
general public is generating a need for rules that reflect the real world. 
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* Members of the University community may NOT distribute or make accessible 
offensive or annoying material. 
* Members of the University community may be punished for infractions against 
rules that are NOT listed here. 
* Members of the University community must not “use University property,” where 
“mis-using University property” is defined as misusing University property. 
* The University has the power to “amend the Conditions and Policies at any time 
without prior notice.”76 
In addition, the concept of “University property”77 (as cited above) needs to 
be examined. Among other things, the concept itself is vague and overly broad. 
More generally, what is “at issue are the ‘authority-conferring’ concepts—misuse of 
property, for example—and the invasions of privacy that are prima facie justified by 
them.”78 
The due process79 aspect also appears to be faulty. For example, the 
University has reserved the power to “amend the Conditions and Policies at any time 
without prior notice.”80 This appears to strip an offender of the right to due process. 
It also appears to strip away the concept of publishing the rules so that the users may 
know the standards to which they will be held accountable. 
Search and Seizure Issues 
A public university AUP should also address search and seizure issues. There 
will be occasion for university officials to intrude into user accounts. Therefore, it is 
important for university officials to base their AUP on sound search and seizure 
theory as they may need to justify a ‘search’ or a ‘search and seizure’, or, they may 
76 Boston University AUP [Online]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.eff.org/ll 
/CAF/policies. Dr. Kadie has revised the BU AUP to read as though it were the policy for the real 
world campus. 
7 Carl Kadie (personal e-mail, July 1, 1996). 
78 Lee Tien (personal e-mail, March 17, 1996). 
79 Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Due Process does not have does not have a 
fixed meaning but it expands with jurisprudential attitudes of fundamental fairness). 
80 Boston University AUP [Online]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org/ll 
/CAF/policies. Dr. Kadie has revised the BU AUP to read as though it were the policy for the real 
world campus. 
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need to justify the basis upon which other disciplinary action is taken. Also such 
policy should strive to enforce itself by the least restrictive means possible. 
In recent years computer systems have been seized as evidence when only 
seizure of a copy of the offending material was in order.81 Absent an understanding of 
First Amendment and Fourth Amendment principles that are applicable to on-line 
computer networks, law enforcement officials have caused search warrants to be 
issued that are overly broad.82 
Kapor and Godwin warn of computer searches and seizures based upon the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section suggested search and 
seizure guidelines.83 They are concerned that the ABA’s position seems to be based 
upon three publications84 from the U.S. Department of Justice, which seem to skew 
the principles involved in searches and seizures toward law enforcement’s position 
instead of providing a balance between the public’s right to know and the individual’s 
right to have privacy. 
Commenting further upon this issue, Kapor and Godwin note that the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section suggested search and 
seizure guidelines are faulty because: 
81 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 101(3) holds that an “original” can be “any print-out or other output 
readable by sight [and] shown to reflect the data accurately,” which has been taken from a “computer 
or similar device.” 
82 Dibbell. (1990, July 24). On line and out of bounds. Village Voice, page 27; Jahnke. 
(1990. November 14). The cops come to cyberspace. Boston Magazine; John P. Barlow. (1990). 
Crime and puzzlement [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications 
/John_Perry_Barlow/crime_and_puzzlement.l. See also, Randolph S. Sergent. Note: A Fourth 
Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (May, 1995). 
83 Mitchell Kapor and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line], Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.efif.org/pub/Publications/Mike_Godwin 
/searchandseizureguidelines.eff. 
84 J. McEwan. (1989). Dedicated computer crime units. Washington, DC: National Institute 
of Justice.; D. Parker. (1989). Computer crime: Criminal justice resource manual. Washington. DC: 
National Institute of Justice; C. Conly. (1989). Organizing for computer crime investigation and 
prosecution. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
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There was no guidance to the magistrate as to when the computer or 
related equipment should not be seized, either because it is not necessary as 
evidence or because such a seizure would intolerably “chill” the lawful exercise of 
First Amendment rights or abridge a property owner’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
There was inadequate recognition of the business or individual computer 
owner’s interest in continuing with lawful commercial business, which might be 
hindered or halted by the seizure of an expensive computer. 
There was no effort to measure the likelihood that investigators would 
find computers equipped with such justice-obstructing measures as automatic 
erasure software or ‘degausser’ booby-trapped hardware, the presence of which 
might justify a ‘no-knock’ search and seizure, among other responses.85 
One difficulty is that law enforcement agencies have only attempted to discern 
what the misuses of a computer are. This creates a situation where law enforcement 
agencies do not routinely recognize First and Fourth Amendment significance of on¬ 
line computer networks and other forms of electronic speech and publishing. The 
resulting problem is that there is a tendency to issue broad search and seizure 
warrants. Warrants issued based on this line of thought can, in the long term, abridge 
a person’s First Amendment rights. 
Sergent notes that there is still a compelling need to formulate a search and 
seizure model for computer networks to protect privacy. He states that a question 
“of user privacy arises when examining [a search] warrant’s scope. Search warrants 
should be restricted to the files under investigation. A warrant’s scope should not 
allow invasion of privacy interests of individuals...”86 
85 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.efif.org/pub/Publications/Mike_Godwin 
/searchandseizureguidelines.eff. 
86 See generally. Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer 
Networks and Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (May, 1995). Also see. Terri Cutrera, Note. The 
Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights of Computer Use. 60 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 139 
(1991). 
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To add to the blurring of the legal landscape, there are a number of gaps in 
statutes created by the technology itself. This is evident where there is no applicable 
statute, or there are conflicting statutes.87 For example, in LaMacchia88 “the question 
of whether the defendant had in fact committed any crime at all turned out to be a 
difficult [question] for authorities to answer.”89 LaMacchia’s attorney, Harvey A. 
Silverglate stated that: “The government attempts to assert control over this 
burgeoning thing called the Internet [from time to time] ... [and] spasmodically 
overreacts in order to set an example, to deter behavior the government doesn’t 
like,”90 which then leads to misapplication of the law. 
To compound the lack of clarity and definition on the computer-legal frontier, 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act91 (CD A) as part of the 
telecommunications reform bill in February 1996. The CD A would have imposed 
huge fines and prison terms on anyone who sends or displays ‘indecent’ or ‘patently 
offensive’ material in a public forum on the Internet. There was a challenge to the 
87 David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto 
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (And Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?. 38 
Villanova L. Rev. 487. 488 (1993). 
88 United States v. David M. LaMacchia. Criminal No. 94-10092RGS, March 1994. 
89 Mike Godwin. (1995, March). No copycat criminal: LaMacchia case reveals a federal 
attitude problem. Internet World. Available as of July 1, 1996: http.//swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095 
/readings-crime. html#Required 
90 Harvey A. Silverglate, Silverglate, Harvey A. (1994, December 24). Statement of 
Silverglate and Good concerning the dismissal of the indictment in United States v. David M, 
LaMacchia. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles 
/dml/lamacchia. html. 
91 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C § 151 (1996). 
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law,92 and in June of 1996 a special three judge panel in Philadelphia ruled the CD A 
unconstitutional. Currently this issue is headed to the Supreme Court for resolution. 
The lack of understanding as to the nature of on-line computer networks is 
seen at the state level also. Easterbrook notes that “[ejrror in legislation is common, 
and never more so than when technology is galloping forward.”93 In New York, for 
example, the state legislature is considering the passage of telecommunications 
legislation which seems to ignore fundamental Constitutional issues.94 
Law is a process that is oriented around working with information. As new modes 
of working with information emerge, the law cannot be expected to function or to 
be viewed in the same manner as it was in an era in which print was the primary 
communications medium. Nor can the law be expected to support the same 
symbols and metaphors.95 Not only the seamless web, but “fine print,” “black 
letter law,” “law on the books,” “going by the book,” and other print based 
92 The ACLU, the CPSR and 19 other plaintiffs have initiated a lawsuit to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) on grounds that it flagrantly suppresses 
First Amendment rights. A Federal court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on Feb. 8, 1996 
barring the enforcement of part of the CDA. The court stated that the CDA will have a chilling 
effect on free speech on the Internet and found that the CDA raises “serious, substantial, difficult and 
doubtful questions.” The court further agreed that the CDA is “unconstitutionally vague” as to the 
prosecution for indecency. 
93 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. Paper 
presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace, 
Chicago, Illinois. 
94 Update on New York State Bill. (1996, February 18). BillWatch. Available as of July 1, 
1996: http://www.vtw.org/billwatch (New York Internet, a business oriented Internet Service 
Provider in New York state, suggested that New York State Internet bill (S210/A3 967) was poorly 
drafted as it had major Constitutional flaws and conflicted with existing statutes. The major 
problems were: a. inappropriate liability for Internet providers, b. criminalization of speech that is 
currently legal in print, and, c. no mention of the plethora of parental control tools). 
95 Milner S. Ball. (1985). Lying down together: Law, metaphor and theology. Madison. WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, page 21-36. The author suggests that current metaphors of law as 
bulwark of freedom promote “order” rather than “justice.” 
Many metaphors have been offered in attempts to capture the nature and meaning of an on¬ 
line computer network. An on-line computer network is analogous to many familiar real-life 
metaphors, not just to one. It is analogous to a: newspaper, republisher/disseminator, common 
carrier (e.g., telephone company), traditional bulletin board (the wood and cork type), broadcaster, 
desk at the office, desk at home in the den, free and open frontier (a.k.a. The Old West of the 1800s), 
safe deposit box in a bank, hotel/motel room which one has rented, fratemity/sorority house. 
Depending on which metaphor is invoked, the legal perspective of a computer account will vary 
greatly. 
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expressions will be replaced by allusions that are more consistent with the qualities 
of law and information in electronic form.96 
In addition to the gaps being created by this new on-line electronic technology 
a legal and ethical blurring is occurring due to the lack of consensus among the 
various stakeholders as to what legal metaphors97 apply. 
Perritt notes that: “In the long run, adoption of information technologies 
will blur the boundaries between citizen and agency and between agency and 
court. Blurring of these boundaries may necessitate rethinking the definitions 
of some of the basic events that define the administrative process, public 
participation and judicial review.”98 
Presently, for example, “the balance between speakers’ rights and listeners' 
privacy interests depends largely on how courts conceptualize the forum in which the 
speech takes place.”99 If the Information Superhighway is regarded as analogous to 
public space then First Amendment principles evident outside of the electronic media 
suggest that the burden may be on users of the information superhighway to avoid 
unwanted messages by electronically averting their eyes.100 In other words, accessing 
96 Ethan Katsh. (1995). Law in a digital world. New York: Oxford University Press, page 
406. 
97 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, page 139. “ [MJetaphors are capable of giving us a new understanding of our 
experiences. Thus we can give new meaning to our past, to our daily activity, and to what we know 
and believe.” Also see. James B. White, The legal imagination, page 57-64. “As [the lawyer] works 
on an antitrust or criminal appeal, the lawyer may say to himself that what he is doing and saying 
really means something else . . . The activity of law can be spoken [of] in other terms.” 
98 Henry A. Perritt Jr., The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of 
Administrative Law, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 79 (1992). 
99 Note. The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
100 Laurence Tribe, American constitutional law. 
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the information superhighway may be analogous to walking onto a city street, and 
computer network users may be expected to cope with the wide array of 
entertainment, annoyance, and offensive acts that normally takes place in the real 
world, or, it may be deemed to be analogous to one’s home which would shift the 
burden away from the viewer. 
There is also a lack of familiarity with that place known as cyberspace. This 
lack of mature experience during this period of development introduces yet another 
complicating factor in the rapidly evolving nature of the environment. For example, 
commercial transactions are being transplanted onto this electronic medium that is 
basically focused on communication. The question is arising as to whether the 
medium imbues commercial activities with First Amendment or any other 
Constitutional protections. “That is, if a non-First Amendment activity such as a bank 
transaction occurs over a communications medium, is the First Amendment 
implicated?”101 The Internet, or as it has become known, Information 
Superhighway102 is blurring the distinctions with which we have become familiar.103 
Interactivity will make it difficult to differentiate the transaction from speech that 
101 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corn, v. Public Serv. Comm’n. 447 U.S. 557,564 
(1980). 
102 Information Superhighway is a term initially popularized by then-Senator Albert Gore. 
See Albert Gore, (1990, July 15). Networking the future: We need a national “superhighway” for 
computer information. Washington Post, page B3. 
103 Other changes in the economy are likely to put added pressure on the distinction between 
speech and economic transactions. In particular, the growing importance of information as a 
commodity that is bought and sold may raise First Amendment concerns in the context of economic 
transactions. 
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concerns the transaction.104 To the extent that these two activities become 
indistinguishable, courts may have to apply at least a minimal First Amendment 
standard to activities that were previously clearly outside the reach of the First 
Amendment.105 The speech-conduct distinction may therefore result in blurring of 
economic activities as well as of expressive ones. 
Bruce Sterling states that: “Cyberspace demand[s] a new set of metaphors, 
rules and behaviors.”106 During the time while legal scholars and legislatures explore, 
study and eventually enact legislation, the university should account for this lack of 
statutory guidance. The legislatures and the courts may decide to enact legislation or 
view cases in such a manner that, de facto, the university will be charged with the task 
of defining foundational doctrine which defines their AUP. 
In addition, a current-day AUP should define the computer user’s rights and 
responsibilities to the system itself, to other users, and to the administrators of that 
system. The AUP should also define the administration’s rights and responsibilities to 
the system itself, and to the users of that system. It appears that this may be a 
responsibility which should be represented in the AUP, rather than a judicial concern. 
As a result, the university AUP, among other things, may need to embody legal 
104 Although home shopping channels exist today, the degree of intermingling of 
commercial speech and activity is considerably different. These channels in effect advertise the 
product and allow the consumer to buy almost immediately. The transaction itself, however, occurs 
through another medium—the telephone. This provides at least an initial dividing line between the 
commercial speech and the actual transaction. 
105 Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140, 1154 (1994) (“In recent 
years, it has become evident that information is becoming one of the most important items of 
commerce, or more broadly, of production, exchange, and consumption, so that constitutional 
protection for liberty of expression and information may be the route by which once again the 
Constitution is invoked to protect broad lines of economic activity from government regulation.’’) 
106 Bruce Sterling. (1995). The hacker crackdown. New York: Bantam Books, page 208. 
30 
Current practice in crafting the AUP should be directed to accommodate: 
• a concern for the human interactions which occur on the 
computer system, 
• the software’s capabilities to manage those interactions, and, 
• the applicable Constitutional concepts, laws, and judicial 
opinions. 
These concerns translate into Acceptable Use Policy frameworks, which 
among other things, are intended: 
(1) to educate the University community to the opportunities and obligations 
inherent in a pervasive digital networked environment, and (2) to make 
information as accessible and useful as possible to the University’s various 
constituencies. These goals can be met only if the individual units are guided by a 
consistent philosophical framework for establishing policies and practices.107 
Summary 
Technological change often outpaces the law. Examining the legal implications of 
emerging technologies can help narrow this gap. Although the precise contours of 
the new media technologies are not yet known, certain radical evolutions in the 
way we receive, transmit, and utilize information have already become apparent.108 
The possibilities engendered by the Information Superhighway will evolve in 
many ways. “Two evolutions—infinite choices and interactivity—will have profound 
impact”109 on, inter alia, the need to revisit Constitutional issues in order to reassess 
their application to user policy issues. This reality is beginning to impact federal 
legislators. This is a positive event and we can look forward to a coherent national 
policy regarding the nature of cyberspace. But until that time, those who must create 
107 William Graves, Carol Jenkins and Anne Parker. (1995, Summer). Development of an 
information policy framework. Cause/Effect, page 15. 
108 Note. The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). See generally, Anne M. Fulton, Cyberspace 
and the Internet: Who Will Be The Privacy Police?, 3 Comm. Law Conspectus 63 (1995). 
109 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
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their application to user policy issues. This reality is beginning to impact federal 
legislators. This is a positive event and we can look forward to a coherent national 
policy regarding the nature of cyberspace. But until that time, those who must create 
institutional Acceptable Use Policy should develop their own understanding of what 
constitutes fair and equitable policy in this environment which has warped our sense 
of the law. 
Harvard law professor and Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe posed this 
question: “When the lines along which our Constitution is drawn warp or vanish, 
what happens to the Constitution itself?”110 A possible answer to Professor Tribe’s 
question is: ‘As a blurring of legal definition occurs, a university should identify and 
revisit the basic conceptual issues inherent in an AUP.’ And, a root concept appears 
to be that of the right to privacy. 
Privacy is a major issue of our day. As Smith states: “There seems to be no 
legal issue today that cuts so wide a swath through conflicts confronting American 
society [as Privacy]. From AIDS tests to wiretaps, polygraph tests to computerized 
data bases, the common denominator has been whether the right to privacy outweighs 
other concerns of society . . .”m A Louis Harris poll (figure 3) supports the position 
that Privacy, the root of a number of present issues, is a significant concern of the 
American people. 
110 Laurence H. Tribe. (1991, March). The Constitution in cyberspace: Law and liberty 
beyond the electronic frontier. Keynote address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and 
Privacy, Boston, MA. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles 
/tribe-constitution, txt. 
111 Robert Ellis Smith. Quoted in Andre Bacard. (1995). The computer privacy handbook. 
Berkeley, CA: Peachpit Press, page 17. 
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Percentage of US Public Concerned with 'Privacy' 
1970 1977 1983 1990 1993 
Figure 3 - 1993 Louis Harris Poll regarding Public Perception of Privacy1 u 
Drawing models of privacy and search and seizure with the intent of applying 
them to Acceptable Use Policies may not be realistically possible.113 Easterbrook114 
and de Sola Pool115 suggest that looking to our legal system for guidance is not yet 
112 A 1993 poll conducted by Louis Harris and Associates. Also see. The Equifax Report on 
Consumers in the Information Age, conducted by Louis Harris Associates and Dr. Alan Westin 
(1990); and Equifax Inc., Harris-Equifax Consumer Privacy Survey 1991 and Harris-Equifax 
Consumer Privacy Survey 1992. The question posed in all these surveys was — “How concerned are 
you about threats to your personal privacy in America today?” The graph reflects those respondents 
who indicated that they were either ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’. 
113 David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto 
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should WpLet Our Cc^^ence (And f|for Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 
Villanova L. Rev. 487, 488 (1993). 
1,4 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. Paper 
presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace, 
Chicago, Illinois. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www-law.lib.uchicago.edu /forum 
/easterbrook. doc. 
115 Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1983). Technologies of freedom. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
page 7. 
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possible. The legal community is still in the process of analyzing the phenomenon 
known as cyberspace. They are in the process of setting doctrine which will legally 
define actions in cyberspace. Even with clear legal foundational guidance from the 
legislature and the courts, there may be specific concerns that will not be addressed by 
courts examining privacy and other Constitutional questions, but which will apply to 
the development of Acceptable Use Policies. 
There is a need for universities to craft local rules for a computer network. It 
may also be a compelling reason for universities to craft their own AUP, because the 
AUP may, even for public institutions, “boil down to a matter of contract”116 as they 
are in private institutions. Thus universities should research the issue of privacy as it 
applies to on-line computer systems. Even if an Acceptable Use Policy is eventually 
deemed to be a contract, there still remains a need to base the AUP upon the same 
concepts which are inherent in the U.S. Constitution. 
116 Daniel Burk (personal e-mail, April 6, 1996). 
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CHAPTER HI 
THE RESEARCH METHOD 
In the formulation of policy it is critical that the policy provide for security 
and access to information and communication while ensuring that the resource use 
does not overburden the system’s capabilities. These conflicting demands must be 
analyzed and a synthesis arrived at. 117 
Introduction 
In Chapter II, the review of the literature provided evidence that there exists a 
lack of clarity in regard to a number of legal rights when dealing with networked 
computer systems. Many existing and proposed statutes and AUPs are vague and 
overly broad. There also appeared to be a lack of a common understanding of the 
basic nature of an online computer network. This dissertation focused upon what the 
author considered to be a key foundational factor in the construction of an Acceptable 
Use Policy, that being the determination of the scope and meaning of user privacy. 
Many of the issues inherent in the broader fabric of privacy (e.g., false light) 
do not appear to have immediate relevance on the issue of this study. But it is 
important to review them to gain an understanding of what the concept of privacy is 
and what it is not—and how these issues might be relevant to the formulation of an 
AUP, and how it might not be relevant. 
117 CAUSE Current Issues Committee. (1995, Summer). Current issues for higher education 
information resources management. Cause/Effect. Page 5. 
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The review of literature in Chapter II addressed the general right to privacy as 
defined by a line of decisions from the Supreme Court,118 and also brought forth 
issues having to do with informational privacy. While informational privacy (having 
control of who can and cannot have access to information about one’s bank accounts, 
pharmaceutical purchases, reading habits) is a very important issue, this study did not 
focus directly upon it. This formative research study did not focus upon the 
constitutional right of privacy which the Supreme Court has held to protect such 
activities as the use of contraceptives and the right to abortion. Rather, it focused 
upon a more narrow aspect of the notion privacy, and did address the right to privacy 
in the sense of one’s right to have control over his/her computer account. This study 
also scrutinized the issues inherent in the rights that the system administrators have to 
invade the privacy of a user. 
Overview 
The research method utilized in this dissertation is not a traditional one. 
Neither an opinion survey nor a random sample is appropriate. In order to answer 
the questions inherent in this dissertation it is necessary to turn to a legal model of 
research. The legal model of research involves a careful review of statutes, law 
reviews, other scholarly legal publications, and on-line legal conferences. 
118 Although the term privacy is not mentioned in the US Constitution, it has been defined 
by the Supreme Court, through the years, in a line of decisions. The Court has held in Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create ‘zones of privacy’. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First 
Amendment is one...”); See also. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972) (The Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, ... the Court has recognized 
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Assumptions/Research Questions 
This dissertation attempted to determine the impact of certain aspects of the 
interpretation of the right to privacy to the formulation of an instutition’s Acceptable 
Use Policy. The following questions and assumptions have been assessed: 
1. The content of, and issues addressed by, existing Acceptable Use Policies. 
2. The nature and philosophy of current AUP. 
3. Current trends of thought on the part of legal scholars, law enforcement 
officials and advocacy groups. 
4. The balancing of a computer user’s right to privacy on a computer system 
with the university’s right to insure the computer system functions 
properly. 
Limitations of the Study 
Privacy can be a huge can of worms ... analyzing it as a conceptual problem ... 
often becomes a mess of conflicting statements that everyone agrees on.119 
In all probability, the most important limitation of this study is the likelihood 
that the contours of the Internet and campus computer systems will not remain as 
they are today. Mark Luker, NSFNet Program Director, has stated that there will be 
an “Internet II” which will have greatly increased capability to perform tasks far 
beyond those of which the current Internet NSF is capable. Luker indicates that 
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution.) 
119 Lee Tien (personal e-mail. March 17, 1996). 
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Internet II” will be far more interactive (video and audio interactivity), and, in the 
not to distant future, will be as ubiquitous as cable television is now.120 
A possible source of difficulty in this study could be in the author’s 
interpretation of certain statutes and/or case law. Even the most renowned legal and 
constitutional scholars do not all agree on the meaning, intent, or transferability of 
legal principles and case law. Therefore, the author’s conclusions, which flow from 
those legal documents, analyses, discussions, and research/law review articles could 
be opened to other interpretations. 
The contours of the author’s opinions and conclusions may be altered by 
statutes and court decisions, as for example, “the balance between speakers’ rights 
and listeners’ privacy interests depends largely on how courts conceptualize the forum 
in which the speech takes place.”121 If, for example, the Information Superhighway is 
considered analogous to a public space,122 then First Amendment principles suggest 
that the burden may be on users of the information superhighway to avoid unwanted 
messages by electronically averting their eyes.123 
Depending upon the nature of Supreme Court or Congressional action(s), the 
shape of AUPs may not be in agreement with this study. For example, the 
120 Mark Luker (Interviewee). (1996, August 17). The future of the Internet. Washington 
journal fTelevisionl. Atlanta, GA: Turner Network News, Inc. 
121 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
122 Public space here is not meant to be synonymous with public forum. Public space refers 
to space in which the public is relatively free to move about and interact, such as the courthouse in 
Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In order to be a public forum, public space must also have 
been traditionally open to all for expressive activities. See Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a 
Public Forum?: Computer Bulletin Boards. Free Speech, and State Action, 81 Geo. L. J. 409, 419-28. 
123 Laurence Tribe. American constitutional law (2d ed.). Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 
page 1077. 
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Communications Decency Act (CD A) is contrary to the thinking of most legal 
scholars—parts of the CD A may even be contrary to the Constitution itself While a 
Philadelphia federal circuit court has declared the CDA to be unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court may reverse this decision. A Supreme Court reversal of the 
Philadelphia court’s decision would cause a radical reshaping in the legal landscape of 
the Internet and university computer networks in regard to, inter alia, indecency. 
Another possible difficult with this study is that the issue of privacy may not 
be as critical an issue in regard to the formulation of a university’s AUP as the author 
has postulated. 
The Methodology 
By interrogating Lexis/Nexis with appropriate keywords and Boolean 
searches an attempt was made to survey the “lay of the land”124 by examining law 
review articles and other scholarly publications pertinent to AUPs, privacy, and search 
and seizure. 
Also, a general investigation of the state of Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) 
across the country was conducted by searching web servers and ftp archives which 
contain collections of AUPs and AUP critiques. 
This author explored the larger environment in which an AUP exists, since it is 
consequential to the development of an AUP to evolve a perspective of overarching 
issues which impact the use of networked computers (e.g. privacy issues, right of 
124 Nancy P. Johnson, Robert C. Berring and Thomas A. Woxland. Winning research skills 
(2nd ed. 1993). 
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access, freedom of speech, right of the administration to insure that someone does not 
break the system). 
There was a subsequent focus on an exploration of a number of factors which 
the author considers important influences on the development of an understanding of 
the on-line environment in which privacy exists. It was essential to this study to 
research: 
• the roots of the term privacy, 
• privacy as a practical matter in the real world of today, 
• philosophical issues surrounding privacy, 
• privacy laws and judicial opinions concerning privacy in 
Massachusetts, 
• existing Federal privacy-related statutes, 
• privacy and the elements and requisites of liability, 
• selected cases and statutes which map privacy decisions and statutes 
onto computer network issues, and, 
• privacy in our electronic society. 
The Fourth Amendment, which addresses the issue of search and seizure, 
impacts privacy as it, de facto,125 forbids unreasonable invasion of that right to 
125 This only applies to public institutions as they are considered to be government actors. 
Private institutions are not included. 
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privacy. Therefore, the next phase of this study researched the nature of search and 
seizure. This was appropriate, as privacy and search and seizure occupy antithetical 
legal positions. 
Kapor and Godwin1-6 have stated that there appears to be immature search 
and seizure guidance from the courts, and from legislative bodies. Pursuant to Kapor 
and Godwin’s statements, it is appropriate to survey the foundation issues involved in 
search and seizure. This study will: 
1. investigate privacy and possessory rights, 
2. investigate search and investigate seizure, 
3. investigate existing statutes and opinions regarding search and seizure 
in an on-line computer network, and 
4. examine the concept of a reasonable expectation of Privacy in an on¬ 
line computer network. 
The primary sources of data for this study were: 
• Corpus Juris Secundum. 
• American Jurisprudence 2d. 
• Lexis/Nexis 
These legal resources contain state legal reporters, regional legal reporters. 
Supreme Court reporters, and numerous law journals. 
The author also researched: 
• relevant government documents, 
• testimony before Congress and other agencies. 
126 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Mike_Godwin 
/searchandseizureguidelines.eff. 
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The on-line resources of a number of other organizations were also 
interrogated for appropriate material. These sites included: 
• the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
• the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
• the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), 
• ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center), and, 
• DIALOG (Dissertation Abstracts On-line). 
This study provides a primer into principles of privacy and of search and 
seizure (and due process) that apply to AUPs by addressing the question: “How do 
privacy aspects of the First and Fourth Amendments impact the formulation of 
Acceptable Use Policy for an on-line computer network?” It is also important to 
explore the ways in which the answers to this question will be articulated in a 
university AUP. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RESEARCH 
Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and 
the common law. in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society ... now 
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life—and right to be let alone; 
the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 
“property” has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as 
tangible.127 
Introduction 
Chapter II presented the views and opinions of scholars, law reviews, and 
special interest/advocacy groups. This chapter will present the ministrations of the 
judiciary and the Congress which may apply to Acceptable Use Policies and/or 
address the positions put forth in Chapter II. As a number of the issues are still being 
debated, this chapter will also attempt to provide a measure of objectivity to the 
various positions on the issues. 
An Overview 
The rapid advance and wide acceptance of computers and computer networks 
has spawned many contentious issues. The essential conflicts are between the 
individual user and the system’s administration, and between the individual user and 
various law enforcement agencies. Universities and government agencies have acted 
to establish law to address the number of situations created by computer networks. 
These efforts might consist of some kind of vaguely stated policy which would then 
be enforced on a case-by-case basis. 
127 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 
193 (1890). 
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The needs of society change with the increased use of and progress in technology. 
With the invention of the telephone and computer, communication has reached a 
new height in celebrity. Given enough resources and money, time no longer factors 
in as a constraint in gathering and distributing information. Along with the 
increase in the speed of communicating, the efficiency and ease of obtaining 
information also have increased. The tendency towards an information based 
society raises new issues that need to be resolved. One of those issues, privacy 
rights, demands our attention and resolution.128 
As shown in a previous chapter, there has been a dramatic increase in the U.S. 
public’s concern with privacy.129 “In spite of the growing concern, response by the 
Congress has been lackluster.”130 
The American concern with the right to privacy appears to stem from efforts 
to define acceptable limitation on the amount of information concerning another 
which a person can acquire and distribute.131 It appears that this is a sound 
assumption upon which to base the concern for the loss of privacy. The reasons for 
this rapid growth in a concern for privacy may include the revelations of the 
Watergate Hearings, or any number of other events. However, the vehicle for these 
events has been, and continues to be, technology. “With swift changes in technology, 
the public can no longer take privacy for granted.”132 Because less constraint on 
obtaining information about an individual by advancing telecommunication 
128 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996. March 26). 
Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.tscm.com/full-text.html. 
129 See Figure 3. and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. (1986). Federal 
government information technology: Electronic record systems and individual privacy. (Office of 
Technology Publication No. OTA-CIT-296). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
page 26-27. 
130 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
131 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line], 
132 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line], 
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technology diminishes the degree of privacy an individual may enjoy, advancements in 
telecommunications provoke fear from the public. Therefore, with progressive 
technology, an explicit right to privacy should be defined and widely disseminated so 
that the public can understand what the ‘ground rules’ are and act accordingly. 
Unlike other constitutional rights where the courts interpreted explicitly defined 
rights, the right to privacy struggled to attain the status of a constitutional right 
because the courts and legislature defined and shaped the right to privacy 
according to the public’s reactions to changes in the society. As can be seen 
through the rise of cases from Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company to 
Roe v. Wade, the court grappled with the problem of being in the position of 
defining what has been an implicit right explicitly. The fact that legislative actions 
have been reactive instead of progressive compounded the difficulty of anchoring 
any lucid privacy rights firmly into our society. Detailed examination of some of 
the privacy invasion issues in rapidly changing telecommunication technology will 
demonstrate that the right to privacy cannot continue to be defined by capricious 
approach.133 
The Role of Privacy in Our Lives 
Let there be space in your togetherness.134 
Privacy was not given to us in the same manner that our common law was - it 
did not come from England.135 Frequently referred to as, “The American Tort,” 
privacy was bom in a law review article by Louis Brandeis and John Warren, 
published in 1890,136 which advocated that we should adjust our customs, metaphors 
and rules to account for that which can intrude on our basic right “to be let alone.”137 
133 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
134 Kahlil Gibran. (1923). The prophet. New York: Phoenix Press. 
135 Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy, 3 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 325 
(1983). 
136 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 
(1890). 
137 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy at 195. 
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Modern technology has accentuated existing problems, and created other concerns 
regarding privacy. Computer use has resulted in tremendous improvements in the 
processing and accessibility of information, which was always available, but which 
was previously protected by logistical barriers. One had to be physically where the 
information was stored to access it. Today, such personal information as credit 
records, bank records, insurance information, and criminal data are readily available 
from both governmental and private sources, and physical presence at the site of 
storage is no longer required.138 
Accordingly, issues of informational privacy arise with increasing frequency, and 
the capabilities of the technology present new challenges in balancing the utility of 
sharing personal information against the value of individual privacy. As more 
information becomes available, a natural conflict develops between those who want 
access to information and those who want to protect it. Each of us wants 
information about others, but we desire to keep private the information about 
ourselves, except where it suits our purpose to disclose portions of it. The power to 
limit the availability of personal information may be the heart of privacy, although 
surely it frustrates public curiosity.139 
Roots of the Term Privacy 
Privacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognized than described.140 
The British scholar Raymond Williams has traced the root of the term privacy 
to the Latin word privatus, which means to withdraw from public life, and/or to have 
seclusion from the public.141 
138 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. (1986). Federal government 
information technology: Electronic record systems and individual privacy. (Office of Technology 
Publication No. OTA-CIT-296). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
139 Justice Society (Committee on Privacy). (1983). Privacy and the law. London: Fontana 
Paperbacks. 
140 Young, John B. (1978). Privacy. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
141 Raymond Williams. (1976). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. London: 
Fontana Press, page 203. 
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The modern day “Right of Privacy” is a “generic term encompassing various 
rights recognized ... to be ‘inherent in the concept of ordered liberty’...including 
protection from governmental indifference.”142 This right is not an absolute one, 
and does not apply to conduct that may be harmful to other individuals or to society. 
Privacy in Our Public Society 
The so-called right of privacy is, as the phrase suggests, founded upon the claim 
that a man has the right to pass through this world, if he wills, without having his 
business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written up for the benefit 
of others, or his eccentricities commented upon either in handbills, circulars, 
catalogues, periodicals or newspapers.143 
In Paradise Lost.144 John Milton discussed the concept of privacy but went 
beyond the personal aspects. “Paradise Lost is about the loss of Eden, the loss of 
142 The Right of Privacy is a general right to be left alone. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). The Right of Privacy is a “generic term encompassing various rights recognized ... to 
be ‘inherent in the concept of ordered liberty’ ... including protection from governmental 
indifference.” Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board. 540 S.W.2d 
668, 679 (1976). The four forms of invasion of privacy are unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, 
appropriation of name or likeness, unreasonable publicity given to a person’s private life, and 
placing another in false light before the public.” 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 488. 
Privacy is also a right to “live life free from unwarranted publicity.” Harms v. Miami Daily News. 
127 So.2d 715, 716 (1961). Although the term privacy is not mentioned in the US Constitution, it 
has been defined by the Supreme Court, through the years, in a line of decisions. The Court has held 
in: Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ([S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 
Various guarantees create ‘zones of privacy’. The right of association contained in the penumbra of 
the First Amendment is one ...); See also. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1972) (The Constitution does 
not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however.... the Court has 
recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution. This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.). 
143 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.. 171 N.Y. 538, 544 (1902) (The court found 
that the theory was too broad to be enforced and suggested that the legislature could enact statutes so 
that “the rule would be applicable only to cases provided for by the statute.” In response, the New 
York legislative body enacted Section 50 and 51 of New York Civil Rights Law recognizing the right 
of privacy.) 
144 John Milton. (1987). Paradise lost New York: Chelsea House, pl56. 
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innocence, and the loss of privacy.”145 Arnold Stein’s reflection of Milton’s epic 
message is important as it provides insight into ‘private life’: 
Related (to the known cultural history of Gan Eden) is the occasional human 
yearning for peace and quiet, for an impossibly ideal Arcadia where wilderness 
may be thought paradise snow; or there is the desire to withdraw from 
complexity, from ‘the fury and mire of human veins, ‘to withdraw even, 
especially, from the self and its involvement’s ...146 
Hixson notes that “the terrible irony in man’s ageless search for solitude and 
seclusion, the paradise that is inevitably lost and the privacy that is so temporary [is] 
nearly always invaded.”147 And little did the inhabitants of the Garden of Eden 
realize that their privacy and solitude would be invaded, first by Satan, and then by 
the Archangel Michael, who, (in the final scene of Paradise Lost) instructs them to 
leave. Milton4 s account of the first experience with the loss of privacy thus concludes: 
The World was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide: 
They went hand in hand with wandering steps and slow, 
Through Eden took their solitary way.148 
Many early civilizations have been characterized by the place and meaning of 
privacy in their culture. Without delving into the specific beliefs of various ancient 
cultures in regard to privacy, it can be noted that there was an antithetical posture 
between the need for privacy and the desire for public authority. 
The quotation below from Genesis shows that there was no desire on 
anyone’s part to intrude. 
And Noah began to be a husbandman, and planted a vineyard: and he drank of the 
wine, and was drunken; and he was uncovered within his tent. And Ham, the 
father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father, and told his two brethren 
without. And Shein and Japheth took a garment, and laid it upon both their 
145 Richard F. Hixson. (1987). Privacy in a public society. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
page. 4. 
146 Arnold Stein. (1952). Answerable style: Essays on paradise lost. Minneapolis: Univ. of 
Minnesota, page 4. 
147 Richard F. Hixson. (1987). Privacy in a public society. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
page. 4. 
148 John Milton. (1987). Paradise lost. New York: Chelsea House, page 122. 
48 
shoulders, and went backward, and covered the nakedness of their father; and 
their faces were backward, and they saw not their father’s nakedness.149 
We are also told that there was a sense of intrusion on the part of the sons, but they 
instinctively withdrew in order not to infringe upon their father’s privacy. 
The theme of privacy runs historically through the Bible. It illustrates an 
understanding of personal privacy and the conflict between our need to depend upon 
other people and our desire for seclusion. This theme of “privacy as a right against 
authority”150 is noted throughout history. It has also been shown to have been an 
integral part of early Hebrew, classical Greek, and ancient Chinese culture. 
Barrington Moore, Jr., notes that, man has to live in society, and social concerns 
have to take precedence.”151 In Moore’s view, these initial attempts of many 
civilizations to separate and balance the concepts of personal privacy and public 
authority continue throughout the ages. 
In the Middle Ages, privacy interests were virtually non-existent. Power 
struggles among churchmen and monarchies were prevalent; thus, the rights of an 
individual were not honored. Moore indicates that it was not until a less parochial 
bourgeoisie generated a new belief in the notion of privacy that people began to be 
aware of what ‘privacy’ meant and what it did not mean.152 But it was not until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that privacy began to be accepted in legal terms. 
The ancient concepts of solitude are evident in early America. Privacy there 
was not one of the dominant concerns; however, it was an issue. The Puritan 
settlements were based upon a belief in community which obligated the citizens to 
149 Frank Allen Patterson. (1933). The student’s Milton. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
page 646. 
150 Richard F. Hixson. (1987). Privacy in a public society. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
page 4. 
151 Barrington Moore, Jr. (1984). Privacy: Studies in social and cultural history. New York: 
Random House, page 267-277. 
152 Barrington Moore, Jr. (1984). Privacy: Studies in social and cultural history. New 
York: Random House. 
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band together for protection and mutual encouragement. Flaherty states that in 
Puritan America, privacy took second place to other values in the location of 
homes until Puritan communitarian ideals gradually disintegrated in the face of New 
World conditions.”153 Privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, but the Fourth 
Amendment, de facto, forbids some invasions of it. Privacy may not be explicitly 
defined (in the Constitution), but its aura is often noted.154 
Flaherty additionally notes that “the ordinary colonial family could enjoy 
intimacy, as well as an almost automatic degree of solitude.”155 It was much easier in 
colonial days to remove oneself from the ‘public scene.’ Today, there are few 
reclusive refuges available. As the early colonists became less and less dependent 
upon a communal style of living they began to physically spread out and become more 
diverse in their needs and desires. 
Hixson notes that the: 
colonial household between 1700 and 1740 was necessarily a rather basic 
enterprise, even in the growing seaport towns, with no running water, only 
passable lighting, no refrigeration or screening, and minimal privacy'. The desire 
for privacy in daily life then, as now, was also a by product of a person’s work and 
the work place environment.156 
Flaherty observes that: 
Although colonial New England was in general a democratic society ... the 
concept of deference, which pervaded all aspects of life, modified any elements 
of antipathy to privacy implicit in the notion of democracy. This was unlike the 
situation in late-nineteenth-century America when a popular interpretation of the 
meaning of democracy sometimes associated a conscious search for privacy with 
aristocratic tendencies. The colonial sense of deference stimulated a respect for 
other persons, particularly one’s betters and for their privacy.157 
153 David H. Flaherty. (1972). Privacy in colonial New England. Charlottesville, VA: Univ. 
of Virginia, page 72. 
154 Industrial Foundation v. Texas Industrial Accident Board. 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (1976). 
155 David H. Flaherty. (1972). Privacy in colonial New England. Charlottesville. VA: Univ. 
of Virginia, page 30. 
156 Richard F. Hixson. (1987). Privacy in a public society. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
page 9. 
157 David H. Flaherty. (1972). Privacy in colonial New England. Charlottesville, VA: Univ. 
of Virginia. 
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It was not until the latter Nineteenth Century that legal thinkers began to 
conceive of the notion of privacy as a legal right. Warren and Brandeis credited 
Judge Thomas Cooley, who, in his famous treatise on torts published in 1879, spoke 
of the right “to be let alone”158 as matter of personal security. In a very interesting 
side note, Yale Law School librarian, Fred R. Shaprio159 states that Warren and 
Brandeis’ article was the most cited pre-1947 law review article. Shapiro’s statement 
is based upon data from the Institute for Scientific Information’s database. 
Warren and Brandeis note that: 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten 
to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops. ’ The press is overstepping in every direction 
the obvious bounds of property and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of 
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with 
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual 
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the 
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be 
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.160 
New developments in technology and business methods require that the next 
step be taken to protect our right “to be let alone.”161 Just as Warren and Brandeis 
advocated in their 1890 law journal article, we should adjust our metaphors, customs, 
and rules to account for that which can intrude on our basic right to be let alone and 
not intruded upon. Warren’s and Brandeis’s argument was that, while some aspects 
of privacy involve the ownership or possession of real property, we need to protect 
human ‘personality.’162 They wanted to extend the scope of the law to include a 
158 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harvard L. Rev. 195 
(1890). 
159 Fred R. Shaprio. (1987). The most cited law review articles. Buffalo, NY: W. Hein Co. 
160 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 
(1890). 
161 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 
(1890). 
162 Warren and Brandeis at 202. 
51 
person’s feelings and emotions.163 Warren’s and Brandeis’s law review article 
synthesized a whole new category of legal rights and initiated a new field of 
jurisprudence. 
This notion of privacy which Warren and Brandeis put forth was supported by 
a number of legal thinkers of the time. However, Judge Denis O’Brien was a bit 
skeptical when he stated in 1902 in the Columbia Law Review that: 
The right of privacy in such cases, if it exists at all, is something that can not be 
regulated by law. The rules for the regulation of human conduct with respect to the 
courtesies and proprieties of life and that enjoin that delicate regard for the feelings 
and sensibilities of others are not to be found in statutes or judicial decisions. 
The moment one voluntarily places himself before the public, either in accepting 
public office, or in becoming a candidate for office, or as an artist or literary man, 
he surrenders his right to privacy, and obviously cannot complain of any fair or 
reasonable description or portraiture of himself.164 
Court decisions over the last 100 years, however, have ruled that if people do 
not become part of the public then they are entitled to their solitude—their privacy, 
and that privacy cannot be easily or frivolously taken away. 
In 1928, the Supreme Court ruled that a person’s privacy was not invaded via 
the wiretap since there was no actual (physical) entry into the house in question. 
Louis Brandeis took the government to task for allowing wiretap evidence to be 
gathered via a telephone and then used as evidence against a person. Brandeis stated 
that: 
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of 
the Fifth.165 
163 See generally, Warren and Brandeis. The Right to Privacy. 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 
(1890). 
164 Denis O’Brien,_Columbia L.Rev_(1902). 
165 Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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The law of the land in 1928 did not yet recognize that the right to privacy 
included a person’s character. It was not until early 1967 that the common law right 
to privacy yielded to the Supreme Court1 s intervention in this area in Katz v. United 
States.166 The Supreme Court spoke to a constitutional right of privacy which 
protected citizens from governmental officials. Over the years this right was 
expanded to: 
protect the autonomy of the individual to make certain important decisions of a 
veiy personal nature in such matters as marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education.167 
In their search for solitude (privacy), Americans invented barbed wire, and 
proceeded to build fences on the frontier throughout the mid to late 1800s. The 
private Pullman compartment was invented when railroads became the rage. In the 
United States, even the cheapest hotel often has a private bathroom for each of its 
rooms. Such is not the case in most other parts of the world. In more recent times, 
the suburb came into being when Americans felt a need for more privacy - city life 
was too public. Americans have a deep-rooted concern for privacy, and have always 
sought to satisfy their desire to “be let alone.”168 
166 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Defendant Katz was, convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California, of a violation of statute proscribing 
interstate transmission of wire communication of bets or wagers, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 369 F.2d 130, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court held that 
government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the defendant Katz’s words 
spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the 
defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. Thus this action constituted a ‘‘search 
and seizure” within Fourth Amendment, and the fact that electronic device employed to achieve that 
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could have no constitutional significance. The 
Court further held that the search and seizure, without prior judicial sanction and attendant 
safeguards, did not comply with constitutional standards. Although, accepting the account of the 
government’s actions as accurate, the magistrate could constitutionally have authorized with 
appropriate safeguards the very limited search and seizure. 
16/ 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § §601-606. 
168 Warren and Brandeis at 195. 
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Privacy in General 
In a law review article. Dean Prosser classified the privacy tort into . . four 
separate causes of action,”'69 or forms of invasion of privacy. As a result of Prosser’s 
article, and, as a result of his being the drafter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
these classifications have been recognized in a large number of court decisions.170 
These categories of invasion have been described as “distinct wrongs,”171 and 
as, “loosely related but distinct”172 causes of action. The forms are: 
• an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion,173 
• appropriation of a person’s name and/or likeness for commercial 
use/benefit,174 
• unreasonable publicity given to a person’s private life,175 and, 
• placing a person in a false light before the public.176 
169 Dean Prosser, Privacy. 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960); 62A Am. Jur. 2d Privacy 665. 
170 Factors Ect. v. Pro Arts. 579 F.2d 215 (1978), 4 Media L.Rev. 1144, 205 USPQ 751. cert 
den 440 U.S. 908, 59 L.Ed.2d 455, 99 S.Ct. 1215 and on remand 496 F.Supp 1090, 208 USPQ 529. 
rev 652 F.2d 278, 7 Media L.Rev. 1617, 211 USPQ 1, cert den 456 U.S. 927, 72 L.Ed.2d 442, 102 
S.Ct. 1973, and on remand 541 F.Supp 231, 8 Media L.Rev. 1839, vacated 562 F.Supp. 304, 9 
Media L.Rev. 1642 and reh den 701 F.2d 11,9 Media L.Rev. 1110 and (disagreed with by Rogers v. 
Grimaldi (CA2 NY) 875 F.2d 994, 16 Media L.Rev. 1648, 10 USPQ2d 1825); Cummings v. Walsh 
Constr, (SD Ga.) 561 F.Supp 872, 31 BNA FEP Cas 930, 115 BNA LRRM 4070; Pierson v. News 
Group Publications. (SD Ga.) 549 F.Supp 635; Beard v. Akzona. 517 F.Supp 128; Fogel v. Forbes. 
500 F.Supp 1081, 6 Media L.Rev. 1941 (applying Pennsylvania law). 
171 Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance. 435 So.2d 705 (1983). 
172 Sun v. Langston, 316 S.E.2d 172, 170 Ga.App. 60 (1984). 
173 Sun v. Langston. 316 S.E.2d 172, 170 Ga.App. 60 (1984). 
174 McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times. 623 S.W.2d 882, cert den 102 S.Ct. 
2239, 456 U.S. 975; 72 L.Ed.2d 849; Struner v. Dispatch Printing, 442 N.E.2d 129, 2 Ohio App.3d 
377, 2 O.B.R. 435; Covington v. Houston Post. 743 S.W.2d 345; Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§625A(2)(b), §68. 
175 McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times. 623 S.W.2d 882, cert den 102 S.Ct. 
2239, 456 U.S. 975; 72 L.Ed.2d 849; Struner v. Dispatch Printing, 442 N.E.2d 129, 2 Ohio App.3d 
377, 2 O.B.R. 435; Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345; Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§625A(2)(b), §68. 
176 Cantrell v. Forest City Pub.. 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974), 419 U.S. 245, 42 L.Ed.2d 419; Hogin 
v. Cottingham. 533 So.2d 525; Goodrich v. Waterburv Republican-American, 448 A.2d 1317, 188 
Conn. 107; Restatement (Second) of Torts, §625A(2)(d), § 120 et. seq. 
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In this dissertation, attention will be focused exclusively on ‘intrusion upon 
seclusion’ as it is not likely that the other three elements will impact the unique 
situations which will confront the framers of Acceptable Use Policies. 
A linchpin concern at this juncture seems to be to attempt to establish what 
the scope and limits of‘privacy1 are in an AUP. To do so will define the custom 
which will establish precedent as to what is legal and acceptable for an administration 
to do and/or not to do in regard to a user’s account. There is no legal cause for action 
based upon an invasion of privacy for matters which occur in a public place or in a 
place which is otherwise open to the public.177 
An individual’s right to privacy is not necessarily superior to the rights of the 
public.178 In determining the scope and limits of a person’s right to privacy, it is 
important to consider the rights and responsibilities of a person as a citizen of a free 
country.179 It is equally important to view an individual’s right to privacy as it relates 
to the community in which that person is a member.180 A “conflict between the 
public’s right to information and an individual’s right to privacy requires a balancing 
of competing interests ... In balancing these interests there are occasions in which the 
public right must prevail.”181 
A tactic to negate liability under an invasion of privacy action may be to have 
all university computer users sign a waiver of their rights to privacy. However Mike 
Godwin, the Electronic Frontier Foundation^ legal counsel, states that to consider 
177 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 482; Hartman v. Meredith Corp.. 638 F.Supp. 
1015 (1986). 
178 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 485; Mavitv v. Tyndall. 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), 
224 Ind. 364, appeal after remand 74 N.E.2d 914, 225 Ind. 360, appeal dismissed Indiana on 
relation of Mavitv v. Tyndall. 68 S.Ct. 609, 333 U.S. 834, 92 L.Ed. 1118, reh den 68 S.Ct. 732, 333 
U.S. 858, 92 L.Ed 1138. 
179 Barbery, Time. Inc., 159 S.W.2d291, 348 Mo. 1199. 
180 McGovern v. Van Riper. 54 A.2d 469, 140 N.J.Eq. 341. 
181 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 486; Vassiliades v. Garfmckel. Brooks Bros.. 
App., 492 A.2d 580 (date). 
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such a global waiver as policy would be “transcendentally stupid ... on the part of a 
[system administrator, as] it eliminates ... [the] ability to claim [Electronic Community 
Privacy Act] protections if... e-mail is wrongfully seized. And it eliminates the 
ability of [the] users to file a class action suit against the government.”182 
As one delves further into the scope and limits of privacy, it becomes doubtful 
that the right to privacy is an inherent right of a user of a university’s computer 
system. Aside from the mandates of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Family Educational Records Privacy Act 
(FERPA), the legal concept of privacy (the right to privacy) appears to be a condition 
that can be determined by local authority. Thus, it seems appropriate that the 
university can define what a computer user’s expectations of privacy are through its 
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). 
Seminal Statutes/Cases Applicable to Privacy 
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a 
certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of 
183 **” government. 
Louis D. Brandeis was appointed by President Wilson as an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court in 1916, and served until his retirement in 1939. Judge 
Brandeis was viewed as representing those who lobbied for new concepts in social 
legislation. He was replaced by William O. Douglas, who served until his retirement 
in 1975. 
Although a replacement justice generally does not hold a philosophy similar to 
that of the justice he replaces, these two men held amazingly similar points of view. In 
182 Michael Godwin. (1994, May 10). Logon disclaimers waiving the ECPA. Posted to: 
alt.bbs newsgroup. 
183 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747, 772 
(1986) (Harry A. Blackmun, J.). 
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a quite pragmatic sense, Brandeis, and then Douglas, occupied what was known as 
the “privacy seat” on the Court for over half a century. 
It was not until 1928 that Brandeis had an opportunity to present a case for 
constitutional privacy. His vehicle for doing so was Olmstead v. United States.184 a 
case which dealt with the Fourth Amendment prohibition in regard to “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”185 
The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. 
In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the 
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its 
roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “the right of the people to be secure 
in their ... house ... shall not be violated.186 
The Fourth Amendment states that people have the right to be “secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,”187 
But it does not go on to define “unreasonable.”188 The interpretation here has been 
left to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
There are two possible interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. One view of 
the Amendment is that it means exactly what is says. It does not protect fields, or 
phone lines, or anything other than “persons, houses, papers and effects.”189 Based 
upon this position it is not reasonable to search “persons, houses, papers and 
effects”190 absent a search warrant being issued. 
Another view is that this amendment was intended to generally protect the 
right of private property against government trespass. This point of view 
184 Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
185 U.S. Const, amend IV. 
186 Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (John Paul Stevens, J.). 
187 U.S. Const, amend IV. 
188 U.S. Const, amend IV. 
189 U.S. Const, amend IV. 
190 U.S. Const, amend IV. 
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encompasses the notion that technological developments should extend the concept 
and right of privacy to those ‘developments.’ But it should do so, not based upon 
accidents of technology, but upon the interpretation of the fundamental principles of 
the Constitution. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court held a combination of these two views. 
Olmstead v. United States191 
Olmstead involved an FBI wiretap of Olmstead and seventy other people who 
were engaged in a conspiracy to transport and sell liquors in violation of the 
Eighteenth Amendment192 (National Prohibition Act of 1919). Evidence of the 
conspiracy was obtained by the use of wiretaps. The Court ruled that the wiretaps 
were made without having to physically trespass on private property because the 
phone wires were not part of Olmstead’s house or office. The Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment had not been violated as there had been no physical invasion. 
Brandeis noted in his dissent of Olmstead: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against government, the right to be let alone - the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To 
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.193 
191 Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
192 U.S. Const, amend. XVIII. “One year from ratification of this article the manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, importation thereof into, or exportation thereof 
from the United States and all its territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purpose is 
hereby prohibited.” 
193 Olmstead at 478. 
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In this dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis argued that Olmstead’s rights had 
still been violated, even though “persons, houses, papers and effects”194 had not 
physically been searched or trespassed upon. He argued that the question at hand was 
whether Olmstead’s inherent right to privacy had been violated, and not that his 
property was (or was not) physically trespassed upon. Brandeis’s position was that 
there is a critical difference between the right one has in regard to personal property 
and the right one has to privacy. 
Griswold v. Connecticut195 
In other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected 
from governmental intrusion.196 
A Connecticut statute made it a crime to use “any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument”197 for the purpose of birth control. Another statute in Connecticut made 
it a crime to aid a person in the act of birth control. In Griswold, the executive 
director and the medical director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut 
were convicted under these statutes as they provided birth control devices and other 
material to married couples. 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling, and established a 
landmark philosophy regarding the right to privacy. 
194 Olmstead at 479. 
195 Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendants were convicted of 
violating Connecticut’s birth control law. The Circuit Court of the Sixth Circuit, Connecticut, 
rendered judgments against the defendants, and the defendants appealed. The Appellate Division of 
the Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, and the defendants appealed. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court of Errors, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479, affirmed the lower court’s decision, and the 
defendants appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Connecticut courts. The Supreme Court 
held that the Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon 
the right of marital privacy. 
196 Griswold at 483. 
197 Griswold at 480. 
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The aforementioned cases lead the Supreme Court to state that “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance ...Various guarantees create zones 
of privacy.”198 
Katz v. United States199 
In 1967 the Supreme Court overruled the Olmstead200 decision of 1928. The 
Court essentially rejected the Olmstead notion that there needed to be a “physical 
intrusion . . . [or] trespass”201 into a given area before there can be an invasion of 
one’s privacy. Katz clearly established that the Fourth Amendment “protects people” 
and not places. 
Cubby v. CompuServe202 
“NEW YORK, NEW YORK, USA, 1991 OCT. 31 (NB)-U.S. District Judge Peter 
Leisure ruled that CompuServe cannot be held liable for information in a 
newsletter it did not originally publish. His decision, the first of its kind, held that 
computer databases are the equivalent of newsstands or book stores, whose owners 
cannot be held liable for the content of the papers they sell unless they know 
beforehand that the stories are false.” 
198 Griswold at 482. 
199 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Defendant Katz was. convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California, of a violation of statute proscribing 
interstate transmission of wire communication of bets or wagers, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 369 F.2d 130. affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court held that 
government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the defendant Katz‘s words 
spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the 
defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. Thus this action constituted a “search 
and seizure” within Fourth Amendment, and the fact that electronic device employed to achieve that 
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could have no constitutional significance. The 
Court further held that the search and seizure, without prior judicial sanction and attendant 
safeguards, did not comply with constitutional standards. Although, accepting the account of the 
government's actions as accurate, the magistrate could constitutionally have authorized with 
appropriate safeguards the very limited search and seizure. 
200 Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
201 Olmstead at 484. 
202 Cubbv v. CompuServe, 766 F.Supp 135 (1991). 
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In Cubby, the defendant CompuServe was an on-line service providing 
subscribers with access to a variety of special interest databases and forums. The 
Journalism Forum carried false and defamatory statements about the plaintiffs who 
were developers of an electronic news and gossip magazine entitled “Skuttlebut.”203 
“CompuServe did not dispute that the statements concerning the plaintiff were 
defamatory.”204 Rather, CompuServe argued that it “acted as a distributor, and not a 
publisher, of the statements, and cannot be held liable for the statements because it 
did not know and had no reason to know of the statements.”205 
“CompuServe had no opportunity to review the contents of publications 
before they were uploaded into the company's computer data banks. Conversely, the 
plaintiffs argued that CompuServe was a publisher of the false statements and should 
be held to the higher standard of liability accompanying such designation.”206 
At issue was the standard of liability which should be imposed upon 
CompuServe. If CompuServe could be likened to an electronic library or bookstore, 
then it would be considered a distributor of published material.207 In Smith v. 
California.208 the Supreme Court held that a distributor must have knowledge of the 
contents of a publication before imposing liability for its distribution. In Smith, the 
Court struck down an ordinance which imposed liability on a bookseller for 
possession of an obscene book irrespective of whether the bookseller actually had 
knowledge of the book's contents.209 The Court observed that “[e]very bookseller 
would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every 
203 Cubby at 138. 
204 Marc L. Caden and Stephanie E. Lucas, Comment. Accidents on the Information 
Superhighway: On-Line Liability and Regulation. 2 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3 (1996). Available as of July 
1, 1996: http://www.urich.edu./~jolt/v2il/caden_lucas.html. 
205 Cubby at 137. 
206 Caden and Lucas at para. 18. 
207 See generally. Caden and Lucas. 
208 Smith v. California. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
209 Smith at 155. 
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book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach 
to omniscience.”210 Thus, “a distributor is a passive receptacle for information and 
will not be held liable in absence of actual knowledge.”211 
“If CompuServe was found to have published the defamatoiy statement, it 
would have been liable as a culpable party because a publisher who republishes or 
repeats a defamatory statement is subject to the same liability as if it had originally 
published the statement.”212 Whether or not a party is characterized as a publisher is 
largely dependent upon the degree of editorial control that is exercised over the given 
publication. For example, “a newspaper exercises a high degree of control over its 
final product with respect to editorial judgments and ultimate content.”213 In Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.214 the Court held that the “choice of material to go 
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of 
the paper and treatment of public officials ... constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment.”215 Thus, “newspapers are considered publishers within the 
legal context of libel and defamatory statements.”216 
The court characterized CompuServe's product as an “electronic, for-profit 
library”217 which provides a variety of publications and collects subscriber fees in 
return for access. More importantly, the court found that “CompuServe has no more 
control over such a publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand. 
210 Smith at 153 (quoting The King v. Ewart, 25 N.Z.L.R. 709, 725 (1905). 
211 Caden and Lucas at para. 19. 
212 Caden and Lucas at para. 20. See also. Hoover v. Peerless Publications, 461 F.Supp. 
1206, 1209 (1978) (noting that one who republishes libel is subject to the same liability as if he had 
originally published such a statement, even if the republisher attributes the libelous statements to the 
original publisher); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §578 (1976) (“one who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”). 
213 Caden and Lucas at para. 20. 
214 Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
215 Miami Herald at 258. 
216 Caden and Lucas at para. 20. 
217 Cubby v. CompuServe. 776 F.Supp. 135, 140 (1991). 
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and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it 
carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other 
distributor to do so.”218 Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
CompuServe.219 
By labeling CompuServe as a distributor rather than a publisher, the court 
issued the first prominent legal decision concerning the culpability of on-line access 
providers. The decision encouraged growth within the Internet community by 
reducing the threat of liability to on-line access providers.220 
So, although we often talk about BBSs as having the rights of publishers and 
publications, this accentuates an important distinction. How are publishers different 
from bookstore owners? Because we expect a publisher (or its agents) to review 
everything prior to publication. But we do not expect bookstore owners to review 
everything prior to sale. Similarly, in the CompuServe case, as in any case involving 
an on-line service in which users freely post messages for the public, we would not 
expect the on-line communications service provider to read everything posted before 
allowing it to appear. 
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court case on which Judge Leisure relies 
is Smith v. California.221 an obscenity case, not a defamation case. Smith is the 
Supreme Court case in which the notion first appears that it is generally 
unconstitutional to hold bookstore owners liable for content. So, if Smith v, 
California applies in a on-line-service or BBS defamation case, it certainly ought to 
apply in an obscenity case as well. 
218 Cubby at 140. 
219 Cubby at 141. 
220 Caden and Lucas at para 22. 
221 Smith v. California. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
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Thus, CompuServe sheds light not only on defamation law as applied in this 
new medium but on obscenity law as well. This decision should do much to clarify to 
concerned sysops (system operator) what their obligations and liabilities are under the 
law. 
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy222 
On May 26, 1995 the New York Times reported that: 
In a ruling that could change the nature of on-line information services, a New 
York judge cleared the way Thursday for a $200 million libel lawsuit against the 
Prodigy Services Company when he ruled that the popular on-line network was a 
publisher of information, not just a distributor. 
And, according to a Reuters news release on May 26, 1995, “The ruling is the 
first time a computer bulletin board has been held subject to a libel suit.”223 However 
other issues are involved, and the case will likely turn on those other issues. 
On May 24, 1995, the Supreme Court of New York granted partial summary 
judgment against Prodigy Services Company, finding that it had exercised sufficient 
editorial control over its computer bulletin boards to incur liability as a publisher.224 
Prodigy subscribers are able to communicate with one another through various 
bulletin boards. One such bulletin board was Money Talk, a widely read financial 
bulletin board, where members could post statements concerning stocks, bonds, 
investments, and related financial matters. The plaintiffs, Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a 
securities investment banking firm, and its president, Daniel Porush, brought an action 
for per se libel for statements posted about them on Prodigy's Money Talk computer 
bulletin board in 1994. The posting reflected that Porush was soon to be proven 
222 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 NY Misc. LEXIS 229. 
223 Stratton Oakmont. 
224 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
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criminal and that Stratton Oakmont, Inc., was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a 
living or get fired.”225 
The plaintiffs contended that Prodigy had held itself out as an on-line service 
which was family oriented. In an effort to provide a family environment, Prodigy 
edited the content of messages posted on its bulletin boards. Prodigy made no 
apology 
for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the millions of American 
families .. . [and] no responsible newspaper does less when it chooses the type of 
advertising it publishes.226 
Stratton Oakmont further argued that statements such as the prior remark by a 
Prodigy official were tantamount to an admission which proved that Prodigy was akin 
to a newspaper. As such, Prodigy should incur liability for defamatory statements 
posted on its bulletin boards as a publisher.227 
Prodigy openly advertised that all e-mail and postings are screened. They 
have stated that they delete anything that does not comply with their rules. Prodigy 
has also announced that it is a place where children would not be exposed to sex and 
other illegal activity. “And therein lies the hook by which Prodigy became a party to 
this lawsuit. By their statements. Prodigy assumed direct responsibility for the 
happenings on their system.”228 The judge in this case specifically said that the 
holdings in CompuServe did not apply to this case, as CompuServe Information 
Systems doesn’t claim to edit content. Because Prodigy had made a prior policy of 
scanning for content, the judge held Prodigy to a different standard. 
225 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. 1995 NY Misc. LEXIS 229. 
226 Stratton Oakmont (quoting Exhibit J). 
227 Stratton Oakmont at 1795-96. 
228 Caden and Lucas at para 26. 
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Implications from Cubby and Prodigy 
Judge Ain, in writing the Prodigy opinion, observed “that Prodigy's current 
system . . . may have a chilling effect on freedom of communication in cyberspace, 
and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what Prodigy wants, but for the legal 
liability that attaches to such censorship.”229 Judge Ain was not attempting to 
promote chilling effect by deciding against Prodigy. However, Prodigy may now 
serve as a vehicle to curtail or discourage the development of the Internet by causing 
access providers to fret about potential legal culpability.230 “Worse yet, access 
providers may turn a blind eye to any and all communications disseminated through 
their services in an effort to reduce their potential liability as a publisher. This may 
result in an increase in Internet activity involving precisely the kind of material, such 
as pornography and bomb-making manuals, currently generating paranoia among the 
general public.”231 
Cubby was clearly an opinion which favored access providers as it severely 
reduced their level of culpability. Although it provided a different verdict, Prodigy 
agreed that access providers “should generally be regarded in the same context as 
bookstores, libraries, and network affiliates.”232 However, the Prodigy court found 
that it was Prodigy's own conscious decisions which altered its liability and resulted 
in it being labeled a publisher. “Prodigy's conscious choice to gain the benefits of 
editorial control has opened it up to greater liability than CompuServe and other 
networks that make no such choice.”233 
229 Prodigy. 23 Media L.Rep. (BNA) at 1798. 
230 See generally. 23 Media L.Rep. 1794. 
231 Caden and Lucas at para 28. 
232 Prodigy. 23 Media L.Rep. (BNA) at 1798. See also. Edward V. DiLello, Functional 
Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards. 26 Coluin. J.L. 
& Soc. Probs. 199, 210-211 (1993). 
233 Prodigy. 23 Media L.Rep. (BNA) 1798 
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It appears that lines of demarcation with respect to liability will ultimately be 
drawn by Congress. The court in Prodigy observed that the issues it considered may 
be preempted by federal law if the Communications Decency Act of 1995 is enacted. 
Thus, state and federal legislators appear willing to take these issues into their own 
hands. 
Selected Statutes Applicable to Computer Networks and Privacy 
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage’s whole 
existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of 
setting man free from men.234 
Federal Statutes and Laws 
The world's information base ... [is] estimated to be doubling everv three to four 
235 years 
“As the information privacy of individuals becomes increasingly threatened by 
the heightened use of computers by the government, the Congress enacted statutes to 
provide individuals control of some amount of privacy.”236 The federal statutes 
involved are the Freedom of Information Act, Communications Decency Act, 
Electronic Communications Decency Act, Cox-Wyden Bill, Code of Fair Information 
Practice, and the Privacy Act of 1974. The major federal laws on privacy which 
impact an Acceptable Use Policy are: 
The Privacy Act of 1974.237 The Act was implemented “to provide certain 
safeguards for an individual against an invasion of privacy.” The Act is very 
234 Ayn Rand. (1994). The fountainhead. New York: Plume. 
235 David F. Linowes. (1989). Privacy in America: Is vour private life in the public eves? 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, page 169. 
236 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996). 
237 5 U.S.C.S. §552a, 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records. §46.5; Pub. L. No. 93-579. 
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important, but poorly understood, law which “seeks to protect individuals against the 
misuse of information about them contained in government files.”238 It was bom as a 
result of the Watergate crisis. In 1974, the 93rd Congress considered a number of 
pieces of legislation dealing with various aspects of privacy. The bills dealt with the 
regulation of governmental data banks,239 a wide range of data bases in a number of 
federal and state agencies dealing with criminal justice information,240 the disclosure 
and sale of mailing lists,241 and various other measures containing access and 
disclosure provisions for various other statutes.242 The Privacy Act is a 
comprehensive response to the public’s concern as to just how much information is 
available about the average citizen and what can be done with such data. 
The federal government had been gathering information on the average citizen 
for decades without drawing the concerned attention of the citizenry. Two factors 
(which made Watergate possible) heightened the concern of the public to such a 
degree that legislation was in order. First, the federal government had been growing 
larger each year, and thus the amount of information it collected had grown in order 
to make informed policy decisions possible. Second, the maturation of technology had 
made the compilation, retrieval, analysis, and dissemination of data significantly 
easier. Previously, all of this has been required to be done manually.243 
During the Congressional hearings which recommended the enactment of the 
Privacy Act, a 1974 study of 54 federal agencies revealed the existence of over 800 
computerized data banks containing some 1.25 billion records on individual citizens. 
238 Creech. Kenneth C. (1993). Electronic media law and regulation. Boston: Focal Press, 
page 256. 
239 S. 3633, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
240 S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
241 S. 3116, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
242 S. 2452, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
243 See generally. Note. The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique. 1976 Wash. 
U. L.Q. 667. 
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s main data bank (the National Crime 
Information Center - the NCIC) then contained just under 2 million files and almost 
200 million sets of finger prints. It was also discovered that some 30 data banks exist 
which contained information about political and other such activities of many 
thousands of law-abiding citizens. One expert who testified before the Congress 
estimated that the typical citizen was the subject of at least 20 records.244 
The Act addresses the gathering and possible misuse of otherwise personal 
information, and very clearly expresses its intention in section 2 where it states: 
The privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance, 
use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies; 
The increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology, while 
essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified the 
harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use or 
dissemination of personal information; 
The opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit, 
and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by the 
misuses of certain information systems; 
The right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution of the United States, and; 
In order to protect the privacy of the individuals identified in information systems 
maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to 
regulate the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of information by such 
agencies.245 
The Privacy Act‘s purpose was “to provide certain safeguards against an 
invasion of personal privacy.”246 To accomplish this the Act has six basic provisions: 
• Individuals are given control over what personal records247 (pertaining to 
themselves) can be collected and maintained by the Federal government. 
244 Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique. 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 
670. 
245 Privacy Act. Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974). 
246 Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974). 
247 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(4) considers a “record” to be: “any item, collection, or grouping about 
an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to his education, financial 
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history, and that contains his name, or 
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• Individuals have control over the dissemination of personal records gathered 
by one agency when other organizations or agencies request that information. 
• Individuals can gain access to their records in any agency and can have such 
information corrected or amended. 
• Agencies are required to assure that all information is current and accurate for 
its intended use. 
• Agencies are exempted from other provisions of the Act “only in cases where 
there is an important public policy need for such exemption.” 
• Agencies violating an individual’s rights under this Act are subject to civil 
litigation by the individual. 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPAT TheECPA248 
contains two main parts or Titles. Title I deals with “Interception of 
Communications and Related Matters.” This Title updates existing laws to 
encompass computer ‘acts’ as illegal if there is an equivalent real life law. For 
example, where the law is such that you can not electronically eavesdrop on private 
telephone communications, it now states that you can not electronically eavesdrop on 
private computer communications. Where the law preserved your right to listen to 
public radio transmissions, it preserves your right to listen to public computerized 
transmissions. 
Title II deals with “Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and 
Transactional Records Access.” This Title makes certain acts federal crimes. Equally 
important, it protects certain common-sense rights of system operators (sysops). 
Under the Act, it is now a federal offense to access a system without authorization. 
The Cox-Wvden Bill. The Cox-Wyden Bill (Internet Freedom and Family 
Empowerment Act) on August 4, 1995 was passed by the US House of 
Representatives “as a direct response to the Prodigy decision and the original version 
the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a 
finger or voice print or a photograph.” 
248 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508 (1986). 
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of the Communications Decency Act.”249 The bill specifically prohibits the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) from regulating material on the Internet.250 It 
released access providers from liability if they did not exercise direct editorial control 
over their transmissions. The bill ensured that access providers could unilaterally 
remove obscene material without incurring liability, provided there was a “good faith” 
effort to screen services, and provided screening devices for parents.251 
“By prohibiting FCC intervention, the Cox-Wyden bill virtually eliminated the 
prospect of federal content-based regulation of the Internet. It focused on screening 
indecent material from children, instead of regulating or eliminating the material from 
the Internet altogether.”252 The bill attempted to “remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower 
parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material. . ,”253 “[T]his bill was favored by on-line users and access providers. The 
latter were shielded from liability, while the former continued to enjoy a decentralized 
and uncensored Internet.”254 
( 
The Cox-Wyden bill failed to directly address the concerns of parents and teachers 
regarding children's continued Internet access to indecent and obscene materials. 
The bill's focus on screening devices carried a less powerful punch than its 
proponents would have liked to admit. The bill's language merely provided that as 
a general “policy,” the government should “remove disincentives” for the 
development of screening and blocking devices. This language is suggestive, but 
vague. It did not mandate any behavior or specific actions by access providers to 
249 Caden and Lucas at para 56. 
250 1 41 Congressional Record. H8478-79 (August 4, 1995). 
251 H.R. 1978. §230(c), 104th Cong., 1st Session (1995) (“No provider ... shall be held 
liable on account of -- (1) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected ...”). 
252 Caden and Lucas at para 57. 
253 H.R. 1978. §230(b)(4), 104th Cong., 1st Session (1995) 
254 Caden and Lucas at para 58. 
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further this policy. For those who feel that FCC jurisdiction may be appropriate, 
the Cox-Wyden bill failed to grant proper control over the medium.255 
The House-approved Cox-Wyden bill preserves the Internet as a more-or-less, 
unregulated environment which appears to be an outcome desired by civil libertarians 
and many Internet users.'56 But the Communications Decency Act held center stage 
and a majority of the Cox-Wyden bill was incorporated into the adopted version of 
the CD A, “with the notable exception of Cox-Wyden's prohibition on FCC 
jurisdiction. In lieu of the Cox-Wyden approach to FCC jurisdiction, the CDA grants 
the FCC a consultative role in helping determine appropriate standards for indecent 
material available on-line.”257 Nonetheless, the FCC, under the adopted CDA, is 
prohibited from enforcing those standards.258 
The Freedom of Information Act (TOIAT The FOIA stipulates that “every 
American has the right to look at any government records unless the disclosure of a 
record would warrant an”259 “invasion of personal privacy.”260 “This act gives the 
citizens the right to know what the government knows so that the citizens would be 
able to discover any fraud in the government, including privacy violations.”261 
“Ironically, this act simultaneously creates a tension between the public's right to 
255 Caden and Lucas at para 58. 
256 See e.g.. John Perry Barlow. (1994, March). The economy of ideas: A framework for 
rethinking patents and copyrights in the Digital Age. Wired. 2.03. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
http:// www.hotwired.com/wired/2.03/features/economy.ideas.html; Also see. Caden and Lucas at 
para 59. 
257 Caden and Lucas at para 59. 
258 Communications Decency Act §502. 
259 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
260 Freedman. Warren. (1987). The right of privacy in the computer age. New York: 
Quorum Books, page 18. 
261 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
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know and an individual's right to privacy.”262 The Act allows files to be available to 
any person, thus individual privacy may be lost. The Act does attempt to protect the 
privacy of individuals by making certain categories of data not readily accessible. 
However, the Act, in regard to “internal personnel rules,” or, “files, the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” the Act is 
vague.263 This vagueness “create[s] interpretational problems, especially with the use 
of computers.”264 
For example, what constitutes files remains ambiguous when using a computer. 
Should files be interpreted to constitute storage discs or data cells containing items 
unrelated to each other? Answering this question determines how much 
information a person could obtain and how much privacy of an individual can be 
lost.265 
Communications Decency Act of 1995 (CD AT The CD A266 was approved 
by the U.S. Senate as an amendment to the Senate’s omnibus telecommunications 
deregulation bill. This amendment poses great Constitutional questions in regard to 
the future of freedom of speech on the computer networks. 
The CDA was sponsored by Sen. James Exon (D-Nebraska) and was 
intended, according to its sponsor, both to prohibit the [computer] equivalent of 
obscene telephone calls and to prohibit the distribution to children of materials with 
sexual content. The legislation imposes content restrictions on computer 
communications that would chill First Amendment protected speech in forums of 
262 Freedman, page 18-19. 
263 Richard F. Hixson. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. New 
York: Oxford University Press, page 194-95, 199. 
264 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
265 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
266 Communications Decency Act of 1995, 47 U.S.C. 151 (1995). 
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computer networks. The only postings that would be acceptable would be those 
appropriate for children to read. 
The CD A changes the language of Title 47, US Code, Section 223. This 
section of Title 47 primarily deals with: 1) a prohibition on “obscene or harassing” 
phone calls and other, similar, abusive uses of the telephone, and, 2) FCC regulation 
on telephone services that provide so-called indecent content, and prohibits those 
services from providing legally obscene content. 
In other words, the CDA substantially restructures and alters the provisions of 
this section in an effort to bring computer communications under the same laws that 
effect telephone communications. 
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 will, according to the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation: 
(a) Expand the scope of the statute from telephones to “telecommunications 
devices” (such as computers, modems, and the data servers and conferencing 
systems used by Internet sites and by commercial providers like America Online 
and CompuServe); 
(b) Define as a criminal offense any communication that is legally obscene or 
indecent if that communication is sent over a telecommunications device “with 
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person”; 
(c) Penalize any person or entity who, by use of a telecommunication device. 
“knowingly ... makes or makes available” any content or material that is legally 
obscene; and 
(d) Penalize any person or entity who “knowingly ... makes or makes available” to 
a person under the age of 18 any content or material that is “indecent.”267 
267 Electronic Frontier Foundation. (1995, June 10). EFFector, 8 [On-line], Available as of 
July 1, 1996: http://www.eff.0rg/pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector/#8. 
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The CDA may very likely be declared unconstitutional as it is vague and 
overly broad in its mandate. Case law has already been handed down by the Supreme 
Court which, in all likelihood will undo the CDA. In Sable Communications v. FCC 
(1989),268 a case involving dial-in phone-sex services, the Supreme Court held that, 
even though a ban on obscenity in dial-a-pom services is constitutional, a ban on 
indecency is not. The Court also said that “[t]he government may not reduce the adult 
population to only what is fit for children.”269 
The Code of Fair Information Practice (Public Law 93-579, sec 2(b)) was 
recommended by an advisory committee of the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare in a report called Records, Computers, and the Rights 
of Citizens in 1973.270 “The code served as the model in constructing the Privacy 
Act.”271 The five major principles of the code mandate that the government will: 
1) create no secret personal data record-keeping systems, 
2) provide access for individuals to find out the use and existence of any 
information about him/her in a record, 
3) establish a procedure for individuals to prevent the use of information 
collected for one purpose to be used for another purpose without his/her 
consent. 
268 Sable Communications vs. FCC. 492 US 115 (1989). 
269 Sable Communications at 121. 
270 Michael Rogers Rubin. (1988). Private rights, public wrongs: The computer and 
personal privacy. Norwood, MA: Alex Publishing Corporation, page 80. 
271 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-lineJ. (1996, March 26). 
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4) allow an individual to correct a record about himself/herself, and, 
5) assure the reliability and accuracy of the use, maintenance, and 
dissemination of the data.272 
These principles mandate a number of requirements from the Privacy Act. An 
individual should be able to: 
• determine what records related to him/her are used, collected, maintained, 
and disseminated, 
• prevent the use of information collected for one purpose from being used 
for another purpose without his/her consent, 
• access information pertaining to him/her, have copies of such records, and 
be able to make corrections. 
These stipulations are in place in order to provide for a balance between the 
individual’s rights and the governments interest in collecting data. “In essence, this act 
empowers] individuals to know of the existence and use of the information pertaining 
to them collected and held by the government.”273 
Selected Cases 
In Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel274 it was held that surveillance is not 
actionable (as an invasion of privacy) so long as the surveillance is conducted in a 
reasonable and unobtrusive manner. Thus, the use of software to monitor the size of 
272 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. (1986). Federal government 
information technology: Electronic record systems and individual privacy. (Office of Technology 
Publication No. OTA-CIT-296). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, page 16. 
273 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
27-1 Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel, 502 A.2d 488 (1986), 306 Md. 289, cert den 479 U.S. 
984 (1986), 93 L.Ed.2d 575. 
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user’s account space consumption would appear to be legal (even if there is an 
assumption that the user’s account space is totally private). 
Stikes v. Chevron USA275 is a case where a former employee of Chevron 
brought action based upon his belief that Chevron (and the federal Labor 
Management Relations Act) breached his Constitutional right to privacy. As part of 
the Chevron’s collective bargaining agreement’s safety program, employees were 
required to submit to random searches of their person and property. Stikes refused to 
submit to a search of his private vehicle which was parked on company grounds. As a 
result of his refusal, he was discharged. The case was decided in favor of Chevron, 
and the Supreme Court upheld that decision from a lower court. 
Citing Stikes. a university AUP stating that users, given proper notice, must 
submit to searches of their accounts would appear to be lawful and not a breach of 
their right to privacy provided the university has a compelling interest in setting such 
a policy. 
In Barber v. Time the court held that a person does not always have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that they can not have complete isolation 
under the right of privacy. Individual rights should be construed in the light of the 
duties and responsibilities incumbent upon citizens of a free country. Thus, a person 
on a computer system who expects to be totally isolated from intrusion, warranted or 
unwarranted, is mistaken. Barber also indicates that some intrusions, even if they are 
unwarranted, are not actionable.276 
In Elmore v. Atlantic Zavre277 a store employee (based upon complaints from 
customers) observed an individual allegedly performing acts of sodomy. The 
275 Stikes v. Chevron USA. 914 F.2d 1265 (1990), cert den (US) 59 USLW 3769. 137 BNA 
LRRM2248, 118 CCHLC §10703. 
276 Barber v. Time. Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), 348 Mo. 1199. 
277 Elmore v. Atlantic Zavre. 341 S.E.2d 905 (1986), 178 Ga.App. 25. 
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perpetrator was in a closed stall in a public restroom. The court ruled that there was 
no invasion of privacy nor did the action violate the individual’s privacy interests as 
Zayre’s desire to provide crime free restrooms to its customers was a more 
compelling than the individual’s right to privacy. 
Elmore is applicable to a university’s AUP as it sets a principle. Certainly the 
facts of the case do not involve any electronic issues. However the principle of law in 
this case establishes an analogy between the Zayre’s restrooms and a university 
computer system user’s account. Based upon this case, an invasion of privacy is not 
actionable given the organizations desire to maintain a crime-free environment. 
Elmore also supports the action of store employees to invade otherwise private spaces 
(a closed stall in a public restroom) where there is a suspicion of illegal activity. 
It would also seem that Elmore will allow university computer staff members 
to enter a user’s computer account if there are reports of, among other things, 
conspicuous disk space consumption, or other suspicious activity. 
The means used in an intrusion of privacy are prime factors, according to 
Hogin v. Cottingham.278 There is a great deal of weight given to the degree of 
intrusiveness that was perceived by the victim. The manner in which an ‘intrusion’ 
occurs is important. Thus it would seem to follow that, if a computer monitoring 
program were transparent, then a plaintiff would seem to loose a cause for action 
based upon the ‘intrusiveness’ of the alleged invasion.279 
Privacy and the Elements and Requisites of Liability 
A legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the 
court—and so of a legal right.280 
278 Hogin v. Cottingham. 533 So.2d 525 (1988). 
279 Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, 798 P.2d 1106 (1990), 103 Or.App. 555. 
280 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law. 10 Harv. L.Rev. 457, 458 (1897). 
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There are a number of elements which must be present in order for an invasion 
of privacy to be actionable. The information accessed must otherwise be private, 
secluded, or secret,281 there must be lack of consent by the owner of the facts,282 
and/or the intrusion must involve public disclosure283 of facts which are otherwise 
private. Some authorities have also held that a physical intrusion or something 
analogous to a trespass must occur.284 
Thus, the term ‘wrongful’, in regard to a wrongful intrusion, does not require that 
the intrusion itself be wrongful in the sense that there is no right to make the 
intrusion, but may relate to the manner of making the intrusion.285 
Thus, another “primary factor in determining whether there has been an 
intrusion in connection with those aspects of a violation of the right of privacy 
relating to an intrusion upon seclusion is the means used.”286 
Merely entering onto private property is not, by itself, sufficient to institute an 
action based upon invasion of privacy. An invasion must be highly intrusive and 
offensive.287 
There are, however, a number of elements which do not impact the 
actionability of an ‘invasion of privacy.’ Whether an ‘invasion’ was negligent or 
281 Dortch v. Atlanta Journal. 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991), 261 Ga. 350. 
282 Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 1083 (1987), 86 Or.App. 523. 
283 Dortch v. Atlanta Journal, 405 S.E.2d43 (1991), 261 Ga. 350; Steele v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding. 867 F.2d 1311 (1989). reh den 874 F.2d 821 (1989) and McCullough v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding. 874 F.2d 821 (1989). 
284 Gamer v. Triangle Publications. 97 F.Supp. 546 (1951), Hogin v. Cottingham, 533 
So.2d 525 (1988), McDaniel v. Coca-Cola Bottling. 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), 60 Ga.App. 92. 
285 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 511; Struner v. Dispatch Printing Co.. 442 
N.E.2d 129 (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 377, 2 O.B.R. 435, 77 C.J.S.; Right to Privacy and Publicity 
511. 
286 77 C.J.S. Right to Privacy and Publicity 511. 
287 Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, 798 P.2d 1106 (1990), 103 Or.App. 555. 
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purposefully planned is not relevant.288 Malice is not an essential element.289 It does 
not matter if profit is made from the intrusion.290 
The actionability of an ‘invasion of privacy’ is negated when publicity is given 
to facts which are already a matter of public record, or to matters otherwise generally 
discernible through public observation.291 
Privacy in Our Electronic Society 
In the new electronic age, we are relying more and more on information 
technology to streamline government, educate our children, make health care more 
accessible and affordable, and make our businesses more productive and 
competitive. This rush to embrace a new age of technology must not, however, 
obscure our ongoing responsibility to protect important information and maintain 
the personal privacy of citizens. 
- Senator John Glenn (D-OH) Chairman, Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Privacy is, conceivably, a foundation issue when crafting an acceptable use 
policy. The determination of what privacy is and what it is not will lay a foundation 
for all subsequent AUP formation discussions. There are a number of flavors of 
privacy, and a University community should come to a consensus on which flavor it 
desires. 
University computer system administrators and users alike will need to 
understand that which is before them. Cyberspace presents a new mode of thinking 
about privacy. Both cyberspace and privacy will need to be understood in order to 
accommodate how we describe and use information. This understanding will be 
288 Lynn v. Allied Corn.. 536 N.E.2d 25 (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 392; Prince v. St. Francis- 
St. George Hosp.. 484 N.E.2d 265 (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 4, 20 O.B.R. 4. 
289 Cason v. Baskin. 20 So.2d 243 (1945), 155 Fla. 198. 
290 Gamer v. Triangle Publications, 97 F.Supp. 546 (1951), Hogin v. Cottingham. 533 
So.2d 525 (1988), McDaniel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), 60 Ga.App. 92. 
291 Ledsinger v. Burgmeister. 318 N.W.2d 558 (1982). 
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“based upon electronic models of how information is organized, stored and 
processed.”292 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) has been a first 
step in attempting to deal with one aspect of the many heads of the cyberspatial 
‘Hydra.’293 The ECPA deals with a computer information system only as traditional 
mail and telephony. The ECPA began a legal discussion concerning the nature and 
ramifications of various viewpoints in regard to cyberspace. The ECPA is the first 
step toward reducing the lack of comprehension about the foundation issues of how 
we work with information. 
We should begin to realize that cyberspace is more than a one dimensional 
entity. Cyberspace is analogous to many familiar real-life metaphors, not just to one. 
Cyberspace is analogous to a: 
• newspaper 
• republisher/disseminator 
• common carrier (i.e., telephone) 
• traditional bulletin board 
• broadcaster 
• desk at the office 
• desk at home in the den 
• free and open frontier (a.k.a. The Old West) 
• safe deposit box in a bank 
• hotel/motel room which one has rented 
• fraternity/sorority house 
292 Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World. 38 Villanova L. Rev. 403 (1993). 
293 A “Hydra” is a mythical multi headed reptile. The analogy is made that Cyberspace is a 
multi dimensional entity and can be just as dangerous as a Hydra if one does not address and deal 
with all the heads (facets). 
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If an on-line computer system is like all of these things, how do we legally and 
ethically deal with this multi-faceted, multi-dimensional environment, and, how do we 
deal with a situation in which two antithetical metaphors seem apropos? 
A legal and ethical blurring occurs due to the lack of consensus among the 
various stakeholders as to what the ‘rules’ and metaphors are in cyberspace. 
In the long run, adoption of information technologies will blur the boundaries 
between citizen and agency and between agency and court. Blurring of these 
boundaries may necessitate rethinking the definitions of some of the basic events 
that define the administrative process, public participation and judicial review.294 
When crafting an AUP, a foundation issue will be the determination of the 
scope and limits of privacy on a given computer system. A clarification of privacy as 
a global principle for computers, as a principle for individual systems, as a non¬ 
existent principle, or as some combination of these needs to be established before 
other concerns are addressed. Deciding this will facilitate the process of developing a 
basis of thought upon which other issues (e.g., computer as a newspaper, office desk, 
common carrier, broadcaster, etc.) will rely. Establishing the basic notions of public 
and private in regard to on-line computer systems is critical in order to build a 
foundation upon which resolution of other issues will be based. 
It is also an issue that many of those rights, especially the right of privacy, 
have themselves become confused. The metaphors which are conjured through 
hypotheticals in order to equate a given cyberspatial act to real life situations are, 
many times, in conflict and inaccurate. An act in cyberspace can be, for example, 
viewed as analogous to a phone conversation. Given the telephony metaphor, one 
statute applies, but, given the same act and drawing on a traditional mail metaphor, 
the situation brings another statute into play. Using a telephony metaphor, this act 
294 Perritt, Henry A. Jr., The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of 
Administrative Law. 44 Admin. L. Rev. 79, 105 (1992). 
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may be completely legal while applying the metaphor of traditional mail might cause 
the act to be illegal. 
Also law enforcement agencies are not solidly founded in regard to 
cyberspatial legal issues. The legal system’s insufficient comprehension of cyberspace 
has routinely caused search warrants to be issued which are overly broad.295 
Complete computer systems have been seized as evidence when only seizure of a 
copy of the offending material was in order.296 
The Clinton administration’s program regarding cyberspace, as announced by 
Vice President Albert Gore, incorporated many of the concepts of open competition, 
universal access, and deregulated common carriage. But Gore said nothing 
concerning the future of privacy and personal rights, except to cite, among the 
bounties of the National Information Infrastructure, its ability to “help law 
enforcement agencies thwart criminals and terrorists who might use advanced 
telecommunications to commit crimes.”297 
Lacking legal clarity on a number of issues, a University needs to establish 
policy—its AUP—in order to clarify the ‘ground rules’ for the entire community of 
users. Furthermore, as a chief source of litigation is failure to properly prepare for 
legal eventualities, having an AUP in place will greatly aid in reducing potential 
exposure to litigation. 
295 Dibbell. (1990, July 24). On line and out of bounds. Village Voice, p 27; Jahnke. (1990. 
November 14). The cops come to Cyberspace. Boston Magazine, page 140; Barlow, John Perry. 
(1990). Crime and puzzlement [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.efif.org/pub 
/Publications /John_Perry_Barlow /crime_and_puzzlement.l. The scope of “Operation Sun Devil“ is 
unclear. Although many wholesale seizures of computer equipment have occurred over the past 
several years, executed by teams of federal and state agents, some law enforcement officers 
specifically have disavowed that their particular police action was a part of “Sun Devil.” For 
example, “[fjederal officials said that the raid on Steve Jackson Games was not part of Operation 
Sun Devil.” Lewis. (1990, September 9). Can invaders be stopped but civil liberties upheld?. New 
York Times. 
296 Fed. R.Evid. Rule 101(3). 
297 Albert Gore. (1994, January 11). Clinton administration’s Nil policy in regards to the 
National Information Infrastructure. Press Conference. Los Angeles, CA. 
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Regulation of electronic communication has historically been influenced more 
by market and political forces than by constitutional principles or legal concerns. 
Current legislative interpretations and trends are not based upon precedents in 
jurisprudence or upon striking a balance among the legal principles involved. The 
decisions are generated from the need to provide a practical resolution to an 
immediate problem.298 
There should, in the short term at least, be a balance between the need to have 
an immediate and practical solution, and, the desire to have a just and fair solution. 
After all, application of theoretical law has always been predicated upon its 
implementation in actual case law. Thus, we should blend the theoretical and the 
practical. 
The National Information Infrastructure’s (Nil) Working Group Task Force 
on Privacy supports this blending, as indicated by Carol Mattney’s statement on their 
behalf: 
... the Information Infrastructure Task Force’s Working Group on Privacy 
[intends] to update the Code of Fair Information Practices that was developed in 
the early 1970s. While many of the Code’s principles are still valid, the Code 
itself was developed in an era when paper records were the norm. 
The advent of the National Information Infrastructure has caused two things to 
change dramatically. No longer is information usage bound by the limitations of 
paper - the seamless web of networks linking us to each other is creating an 
interactive environment in which all of the participants must share certain 
responsibilities. Moreover, non-governmental usage rivals the government’s 
[usage], and is largely unregulated.299 
298 It would be impossible to exaggerate the frequency with which computer information 
banks containing private information of third parties are seized, ostensibly in search of criminal 
evidence. Most bizarre is the story of the nonprofit California cryogenics organization, whose 
computer equipment and cryogenics-related bulletin board were seized and shut down, in the course 
of a coroner’s office investigation into the whereabouts of a missing human head. See Brock Meeks. 
(1991, April 12). The case of the missing head and the missing BBS. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
http://www.well.org/fmish 
299 National Information Infrastructure Task Force. (1995). Statement on Privacy. 
Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.eff.org/ll /CAF/policies. 
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Applying long-standing guarantees in the burgeoning electronic forum. Tribe 
recommends “that policy makers look not at what technology makes possible, but at 
the core values the Constitution enshrines.”300 The principles of the Constitution, he 
maintains, are its protection of people rather than places, and its regulation of the 
actions of the government, not of private individuals. Tribe notes there must be an 
“invariability of constitutional principles despite accidents of technology.”301 Tribe’s 
statement provides a basis for the belief that government and university administrators 
should set acceptable use policy instead of allowing it to be established solely by 
network denizens, as is often currently the case. 
If the primary nature of the role of government and the University’s administration 
is protection, coupled with facilitation, then existing laws, statutes and University 
policies could well be developed/applied for the protection of privacy when 
accidents of technology threaten it.302 
Two points of view appear to exist concerning the broad notion of privacy. 
On one hand, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) favor almost exclusive privacy from 
governmental intrusion. On the other hand, the System Administrators want to be able 
to insure the security and integrity of their on-line systems. The administrators of on¬ 
line networks (System Administrators, postmasters, System Operators, etc.) want and 
deserve the legal ability to protect their systems from vandalism and illegal intrusion, 
and to prevent them from acting as conduits for pirated software, or serving as homes 
300 Laurence Tribe. (1991, March). The Constitution in cyberspace: Law and liberty beyond 
the electronic frontier. Keynote address at the First Conference on Computers. Freedom and 
Privacy, Boston, MA. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/ 
articles/tribe-constitution.txt. 
301 Laurence Tribe. (1991, March). The Constitution in cyberspace: Law and liberty beyond 
the electronic frontier. Keynote address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and 
Privacy, Boston, MA. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/ 
articles/tribe-constitution.txt. 
302 Vernon Pero (e-mail communication, June 5, 1994). 
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for illegal activity. There is legitimate concern that, given free rein, those who craft 
policy will follow a path that may not consider the rights of the individual users. 
Virtual Reality should not be interpreted as a duplication of real life society; 
but as an extension of it. Separating them in such a way that electronic 
communications would be completely secure and free from intrusion, while other 
aspects of one’s life are not, seems unreasonable. For example, telephone calls are 
not currently totally secure, as with proper authorization, the government can wiretap 
them. One’s “person, papers, houses, and effects”303 are secure only from 
unreasonable searches, not totally secure from any searches whatsoever. 
The University administration has been established to protect everyone’s 
rights and to insure that everyone’s rights and responsibilities are properly addressed 
and protected. The stakeholders in the creation of policy should be constantly 
reasserting, in their minds, that crafting policy is a positive activity and should benefit 
and protect all. 
Both sides have legitimate and compelling reasons for their points of view. 
Senator Patrick Leahy notes that “(t)he part that frightens the hell out of me is the 
government deciding where technology goes.”304 Senator Leahy is reflective of the 
thinking of those who believe that, left to its own devices, government (or those who 
govern, i.e., the administration of an organization) will function in its own best 
interest, and not in the interest of the community which it serves. 
In regard to self interest and the direction an organization will take, Herbert 
Schiller states that “[bjehind all the hype shaping the electronic highway are 
303 U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
304 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) quoted in Kevin Power. (1994, April 10). Proposed 
wiretap law sets off debate over justice role. Government Computer News, page 5. 
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corporate interests. These huge companies are doing the most natural thing in the 
world . . . [they are] following their own corporate interest.”305 
Alternatively, FBI Director Louis Freeh asserted that: “in order to keep up 
with the criminals and to protect our national security, the solution is clear: we need 
legislation to ensure that telephone companies and other carriers provide law 
enforcement with access to this new technology.”306 
On May 19, 1994, Director Freeh spoke in Washington, DC, to the American 
Law Institute. He contended that: “Within the last month, the FBI conducted an 
informal survey of federal and local law enforcement regarding recent technological 
problems which revealed over 180 instances where law enforcement was precluded 
from implementing or fully implementing court [wiretap] orders.” 
However, EPIC307 Legal Counsel David L. Sobel disputes the statements of 
FBI Director Freeh. Sobel stated that the FBI and other such agencies have not yet 
demonstrated a need for sweeping new legislation such as their digital telephony 
proposal308 or the Clipper Chip.309 Sobel also stated that “[t]he Bureau has never 
305 Herbert Schiller. (1994, March). Information superhighway: Paving over the public. Z 
Magazine, page 21. 
306 Louis Freeh. (1993, December 8). Making new telecom technology wiretappable. 
Presented at the National Press Club, Washington. D.C. 
307 EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Center) is a public interest research center in 
Washington. DC. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues 
relating to the National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony 
proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer data. 
308 The FBI digital telephony proposal. (1994. October 6). The Wiretap Watch. 1,05. The 
‘FBI’s Wiretap Bill’, mandates that all communications carriers must provide wiretap-ready 
equipment so that the FBI can more easily implement their court-ordered wiretaps. The costs of re¬ 
engineering all communications equipment will be borne by the government, industry and 
consumers. It does not cover information service providers. 
309 The Clipper Chip has been designed and introduced by the Federal government to 
standardize encryption technology so that law enforcement agencies can listen in on “private” 
conversations in electronic media. The device will initially be installed in government phones, and 
AT&T will also sell it for individual and business use. It is clear that the government would very 
much like the Clipper to become the standard for all future domestic electronic “private” 
communication. Many respected professionals in telecommunications and related industries fear 
that the government may soon make moves to outlaw or otherwise kill other encryption technology 
that could compete with the Clipper Chip. 
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presented a convincing case that its wiretapping capabilities are threatened. Yet it 
seeks to redesign the information infrastructure at an astronomical cost to the 
taxpayers.”310 EPIC also notes that the nation’s telephone companies have 
consistently stated, in all cases, that the needs of law enforcement have been met. 
Education in the USA is also aggressively moving forward on a national 
electronic network which will maintain student records. This network will allow 
exchanges of information among a vast number of agencies and schools. There will 
be continuous tracking of individuals through the social service, education and 
criminal justice systems, into higher education, the military and the workplace. 
Overlooked in this organizational structure is any assurance that the data will be 
collected and disseminated only with the knowledge and informed consent of parents. 
This action seems to violate the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974 (20 USC 1232g) and related federal regulations. 
Absent also is a regime level mindset that lobbies for the rights given to all 
citizens by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the US 
Constitution. Purporting to survey the primary goals of‘education’, they seem to be 
establishing as much ‘network’ as possible and gathering as much information as 
possible. There appears to be minimal, if any, concern for the nature of the data 
collected and its relationship to personal privacy. 
Efforts are moving forward on a national level. Proposals being implemented 
include: 
• Compiling electronic “portfolios” for all students, 
• Requiring enrolling kindergarten students to produce Social 
Security Numbers, which will track them through high school. 
• Providing high school students’ transcripts and teachers’ ratings 
(of students) to employers 
310 David Sobel (personal e-mail, January 14, 1994). 
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The National Education ‘Goals 2000’ Panel recommends that it is “essential” 
for school districts and states to collect information on students. This information 
will include: name, type, and number of years in a institution, duration and extent of 
first prenatal care, birth weight, preschool program, poverty status, physical, 
emotional and other development at ages 5 and 6, date of last routine health and 
dental care, extracurricular activities, type and hours per week of community service, 
name of post-secondary institution attended, post-secondary degree or credential 
awarded, employment status, type of employment, and employer name.311 
This report also calls for the collection of additional “data elements useful for 
research and school management”312 such as: names of persons living in student 
household, relationship of those persons to student, highest level of education for 
primary care-givers, total family income, public assistance status and years of benefits, 
number of moves in the last five years, nature and ownership of dwelling.313 
For example, recent legislation in Washington state (SB 6428, HB 1209, HB 
2319) provides direct connectivity between public schools, a social service 
superagency, and other community agencies which provide family services. 
Together We Can, published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Department of Education describes this type of program. It also 
suggests a need to “overcom[e] the confidentiality barrier.”314 
Along the same lines, on July 12, 1994, the CBS Evening News reported that 
the National Commission on Immigration Reform (a bipartisan group formed under 
the 1990 Immigration Reform Act) was about to recommend that a national identity 
311 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227 (1994). 
312 Goals 2000. 
313 Goals 2000. 
314 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education, 
(1993). Together we can: A guide for crafting a profamilv system of education and human services. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
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card be adopted. This card would be used to verify employment eligibility and to 
expedite other actions with government agencies. Each photo-id card would contain a 
name, fingerprints, and a verified Social Security Number. 
CBS reported that this action was supported by long-time national-ID-card 
advocate Senator Alan Simpson (D-Wyoming). The national ED-card idea is not, by 
any means, the idea of a solitary few. California Gov. Pete Wilson has offered to 
make California a test-bed for the proposal. 
The Secret Service has testified before Congress that a such an national ID 
card system development would cost approximately $2 - $4 billion. The Secret 
Service also noted that within a few months of implementation of such a system, 
forged cards would be readily available. 
The Commission said that its mandate was to inquire into a “simple, fraud 
resistant way of verifying authorization to work, building on information the 
government already maintains.. .”315 
In order to function, in the future, in our democracy, we should define what 
privacy is and what privacy is not in cyberspace. There should be a balance between a 
user’s expected right to privacy and the administration’s right to insure the continued 
operation of its systems. This balancing should be crafted into an AUP in order for it 
to be effective. 
Violations to the Right of Privacy 
The fear of invasion of privacy lies in the real possibilities and/or occurrences of 
misuse of advancing technology. The abuse from either a big institution, such as 
the government, or a private individual can easily deprive unsuspecting victims of 
privac\r. Although the types of intrusion may differ depending on the size, 
number, and the intention of invaders, the results all point to the common 
denominator—privacy loss.316 
315 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
316 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
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Current technology allows access to databases to gain information about an 
individual for the sake of knowledge, or to manipulate private information for an 
organization's profit. On the other hand, private individuals may simply invade 
another’s privacy for amusement or for the pleasure of manipulating the technology. 
With the integration of the computer into the information superhighway, more threats 
to privacy invasions arise. 
The statistics (see figure 3) show that the public understands the existence of 
the threat of losing privacy to the government or to an equally equipped employer. 
The examination of the types of invasions of privacy possible by such organizations 
will illuminate the possibilities of electronic monitoring through wiretapping and data 
matching. The increased incorporation of the Internet into today's communication 
systems also raise the same kind of threat which electronic surveillance via the Clipper 
Chip controversy reflects. 
Wiretap Surveillance 
Almost one out of every ten Americans believes his or her telephone has been 
tapped at one time or another317 
Congress intended that wire surveillance be difficult.318 
“In today's society where the use of telephone has become ubiquitous, 
wiretapping can provide a valuable aid for catching criminals in the act or for simply 
giving the tapper important information for personal gain.”319 Wiretapping is capable 
317 William Petrocelli. (1981). Low profile: How to avoid the privacy invaders. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, page 179. 
318 Branscomb, page 36. 
319 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line], (1996, March 26). 
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of depriving individuals of their privacy, as a person may not have knowledge that a 
third party is listening to and/or recording the conversation. Tuerkheimer320 believes 
that people have “an expectation of privacy” when making telephone calls. Therefore, 
the possibility of an unwanted party monitoring private conversations is quite 
upsetting. Such is generally not the case on the Internet. People do not appreciate 
what privacy is like in cyberspace, let alone have an expectation of privacy. 
The current wiretap statute has de facto loopholes that leave sizable room for 
invasion of the privacy of an unsuspecting phone caller. Although, according to the 
notice in the telephone company’s White Pages, “calls between customers are not 
monitored for [training and quality control purposes] or for any purpose ... except 
when required by law enforcement and national defense agencies,” however, if the 
telephone company spots suspicious calls, the telephone company may inform the 
law enforcement agencies of suspicions of criminal activity so that the law 
enforcement agents can obtain a warrant to tap the phone line. Although the statute 
requires the federal agencies to obtain a search warrant in order to tap a line, 
telephone company is exempted from obtaining any search-warrants for routine 
monitor.321 As a result, in one incident, the telephone company monitored about 1.8 
million telephone calls for five years, justifying its action as necessary to catch Phone 
Phreaks.322 Unfortunately, more than 98% of the calls monitored were innocent,3~3 
320 Frank M. Tuerkheimer. (1993, August). The underpinnings of privacy protection. 
Communications of the ACM, 36(8), page 36. 
321 William Petrocelli. (1981). Low profile: How to avoid the privacy invaders. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, page 183. 
322 Petrocelli, page 180. 
323 Petrocelli, page 180. 
92 
Petrocelli also reported that telephone company employees routinely listen to 
telephone conversations under the guise of maintenance and training.324 
Even though wiretap law stipulates that phone companies should assist law 
enforcement agencies in executing warrants for wiretap, the law does not provide 
for unofficial surveillance by the telephone company. 325 However, it is difficult to 
stop such surveillance because the existing law exempts the phone-company 
employee in routine monitoring of the calls.326 Hence, unofficial surveillance can 
occur in the disguise of routine monitoring.327 
The loopholes in the existing wiretap laws allow room for loss of privacy for 
individuals caught unsuspectingly. Granted that “wiretapping has been a critical tool 
in combating organized crime, drug trafficking, and acts of extortion, terrorism, 
kidnapping, and murder,”328 the potential for wiretapping to not only intrude but 
monitor individuals weighs heavily in today's society. One can argue that, when 
people use the phone, they should assume that “the contents of their private phone 
calls can be revealed by a telephone workman who wanders across their line.”329 “In 
fact, perhaps people should assume that no privacy will be given when making any 
phone calls.”330 
The extension of the telecommunication technology from telephones to the 
Internet not only extends new methods of communicating but also the problems of 
324 Petrocelli. page 183. 
325 Marc Rotenberg. (1993, August). Communications privacy: Implications for network 
design. Communications of the ACM. 36(8). page 67. 
326 Petrocelli. page 184. 
327 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
328 Dorothy E. Denning. (1993, March). Wiretapping and cryptography. IEEE Spectrum. 
30(3), page 16. 
329 Petrocelli, page 184. 
330 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
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unwanted surveillance. The same amount of privacy should exist in using e-mail 
by the same line of logic as using the telephone. However, because of even less law 
existing to protect privacy rights in using e-mail, privacy invasion problems are 
rife in the e-mail system.331 
“In fine historical fashion, the court stated that the legislation should resolve 
these types of problems by enacting clearer statutes covering e-mail systems.”332 
In using either a phone or Internet, the problem of violation of privacy remains 
unresolved because of unclear legislation. Although the system providers claim 
that maintaining the operation of the systems necessitates routine monitoring, such 
routine monitoring can easily transform into surveillance which invades the 
privacy of the users of the systems. As people depend more and more on these 
technologies for communication, more surveillance will probably take place to 
secure the systems’ operations, and there will be more violations of privacy. The 
legislature must enact clearer legislation on what should constitute a routine 
monitoring.333 
Data Surveillance 
As information-recording processes have become cheaper and more efficient... an 
appetite for data has intensified, this has been accompanied by a predilection 
toward centralization and collection of file material. As if responding to something 
akin to Parkinson’s Law, technological improvements in information-handling 
capability have been followed by a tendency to engage in more extensive 
manipulation and analysis of recorded data.334 
Many artifacts of technology (e.g., gunpowder, the automobile, the aeroplane) 
have been the penultimate examples of a double edged sword’s ability to cut in two 
directions. The computer is no exception. “The power that attracts people to 
computers has become a nemesis of right to privacy.”335 The ability of the computer 
to store vast amounts of information for a long time entices the government and large 
organizations to do just that. However, storing and analyzing that information raises 
331 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
332 George B. Trubow. (1992, March). When is monitoring e-mail really snooping? IEEE 
Software. 9(2), page 97. 
333 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
334 Arthur R. Miller. (1971). The assault on privacy: Computers, data banks, and dossiers. 
Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, page 21. 
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problems concerning privacy as does the mere potential for such analysis and 
subsequent use. 
Due to the fact that the dissemination and interchange of information via 
computer networks is virtually instantaneous, the computer can become another tool 
in violating the right of privacy. 
The Clipper Chip Controversy 
The government intelligence agencies feared that the widespread use of the almost 
unbreakable encryption would breed criminal activities. The problem rises not 
from the growth of criminal activities but from the inability of the government 
intelligence agencies to break the encryption to detect and catch the culprits.336 
“One of the privacy concerns involved in the use of the Internet lies in the 
application of encryption codes to gain as much privacy in using e-mail as using 
regular mail.”337 To guard against computer hackers who may intercept and read 
private e-mail, people increasingly use encryption. To make the inaccessible 
accessible, the agencies proposed the Clipper Chip as the encryption method for 
people to use. Because the Clipper Chip allows the government to hold the key to 
decrypt, the controversy ensued between the proponents and the opponents of the 
implementation of the Clipper Chip. The disagreements surrounding the 
implementation of the Clipper Chip technology as the last topic in the types of the 
violations of privacy demonstrates the urgent need for progressive, clearer legislation 
in consideration of advancing telecommunication technology. 
336 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-lineJ. 
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The National Security Agency and the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology designed the Clipper Chip. The system relies on a key to encode and 
decode information. The key consists of bits or series of numbers, and an 
algorithm.338 “The keys would be placed in escrow with the two government 
agencies. The agencies would only be authorized to hand the keys to the law- 
enforcement agencies when probable cause to believe that a crime had been 
committed was demonstrated.”339 “Hence, government agencies would be able to 
decode if necessary. The controversy stems from this escrow security system of the 
Clipper Chip and the possibility of the government to abuse the back door”340 
Clipper Chip proponents argue that the proposal allows “law-abiding citizens 
with access to the encryption they need and [prevents] criminals from using it to hide 
criminal activity.”341 A Clipper Chip proponent, Dorothy E. Denning states several 
points in favor of the Clipper Chip proposal: 
Although present law does not explicitly state that communication service 
providers must incorporate systems which will insure that the law enforcement 
agents have the capability to intercept data, the law does state that the 
communication providers must assist those law-enforcement agents with warrants. 
The law naturally lacks the provision because at the time of the enactment of the 
law, legislators did not anticipate technological advances. Hence, in today's society, 
we must interpret the meaning of the word assist more flexibly.342 
The Clipper Chip proposal would require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
route the monitored traffic to the law-enforcement agents. “[T]he connection to a 
338 Dorothy E. Denning. (1993, July-August). The clipper encryption system. American 
Scientist. 81(4). page 31. 
339 Levin, Carol. (1993, November 23). Digital privacy: Who has the right to read your 
data? PC Magazine, 12(20). page 29 
340 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
341 Levin, page 29. 
342 Dorothy E. Denning. (1993, March). To tap or not to tap. Communications of the ACM, 
36(3), page 27. 
96 
remote government monitoring facility would support an outgoing data stream 
only... [it] does not impose any new or additional danger to the security of the 
systems and the privacy of the people who rely on them for their communications.”343 
Denning postulates that the privacy level will not decrease because the “employees of 
the service providers who have been strict about requiring court orders”344 must 
initiate the surveillance as opposed to law enforcement officials. 
The Right to Privacy in the Age of Telecommunications345 critiques Denning’s 
position when he states that: 
In light of the public concern over intrusiveness of the wiretapping, because of 
public reaction against the court's inaction, the [Congress] took the action to curb 
wire surveillance. Although Congress could not have known how far technology 
would progress, the enactment of the wiretapping law did not intend or imply the 
facilitation of the wire surveillance for the government agencies. Denning 
misconstrues this intention by taking the word “assist” out of context. The basic 
purpose of enacting the wiretapping law is to allow as few wiretaps as possible, not 
to aid the intelligence agencies in wire surveillance.346 
In reality, the threat to privacy will not diminish, and may well increase. The 
Clipper Chip proposal does not attempt to reduce such risk. Warren and Brandeis34 
note in their 1890 law review article that privacy is diminishing.348 Even with 
governmental reassurances and safeguards the public must have “more than a huge 
leap of faith ... to entrust government agencies with the keys to the encryption.”349 
343 Dorothy E. Denning. (1993, March). To tap or not to tap. Communications of the ACM, 
36(3). page 28. 
344 Dorothy E. Denning. (1993, March). To tap or not to tap. Communications of the ACM, 
36(3). page 28. 
345 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
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349 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. 
97 
In support of the Clipper Chip, Marc Rotenberg indicates that that the 
intelligence community (e.g., CIA, military intelligence entities) and law enforcement 
agencies (FBI, state police, state bureaus of investigation) only want access, not 
remote monitoring capability, simply does not obviate the fact that the proposal 
intends to set up a “government monitoring facility.”350 
By endorsing the monitoring capability, people cannot expect privacy even though 
the quintessential reason for using the encryption is for privacy. Hence even if by 
practice those who use the system will not lose privacy, people will not expect 
privacy to be preserved because people will perceive the omnipresent monitoring 
capability of the government in using the Clipper Chip. This apprehension violates 
the privacy of the Clipper Chip users by changing the perception of the degree of 
privacy maintained or not maintained. The users lose a sense of freedom and 
personal space. Bv losing certain personal space, the users will also lose some 
351 privacy. 
Clearly the government is charged with the duty to protect its citizens from 
harm and illegal activity. So, too, is a university administration duty-bound to insure, 
inter alia, that the computer system is protected from attack and is managed in a fair 
and equitable manner. “But the cost of protection must not come at the expense of 
the rights unconsented by the individuals.”352 To balance the right of privacy against 
the government’s power to protect “shifts the balance of power and control to... [the] 
government.”353 This shifting of power in favor of the government brings into serious 
question the principles of the social contract drawn by the founding fathers in the 
Constitution. 
350 Rotenberg, Marc. (1993, August). Communications privacy: Implications for network 
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Unfortunately, in electronic communication, the escrow keys to the 
encryption would open “not only the phone line but the filing cabinet”354 and the 
resulting loss of privacy coupled with the government’s ability to more freely wander 
about in the personal (and otherwise private affairs) of the public would be seriously 
out of balance. 
This grim picture is the worst scenario; at the moment, the government asserts 
that it has no intention of mandating the Clipper Chip.355 
However, painting the extreme worst case scenario elucidates how much privacy 
rights can be violated. Although the argument for not accepting the Clipper Chip 
cannot depend on the potential of the worst case, the picture focuses on the method 
and the extent of the privacy violations that can occur. Even if the government 
chooses not to monitor to the extreme, the frightening fact still remains that the use 
of the Clipper Chip will result in privacy loss. 
The Assessment of Surveillance Problems 
Surveillance constitutes only a part of the issues of privacy invasions in the 
telecommunications. Disregard for privacy rights have pervaded the mentality of 
the individuals as well as the big organizations, (e.g. computer hacking, 
eavesdropping, etc.).356 
Wiretapping, data manipulation, and the Clipper Chip proposal appear to 
provide a readily available means by which invasion of privacy rights through 
surveillance may occur. “The continued expansion and the greater use of 
telecommunication technology creates new opportunities for abusing the advancing 
technology at the expense of privacy rights.”357 
354 Barlow. John Perry. (1993, November). A plain text on crypto policy. Communications 
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Growth of the Internet (see figure 2) causes many troubling questions to arise 
such as concerns regarding the “status and the level of control of the service providers 
such as Prodigy.”358 Although civil liberty “groups such as Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social responsibility currently battle the 
issues of many individual rights (including privacy rights) in using the Internet,”359 the 
right to privacy is legally ‘in limbo’ until clear and focused legislation defining the 
right to privacy in the context of telecommunication technology is enacted. 
General Discussion of Privacy 
Since 1988, computer network security breaches have grown dramatically, 
increasing 50% per year on the Internet—today’s information highway. The 
ability of the government to protect Americans’ most private information is at 
stake. For example, the Internal Revenue Service is among those agencies who 
rely increasingly on computer networks for such things as filing tax returns. 
Anyone who pays federal taxes has to wonder who might be browsing through 
his/her personal financial data. 
- Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE), Ranking Republican, 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Throughout its history the United States has contained a great dilemma within 
its legal and philosophical system. The problem is its need to create a system that 
protects everyone equally. This is a major difficulty when so many disparate groups 
exist. The dilemma is one of trying to balance an individual’s right to privacy against 
the public’s right to know. The Constitutional dilemma between a person’s right to 
privacy and the public’s right to know invokes the concept of America itself. We 
appear to be constantly wrestling with this issue—cyberspace appears to be no 
exception. 
358 Deborah Branscum. (1991, March). Ethics, e-mail, and the law. MacWorld. 8(3). page 
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Warren and Brandeis, for all practical purposes, created the modem notion of 
privacy in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article entitled The Right to Privacy.360 
They recognized the need for constant refinement and development of this right and 
stated that the idea “that the individual shall have full protection in person and in 
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary 
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and intent of such protection.”361 
There should be a balance between a user’s expected right to privacy and the 
administration’s right to insure the continued operation of its systems. This balancing 
should be crafted into an AUP in order for it to be effective. 
The Role of Search and Seizure in Regard to Computer Networks 
Today, the degradation of the inner life is symbolized by the fact that the only 
place sacred from interruption is the private toilet. 
- Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, ch. 1, set. 5 (1938). 
Introduction 
The Computer—technology’s latest tool in communications—has forced us to 
re-engineer our policy in regard to the balance between individual privacy and 
society’s need for information. The new communications technology has ushered in a 
new era of global access where even the least powerful in society have a significant 
voice. However, the technology has generated the possibility that corporations and 
360 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
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the government will be the beneficiaries of Orwellian powers. The outcome of this 
will be determined by the underlying societal values, and not by the technology itself 
Sergent notes that this is an “apparent...clash between data privacy 
[concerns] and law enforcement’s need to gather evidence in criminal 
investigations.”362 
In recent years, it has become apparent that we have an ever diminishing 
degree (and amount) of control over what personal information of ours is available - 
and available to just about anyone.363 Neither the law enforcement establishment nor 
society in general seems to have kept fully abreast of the changing technological 
times. As a result, our privacy has been severely eroded. Unless a better 
understanding is achieved in regard to the relationship of cyberspace to our real world 
paradigms, we may soon find that ‘privacy’ is non-existent. In regard to search and 
seizures, ‘privacy’ is the Tine in the sand’ which may not be crossed without a search 
warrant. 
Sergent notes that the “Supreme Court’s reliance on risk analysis and its 
avoidance of the normative questions underlying individual privacy expectations make 
it difficult to predict how it will decide future Fourth Amendment cases involving 
364 
computerized information.” Sergent also advocates for a “framework by which the 
362 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995). 
363 Larry Tve. (1993, September 5). Privacy lost in high-tech era. Boston Sunday Globe. 
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Fourth Amendment can be applied to a range of activities involved in computer 
investigation without hampering the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”365 
To develop these frameworks, Sergent suggests that the Supreme Court 
should extend its current analysis: 
... of the scope and content of the Fourth Amendment to [include] searches and 
seizures of computer information. Because the level of privacy we enjoy in personal 
information depends upon value choices made by our society, examining legal 
norms is an important part of the process of making those choices. As new 
technology evolves, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment methodology is likely 
to favor security over privacv. The model [put in place should involvel more 
, . . 366 
emphasis to privacy. 
Kapor and Godwin367 warn of computer searches and seizures based upon the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section suggested search and 
seizure guidelines. Kapor and Godwin are concerned that the ABA’s position 
amazingly seems to be based upon three publications from the Department of Justice’s 
National Institute of Justice. Kapor and Godwin note that: 
1. There was no guidance to the magistrate as to when the computer or related 
equipment should not be seized, either because it is not necessary as evidence or 
because such a seizure would intolerably chill the lawful exercise of First 
Amendment rights or abridge a property owner’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
2. There was inadequate recognition of the business or individual computer 
owner’s interest in continuing with lawful commercial business, which might be 
hindered or halted by the seizure of an expensive computer. 
3. There was no effort to measure the likelihood that investigators would find 
computers equipped with such justice-obstructing measures as automatic erasure 
365 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacv. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995). 
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software or degausser booby-trapped hardware, the presence of which might justify 
a no-knock search and seizure, among other responses.368 
Privacy and Possessory Interests 
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution forbids unreasonable searches 
and seizures. The government, if it wishes to intrude into protected (private) areas, 
should conduct itself within the Constitutional definition of reasonable search. The 
Supreme Court has strictly limited the definitions of the terms search and seizure as 
foundations of the issue of reasonableness. Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate 
how searches and seizures of computer hardware and data fall within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The word search and the word seizure are not synonymous.369 Under the law 
regarding searches and seizures, the term search implies that there is a prying into a 
hidden place for something that might be concealed there.370 For the purposes of 
crafting a university AUP, the notion should be established throughout the AUP that 
‘personal property rights’ as we know them in the real world do not necessarily apply 
to a university computer system. 
A user should understand that his/her account on a university computer 
system is not analogous to his/her domicile or physical person. University computer 
space is metaphorically, far more like a public place than a private place\ it is likely 
not metaphorically akin to, for example, a person’s university dormitory room. 
If this concept is established in the AUP, then it would follow that it is not a 
search (an exploratory investigation) when one observes that which is in an open non¬ 
private place.371 This concept would allow system administrators to have access to a 
368 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
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user's account in the same manner that any person would be able, in real life, to 
access a public space. There would be no need for a search warrant. 
A Definition of Seizure 
The U S. Supreme Court has defined seizure as a "meaningful interference 
with an individual's Possessory interest in that property ”3: For computer networks, 
this creates an interesting situation as data can be seized (actually copied to another 
disk or tape) and the computer system will, seemingly, suffer "no meaningful 
interference "”5 as defined in United States v Jacobsen Computer files and data are 
intangible, and it is difficult to envision a ‘seizure' occurring when something is 
copied as opposed to a seizing of the original. How ever in Katz v United Statesr~ 
and LeCiair v Han. '5 the courts found that intangible objects and the information 
which they contain could be held as a seizure, even though the original documents 
w ere themselves not taken from their owner. 
On the other hand, law enforcement officials routinely copy serial numbers 
from objects, and this has been held not to be a seizure, as it does not meaningfully 
■ ‘ United Stales v. Jacobsen. 466 US. 109. 113 (1984); see also United States v. Karo. 46S 
U S. ”05. "12-13 (1984) (The installation of a beeper in a container was not a seizure w hen it did not 
meaningfully interfere with the defendant's possessory interest in that container). 
33 United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109. 113 (1984). 
3-4 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The Fourth Amendment governs not only 
the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard 
without any technical trespass under... local property law .) 
375 LeCiair v. Hart. 800 F.2d 692. 6% (1986) (This case held thai a seizure occurred when 
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possession). 
105 
interfere with the owner’s Possessory376 interest.377 In Bills v. Aseltine.378 the court 
held that taking photographs of a search scene was not a seizure. Sergent states that 
by “literal extension, this approach could leave copying of computer files outside the 
bounds of Fourth Amendment regulation. The Court might say that the information 
was not seized because it remains available to its owner.”379 
However, the Supreme Court had previously ruled otherwise in Katz when it 
found that a wiretap did constitute a seizure of a conversation. Sergent reconciles the 
seeming conflict between Katz and Hicks by arguing: 
...the Possessory interest in a document or conversation consists of controlling the 
dissemination and use of the information contained therein, whereas the Possessory 
interest in an tangible item, such as a stereo, lies almost entirely in its use. Copying 
the information from a document or conversation interferes with control and thus 
interferes with the Possessory interest. Photographing a scene or copying a serial 
number, on the other hand, does not meaningfully interfere with possession. 
Because the value of a computer file lies in the information therein, it is much 
more analogous to a written document or oral conversation. Although Hicks could 
logically extend to all intangible information, copying a computer file should 
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.380 
The question of whether or not copying computer files and data is a seizure 
will become a more important issue as the use of computers for storing such 
information increases and as more illegal activity occurs in this circumstance. 
This question has not often arisen in courts. As Sergent notes: 
First, police have generally preferred to confiscate the equipment containing the 
information, rather than simply copying the information itself. Clearly, 
confiscation of equipment constitutes a seizure. 
376 Possessory Interest is a person’s right to exert control over property in which they have 
ownership of. 
377 Arizona vs. Hicks. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
378 Bills vs. Aseltine. 958 F.2d 697, 707 (1992) (The recording of visual images of a scene 
by means of photography does not amount to a seizure because it does not meaningfully interfere 
with any possessory interest.) 
379 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995) at 1185. 
380 Sergent at 1130. 
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Second, examination of the physical storage media is usually considered a search, 
dispensing with the need to discuss whether a seizure occurred as well. Finally, 
even if copying information does not constitute a seizure, in many instances the 
police will want to remove the information from the defendant’s possession 
entirely. Such a removal would clearly be a seizure.381 
It is difficult, at best, to attempt to proffer a legal definition of seizure as it 
pertains to a computer network user’s data and/or files. 
A Definition of Search 
The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 
“persons, houses, papers and effects,” is not extended to the open fields. The 
distinction between the latter and the house is as old as common law.382 
The legal definition of a search is quite vague. The Constitutional meaning of 
the term search is certainly much more difficult to define than is the term seizure,383 
Prior to 1967, Olmstead384 mandated that there must be an intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected place before a search could occur.385 This meant that a 
“search” was area-based.386 In the age of electronic communications, the Olmstead 
decision was wholly inadequate. The Olmstead court held that eavesdropping on a 
person’s telephone conversation by use of a telephone tap did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment’s search clause as the wires themselves were not part of the defendant’s 
home. Thus, absent any physical intrusion into the defendant’s home (a specific area), 
there was no search and therefore no search warrant was needed. 
381 Sergent at 1186. 
382 Hester v. United States. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., J.). 
383 Wayne R. LaFave, (1987/1994). Search and seizure: A treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment (2nd ed.). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing. Due to the number of possibilities for police 
action, the Supreme Court has not proffered a comprehensive definition of the term search. 
384 See. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
385 See generally. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
386 Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). 
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Then in 1967, Katz v. United States387 reversed Olmstead as to the ‘area- 
based’ analysis. Katz’ central point was that the search is dependent upon a 
individual’s expectation of privacy in regard to the object or area to be sought in a 
search. Katz caused the Fourth Amendment to apply directly to individuals rather 
than specific places. Speaking in support of the majority opinion, Justice Harlan 
delineated the accepted standards for a search: “first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”388 
The first standard which Justice Harlan defined is easily overcome by making 
an advanced public announcement(s) of the surveillance mechanism/intention. 
Amsterdam has suggested that the government could diminish a person’s subjective 
expectations of privacy by regularly announcing that comprehensive electronic 
surveillance was in place.389 There would then be no expectation of privacy, as 
everyone would be warned that someone or something would always be monitoring 
their activity. 
Sergent notes that: 
Little attention has been given to the independent significance of the subjective 
test, so it is not clear exactly how it should be interpreted. Because the subjective 
expectation of privacy has been so little discussed, and because it is so context 
specific, it is of little use in applying the Fourth Amendment to future situations.390 
The second factor in Justice Harlan’s test is objective reasonableness. 
Objective reasonableness is a value judgment based determination of how much 
privacy a person may reasonably expect in today’s society.391 
387 See generally. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
388 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan. J., concurring). This standard 
has since been adopted by a majority of the Court; See also. California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207, 211 
(1986); Smith v. Maryland. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
389 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment. 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349. 
384(1974). 
390 Sergent at 1186. 
391 See generally, Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in United States v. White: 
We should not... merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the 
desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical question ... is whether 
under our system of government... we should impose on our citizens the risks of 
the electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant 
• 197 
requirement. 
Through the years the Court has been hesitant to make an explicit decision 
based upon this ‘risk analysis’ (how much privacy can a person reasonably expect to 
have). The Court typically asks if the affected individual should have expected that 
he/she would be undisturbed.393 In California vs. Ciraolo. Mr. Justice Powell stated 
that the reasonableness of the action should be the concern of law enforcement rather 
than the affected individual.394 
As Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in Smith vs. Maryland.395 another 
issue here is that the Court has chosen to view privacy as a “discrete commodity, 
possessed absolutely or not at all.”396 In Katz, the Court stated that what “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public ...is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”397 
This rationale of‘knowing exposure’ is problematic in that it has been 
extended such that even disclosure of a bit of information causes one to completely 
loose Fourth Amendment protection of the information in question. It should not be 
392 United States vs. White. 401 US 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
393 Rakas vs. Illinois. 439 US 128, 143, 148-49 (1978); Katz vs. US at 353. The Court 
essentially declared that a person who discloses something to another person assumes (unto 
themselves) the risk of losing protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
394 California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207, 224 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) The Court fails 
to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses made of the 
[public] airspace. 
395 Smith v. Maryland. 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled that a person placing 
a call has no “reasonable expectation of privacy” that the telephone company will not reveal the fact 
of the call to third parties, therefore, no warrant was required. 
396 John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection. 
79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1105, 1177(1989). 
397 Katz at 355. 
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that a person’s privacy protection rights under the Fourth Amendment are totally lost 
merely due to law enforcement’s ability to procure (otherwise protected) information 
from a third party (by any means). 
Search is a vague and ill-defined legal term. As Sergent states: 
... if something is accessible or visible to the public, regardless of the chances of 
the public actually accessing or seeing it, it will be considered to have been 
knowingly exposed, and therefore be outside any reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In either case, the individual loses her privacy interest because she has disclosed 
that information to another party.398 
The Significance of the Discussion 
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized 
makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one 
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left 
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.399 
In the People v. Manzi. the court held that if recognizable contraband (which 
was seized by police) is in open view on a street or other place which can be lawfully 
entered without a trespass occurring or fraudulent invasion of the right of a person, 
then there was no search but there was a seizure, and nothing in the federal 
Constitution inhibits the seizure of property, if the possession of constitutes a crime.400 
It is important to establish a metaphorical correlation between Manzi (and other cases 
cited below) and computer systems. But in cyberspace, all things appear the same. 
Hence it is extremely difficult to only view an object and ascertain whether that object 
is, for example, a hacking program or some harmless utility program. 
In the People v. Heath the court held that an observation from concealment or 
a hidden area which is otherwise open to public access is not an unreasonable search. 
This, however, is not to infer that reading the content of e-mail is allowable into and 
out of the computer system to include the monitoring of disk space being utilized by 
398 Sergent at 1186. 
399 Marron v. United States. 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
400 People v. Manzi 
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any given user.401 This case would seem to offset an argument that a system 
administrator may not monitor traffic. The concept in Heath is difficult to apply as 
monitoring in cyberspace is much more intrusive than it would be in a real-world 
setting. Cyberspatial monitoring seems to necessarily involve trespassing (at least on a 
conceptual level). 
In People v. Thomas, the court held that it is not a search in the Constitutional 
sense where observations are made of events happening in plain sight (and made from 
a place the observers have a right to be).402 This position was reinforced in State v. 
Childs, in that the court concluded that no search as defined by the Fourth 
Amendment occurred where the objects of the observation were in plain view and the 
police officers made those observations from a place they had a right to be.403 As in 
Heath, the difficulty here is also the notion of trespass. Both Heath and Thomas are 
based on the notion that an illegal intrusion is prevented, in this case, by the no¬ 
trespass concept. Such is not true in cyberspace. In the real world, privacy (a 
physical intrusion) is not protected by privacy statutes as much as it is protected by 
other laws, such as, trespassing, or, breaking and entering. 
It is important, on the part of a university, to establish its position that a 
computer account is not a private secluded place. Establishing private places would 
create a situation where users have a reasonable expectation that their space will not 
be invaded. If the situation is such that the computer users have an expectation of 
privacy in their accounts, then any rummaging about or intermeddling with privacy is 
searching within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.404 
401 People v. Heath. 72 Cal. Rptr 457, 458 (1968), 266 C.A.2nd 754. 
402 People v. Thomas. 169 Cal.Rptr. 570, 572 (1980). 
403 State of Arizona v. Childs. 519 P.2d 854, 856 (1974), 110 Ariz. 389. 
404 State of Maine v. Barclay. 398 A.2d 794, 796 (1979); State v. Richards. 269 A.2d 129, 
134 (1970). 
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A university should establish the belief (policy) that computer accounts and 
disk space are not immune from observation by appropriate university employees 
conducting tasks related to the rendition of service to the computer system and its 
users. 
Search and Seizure in Our Electronic Society 
Usually, administrators/owner have but a single relationship with those under 
their authority. Typically, this relationship is one of‘employer-employee.’ In a 
University setting, there is more than one legal relationship that should be considered. 
A University has an ‘employer-employee’ relationship with its faculty and staff, but it 
also has a ‘teacher-student’ relationship with other members of its community. This 
means that there will be at least two sets of legal standards which will guide policy in 
this area. 
The First Amendment is, for the most part, our privacy amendment. The 
Fourth Amendment is that which defines the circumstances under which ‘privacy’ can 
be intruded upon. So, too, will the ‘privacy’ area of the AUP play against the 
‘freedom from unreasonable search and seizure1 area of the AUP. These antithetical 
positions force balance, and this tension will provide a sounding board to assure that 
the ‘privacy’ principles and statements in the AUP are valid and reasonable. It is an 
advantage when developing an AUP to craft the Search and Seizure statements in 
concert with the ‘privacy’ area as the First and Fourth Amendments are built and 
measured on mutual ground.405 
405 Harvey A. Silverglate and Thomas C. Viles. (1991, May). Constitutional, legal, and 
ethical considerations for dealing with electronic files in the age of cyberspace. Paper presented at 
the 1991 Federal Enforcement Conference, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC. 
The courts recognize that the First and Fourth Amendments grew from the same historical source, 
for the struggle for press freedom was energized by the struggle against the license to print, and 
against the prior restraints imposed by the Crown to enforce the license. In the Supreme Court's 
words, “the struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the 
licensor... And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish ‘without a license what 
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It is important to clearly define this area in an AUP, as law enforcement 
agencies and the legal system have not yet provided a clear set of standards. With 
respect to computer searches and seizures, Kapor and Godwin state that law 
enforcement “lack[s] understanding, both of the new technology, and - just as 
important - of how it is normally used, and they simply cannot conduct the 
discretion-less, particular searches and seizures required by the Fourth Amendment 
when those searches and seizures involve computer equipment and data.”406 
What’s happening is that law enforcement agencies have attempted only to 
discern what are misuses of a computer. This creates a situation where law 
enforcement agencies do not routinely recognize the First Amendment significance of 
BBSs and other forms of electronic speech and publishing. The resulting problem is 
that there is a tendency to issue broad search and seizure warrants. Warrants issued 
based on this line of thought can, in the long term, abridge the free exercise of one’s 
First Amendment rights. 
On January' 24, 1990, a handful of Secret Service agents, accompanied by two 
employees of the local telephone company, seized the equipment of a twenty year 
old man living with his mother in New York. From his bedroom, they seized a 
Commodore 128 computer, 200 floppy disks, a telephone answering machine. 
formerly could be published only with one.’” While this freedom from previous restraint upon 
publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint 
was a leading purpose in the adoption of that constitutional provision. Lovell v. City of Griffin. 
Ga.. 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). The Supreme Court commands that special care be taken when 
authorizing or reviewing a search involving any entity engaged in the publication or dissemination 
of ideas. “Freedom of the press” long has been interpreted broadly to protect not only newspapers 
publishers and pamphleteers, ej;., Lovell. Id., 303 U.S. at 452, but also motion pictures, Roaden v. 
Kentucky. 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Burstvn v. Wilson. 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), and even computer bulletin boards, Legi-Tech v. 
Keiper. 766 F.2d 728. 734-35 (1985), from prior restraints and general searches. In order to avoid 
prior restraints on speech, the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment “is to be accorded 
the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things [to be seized]’ are books, and the basis for their 
seizure is the ideas which they contain.” Stanford v. State of Texas. 379 U.S. 476 (1965) reh den. 
380 U.S. 926 (1965), citing Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). 
406 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line], 
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cassette-playing radio, and all of his musical cassette tapes. Apparently, the Secret 
Service was searching for evidence of alleged computer crimes. 
On March 1, 1990 the Secret Service raided offices of Steve Jackson Games, a 
small Austin start-up company which designed and manufactured fantasy role- 
playing books and games. The Secret Service seized the company’s three 
computer systems, two laser printers, miscellaneous hardware, papers, back-up 
disks, and a single pocket calculator. The company’s plans and galleys for a new 
role-playing game, GURPS Cyberpunk, also were seized, after an agent opined 
that the game was a handbook for computer crime. (The format of Steve 
Jackson’s games is similar to that of “Dungeons and Dragons”; GURPS 
Cyberpunk consists of a lengthy instruction book plus general information about 
the game. In fact, all of the company’s games consist solely of printed matter. 
The company was not in the business of manufacturing any software.) 
On May 8, 1990, as part of Operation Sun Devil another bulletin board, called 
‘RIPCO‘, was raided. All of the equipment necessary to run the bulletin board 
was seized. The RIPCO board had operated since 1983, and it had accumulated 
extensive text files which were accessible to its 600 users. No arrests were made, 
nor have any charges been filed against the operators. But the board was shut 
down. 
On February 28, 1991, following an arrest for rape and battery, the Massachusetts 
state and local police seized the suspect’s computer equipment. The suspect 
reportedly operated a 650-subscriber bulletin board called ‘BEN’, which is 
described as “geared largely to a gay/leather/SAM crowd.” It is not clear what 
the board’s seizure is supposed to have accomplished, but the board is now shut 
down, and the identities and messages of its users are in the hands of the 
police.407 
An exemplary case-in-point of the issues of privacy and search and seizure is 
incident involving Arnaldo Lerma.408 Lerma, a Virginia resident, posted numerous 
court documents on the Internet concerning the California based Church of 
Scientology. “In response, the church filed a copyright infringement suit against 
Lerma and his Internet access provider.”409 Ultimately, federal marshals and church 
lawyers obtained warrants, entered his home, and removed all equipment which could 
be used to post information on the Internet. The federal marshals seized several 
407 Dibbell. Gibbs. (1990, July 24). On line and out of bounds. Village Voice, page 27; 
Jahnke. (1990, November 14). The cops come to Cyberspace. Boston Magazine, page 140; John 
Perry Barlow. (1990). Crime and puzzlement [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
http://www.eff.org/pub /Publications /JohnPerryBarlow /crime_and_puzzlement.l. 
408 Nguyen Lan. (1995, Aug. 13). Virginia man’s computer seized in Internet lawsuit. 
Washington Post, page B6. 
409 Caden and Lucas at para 12. 
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hundred floppy disks, a number of hard drives, a computer system and a scanner. The 
case against Lerma was dismissed and all seized material was returned to Lerma.410 
These are but a few examples of the gulf between law enforcement and the 
Constitution in the area of computer related search and seizure issues. This gulf 
needs to be bridged by the establishment of practical as well as theoretically sound 
Search and Seizure procedures which protect the rights and responsibilities of all 
parties concerned. Prosecutors are well aware of the kinds of misuses to which 
computer technology lends itself. But that ‘awareness’ does not address the legal 
uses of computer systems. This is a major predicament, as the magistrate who must 
issue search warrants, and, by decendancy the System Administrator who has 
magistrate-like functionality in regard to the computer system, have an inadequate 
recognition level of what legal procedures should guide them. The magistrate must 
have this knowledge in order to judge whether or not a given petition for search 
demonstrates probable cause for suspicion of criminal activity. 
So, too, the system administrator should be able to judge whether a given 
action, or situation, would legally allow a search of a user’s disk space (and from that 
search, possibly, have a legal basis for further action). Without a set of acceptable 
legal standards upon which to base these decisions, the magistrate and the System 
Administrator lack the ability to protect the rights of users and to insure the safety 
and well-being of their system. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop AUP 
statements to address the issue of search and seizure, especially since the line 
between constitutionally allowable searches and seizures and illegal searches and 
seizures, in respect to computers, is dim and uncertain. Establishing University policy 
410 Religious Technology Center v. Lerma. et. al., 95-1107-A E.D. Va. (November 29. 
1995). 
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which speaks to these issues will aid in insulating the University from legal conflicts as 
well as in forestalling the workaday conflicts generated by dissatisfied users. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has been developing model search 
and seizure guidelines. The EFF hopes to persuade the American Bar Association to 
adopt their model in place of its current guidelines for the issuance of search warrants 
relating to business records. In an attempt to make searches less intrusive and 
destructive, Kapor and Godwin of the EFF recommend that: 
1. computers used for publishing or electronic bulletin boards be afforded the same 
First Amendment protections as other means of publication; 
2. in determining if just cause for seizure of equipment and software exists, judges 
shift the emphasis from what is technologically possible (e.g. an electronic trip 
wire that can erase all data) to what is likely to happen; 
3. the search of computer disks take place on a business’s premises, whenever 
possible; 
4. under most circumstances, computers be seized only when they are the 
instruments of a crime.411 
These guidelines seem to be excellent protection for a University, its 
employees, and its students. The EFF’s model is an excellent balance between the 
user’s right to privacy, and, the University’s right to safeguard its systems, and other 
users on those systems. 
Applying Fourth Amendment Protection to Cyberspace 
Given the Supreme Court’s approach to measuring the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection, it is very difficult to predict what the Court will have to say 
411 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line], 
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about future cases which involve property which exists in cyberspace. As there is a 
need to strike a balance between society’s need to have security and protection from 
crime and the individual’s right to privacy, Junker211 notes that “every fourth 
amendment decision chooses, at the margin, which of these opposing values to prefer, 
and the doctrine reflects and accommodates that choice.”412 
Sergent believes that it will be difficult to predict the legal reasoning which 
will be used in future cases for four reasons: 
First, Katz’s objective reasonable expectation of privacy standard is not an 
objective standard at all. Even if applied as envisioned by its author, the test would 
have to balance what types of privacy we should have, how much that privacy is 
worth, and the strength of the law enforcement interests. In the hands of a court 
that consistently values crime control over individual privacy, the main function of 
the expectation of privacy rubric minted in Katz seems to have been to provide an 
additional ground for denying fourth amendment protection. 
[Second. ] [t]he Court confuses the Katz standard even more by refusing to 
acknowledge that it is making a normative determination. Thus [as Junker notes], 
the standard is subtly reinforced ... with doctrinal and analytic devices that make it 
receptive to the majority’s values and which undermine or deflect Katz’ promise to 
protect any justifiable expectation of privacy. 
Third, when the analysis points in one direction and the Court wishes another 
result, the Court changes analytical tactics. For instance, when the expectation of 
privacy analysis provides poor support for its position, the Court returns to the 
textual approach that was rejected in Katz. [Junker notes that in] addition, when 
the actual facts seem to demand Fourth Amendment protection, the Court deflects 
that result by substituting proxy facts, hypothetical circumstances that appear 
similar to the case at hand but which carry an opposite doctrinal charge. 
Finally, the Court often blurs the line between the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
and its content, making it difficult to distinguish cases in which one discloses 
information, leaving no Fourth Amendment protection at all from those in which 
one merely grants a third party the ability to consent to a search. The Court’s 
dislike for the exclusionary rule as a remedy leads it to limit the scope and content 
of the Fourth Amendment, in order to limit the amount of evidence that is 
excluded.413 
412 John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection. 
79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1105, 1177(1989). 
413 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995) at 1193. 
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Circumstances for Intrusion - Search Warrants 
When an individual has a privacy or Possessory interest in electronic data, the 
Fourth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable police searches or 
seizures. The level of this protection depends largely upon the circumstances under 
which the search or seizure is conducted and the underlying nature of the stored 
electronic information. Although the Supreme Court has asserted that a warrant is 
generally necessary to conduct a search, police can often act on less authority. 
Many of the situations in which police will not need a warrant can apply to 
computer data.414 
The informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue 
warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution 
are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen 
to make arrests.415 
In Johnson vs. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court established the 
importance of securing a search warrant when intruding upon persons, their house, 
papers, or effects which are otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law enforcement the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.416 
The Johnson Court, in regard to the same point, continues to comment and 
states that “there are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for 
effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a 
magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.”417 
Johnson is an excellent example of the debate over the requirements. It 
illustrates that warrants tend to reduce law enforcement’s discretionary ability to 
intrude into otherwise protected areas. The time (and possibly the expense) of 
obtaining a warrant might otherwise hinder law enforcement activities. 
414 Sergent at 1185. 
415 United States vs. Lefkowitz. 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
416 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). 
417 Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). 
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In recent years the courts have been much stricter when judging the 
reasonableness of police actions in regard to search warrants. There are, however, a 
number of areas in which a search warrant is not required in order to perform a 
search. An analogy may be drawn between allowable automobile searches and 
seizures, and computer searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has allowed 
searches of an automobile which were for the purpose of inventorying contents,418 
where the vehicle was towed back to the police station to be searched,419 when the 
search was made given simply the existence of probable cause,420 and/or when a 
search was made of closed containers within car.421 
In commenting on Acevedo. Mr. Justice Scaliawrote that even before 
today’s decision the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions 
that it was basically unrecognizable.”422 
In commenting about the state of affairs of computer networks and the Fourth 
Amendment, Sergent says: 
Because computer information and the networks that carry it are new technologies, it 
may be difficult to determine how the “exceptions” to the warrant requirement 
would apply. Examining the policies underlying which standard of review courts 
apply may enable us to see how far courts will extend existing exceptions or create 
new ones.423 
The key to this issue is to determine the scope of privacy on a university 
computer system. In other words, what ‘expectation of privacy’ will the user of a 
university’s computer system have. Since Katz pronounced that the “Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places”, it would seem reasonable that computer 
spaces (not being a live person) are not afforded as much protection as we may be 
418 Colorado vs. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois vs. Lafayette. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
419 Chambers vs. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
420 Chambers vs. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
421 California vs. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
422 California vs. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991). 
423 Sergent at 1207. 
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lead to believe. The determinations now center around protecting the individual’s 
privacy. 
A search of a user’s computer space may be justified if the system 
management has “articulable suspicion.”424 A key element in a ‘search and seizure’ 
which is generated by “articulable suspicion”425 is that the duration is brief.426 The 
allowable scope of this type of search is justified by the suspicion of the person 
executing the search (and possible seizure). 
Probable cause is another component of search and seizure. Probable cause 
exists where “the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and 
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 
committed.”427 
In a 1991 law review article, Stuntz surveyed the exceptions to the need for a 
required search warrant and concluded that “all these rules mean [is] that given 
424 Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Terry defined “articulable suspicion” as “the 
specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.” 
425 Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Terry defined “articulable suspicion” as “the 
specific reasonable inferences which [a police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.” 
426 United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983). The court ruled an action 
unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment action where luggage was detained for 90 minutes and 
taken to another airport for a “sniff test” by a narcotics detection dog “exceeded the permissible 
limits of a Terrv-type investigative stop.” This time period, and the fact that the luggage was moved 
to another airport was deemed not to be of minimal duration and thus the search was illegal absent a 
warrant. 
427 Brineear v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), quoting Carroll v. United States. 
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
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probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of a crime[,]... the police can 
search pretty much everything they want, apart from the defendant’s home.”428 
Due Process: An Introduction 
“Due process/’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its 
ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for the feeling of just treatment which has 
been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and 
civilization, “due process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of 
any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man. 
and more particularly between the individual and the government, “due process” is 
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence 
in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.429 
The legal system in the United States of America is based upon the notion that 
regime level policy can not be contrived, enacted, and enforced without the consent 
of the governed. The First Continental Congress decreed: “Resolved, N.C.D. 8. That 
[citizens] have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and 
petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and 
commitments for the same, are illegal.”430 
Such was the position of the American colonists in regard to their right to 
‘due process.’ The colonists believed that all things which affected their lives should 
follow a fair and equitable process. 
To become a law, an issue should undergo free debate by legislators, followed 
by a vote which will cause the issue to be enacted or defeated. In a criminal 
proceeding, a person is charged with a crime, and then brought before a jury of 
his/her peers. The person and the state are represented by counsel, there is an 
428 William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies. 77 Va. L. Rev. 881 
(1991). 
429 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm, v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Felix 
Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
430 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Journals of Congress (ed. 
1800), I. pp. 26-30. 
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impartial judge, all the facts are heard, and then the jury renders its verdict. In short, 
if proper ‘procedures’ have been followed in rendering a result, that result should be 
acceptable. Concerning all but relatively trivial matters, a person is entitled to such 
‘due process.’ 
The first reported case involving ‘due process’ was Calder v. Bull431 in 1798. 
The ‘due process’ issue in this case was that a citizen was deprived of his rights by a 
law which was enacted ‘after the fact.’ The citizen had committed an act, and then, at 
a later time, a law was enacted and he was subjected to prosecution for that act. 
A landmark ‘due process’ case occurred in 1857 when the Supreme Court 
was faced with Dred Scott v. Sanford432 The facts in this case set another brick in 
place in the foundation of substantive due process. Dred Scott was a slave who had 
fled from his owner in a slave state to Illinois (a ‘free’ state). It was Mr. Scott’s 
hope that this action would cause him to be a free person. Dred Scott sued his 
owner, arguing that, by virtue of being in a free state, he himself was free. The 
Supreme Court decided against Mr. Scott. In its ruling, the Court invalidated the 
Missouri Compromise as it deprived the slave owners of their property without due 
process. 
As a result of the aforementioned cases, the ‘due process’ clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment433 came to be clearly understood. Due Process means 
431 Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
432 Dred Scott v. Sanford. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
433 U.S. Const, amend. XIV. § 1. “All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of right to life, liberty, or 
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procedure. It means the procedure by which a superior court could strike down the 
decision of a lower court if the lower court failed to follow proper procedures. Due 
process means that a person cannot “be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without”434 some sort of established, fundamentally fair, and equitable procedure. 
Due process also requires that there be, at a minimum, some reasonable form 
of notice given to the person involved in the proposed action (barring exigent 
circumstances). The person at whom the notice is directed should have a fair 
opportunity to be heard on the matter.435 Certainly this requirement varies greatly 
depending upon the factual content of the situation/issue. In Goldberg v. Kelley, the 
Supreme Court held that the extent to which procedural due process must be afforded 
a person is influenced by the extent to which he may be: 
condemned to suffer grievous loss ... and depends upon whether the [person’s] 
interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary 
adjudication. Accordingly ... ‘consideration of what procedures due process may 
require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of 
the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private 
interest that has been affected by governmental action.’436 
The constitution itself adjusts with changing jurisprudential values, thus, ‘due 
process’ of law does not have a fixed meaning. Justice Frankfurter stated: 
The requirement of ‘due process’ is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must 
be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as 
property, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” [emphasis added], 
434 U.S. Const, amend. V. “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS of laws nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation” [emphasis added]. 
435 Roviaro v. United States. 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding. 344 U.S. 
590 (1953); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness. 373 U.S. 96 (1963); in re Ruffalo, 390 
U.S. 544 (1968); Walker v, City of Hutchinson. 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Bailey v. Richardson. 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Rosenberg 
v. United States. 346 U.S. 273 (1953). 
436 Goldberg v. Kelley. 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970). 
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citizens. But ‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it 
does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just 
treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American 
constitutional history and civilization, ‘due process’ cannot be imprisoned within 
the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness 
between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and 
government, ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of 
decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we 
profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick ... It is a 
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by 
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.437 
Due Process In Regard to a Computer System 
A fundamental requirement of due process is “the opportunity to be heard” ... It is 
an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.438 
The collection and dissemination of information via computer networks has 
been moving forward as no other creation in the history of mankind. There is an 
ever-growing desire for information about people, events, happenings, etc. 
Computers have made all sorts of information about all sorts of things readily 
available in all sorts of places. Severe problems can arise concerning this 
accumulation of information as the individual, invariably, has next to no control over 
its dissemination, use, and more importantly, its accuracy. Chlapowski states that: 
“[o]ver time, information may easily become misinformation because individuals 
cannot control, and thus cannot correct, the information that is disseminated.”439 
Speaking in regard to information, privacy, and computer networks, Gerety 
supports this contention when he states that: 
437 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. Anti-Soviet Friendship v. McGrath. 
International Workers Order v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951). 
438 Armstrong v. Manzo. 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (Potter Stewart, J.). 
439 Francis S. Chlapowski, Note: The Constitutional Protection of Information Privacy. 71 
B.U. L. Rev. 133 (1991). 
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[T]here is the possibility that [the information's] contents will be divulged without 
[the individual's] consent or knowledge and so without [the individual’s] 
corrections ... This comes ... to a kind of institutionalized gossip, and its vice is its 
tendency to distortion and incompleteness, tempting others to make decisions about 
us, as gossips will, behind our backs and on uncertain grounds.440 
Furthermore, it is highly possible the data which is factually accurate may be 
disseminated inappropriately. Chlapowski notes that “personal facts which do not 
become distorted may be of such a highly sensitive and personal nature that, although 
correct, they are potentially harmful and embarrassing if disseminated carelessly.”441 
The general public needs to have protection in the event that information about them, 
regardless of whether true or false, is unnecessarily collected, or, inappropriately or 
unnecessarily disclosed. 
The difficulty with challenging data collection is that such action is not usually 
an invasion of privacy (a legal tort). The ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the invasion 
of privacy tort limits its application in this circumstance. 
As long as the government can articulate an arguably legitimate reason for 
collection or disclosure, the collection will probably be considered reasonable 
under the common law. Often the reasons articulated for collection or disclosure 
are deemed legitimate, however, only because they are evaluated from the 
perspective of the majority—those who chose the representative government and 
to whom elected representatives feel most responsible. Thus, individuals who 
desire to keep certain personal information private are denied governmental 
protection of their privacy interest when the interest conflicts with the interests of 
the majority. In order to safeguard the privacy of these individuals, there must be a 
check on governmental disclosure of personal information—a mechanism to 
balance the interests of the individual and the interests of the government when 
those interests conflict.442 
440 Gerety, Redefining Privacy. 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233, 287 (1977). 
441 Chlapowski at 134. 
442 Chlapowski at 134-35. 
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Due to the low standard for assurance that violation of the rights of an 
individual do not occur when information is collected, there should be a balance built 
into an AUP to insure fairness - to insure that there is a balance between the 
individual’s interests and the university’s interest. The university should deal with the 
concept of ‘information privacy’ in its AUPs ‘due process’ statement, or should 
clearly specify a ‘due process’ philosophy in its AUP. 
Substantive Due Process 
The constitutional safe-guard of substantive due process requires that all legislation 
be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective.443 
Information, given the age of the computer, has become a commodity - and 
commodities are ‘property.’ Assuming that this intangible computer data can be 
reasonably be viewed as ‘property,’ computer data (being ‘property’) is protected by 
the statutes that protect and safeguard the liberty and property rights of an individual. 
The due process clauses of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard both 
substantive and procedural due process.444 
The scope of the due process clauses as they apply to a person’s liberty have 
varied over the years as a result of a number of Supreme Court decisions. Such has 
not been true for the Court’s interpretation of‘due process’ as it applies to 
‘property.’ 
443 Steven Gifis. (1991). Law Dictionary. New York: Barron’s, page 56. 
444 Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This 
opinion states that “it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure”); see also Laurence Tribe. (1988). 
American constitutional law (2d ed.). Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, page 769. 
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The Lochner Era 
The Lochner Era derives its name from a 1905 case (Lochner v. New York445! 
in which the Supreme Court struck down many economic and non-economic laws 
based upon very broad concepts of liberty. 
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court began to interpret ‘liberty’ (as in the 
due process clauses) more broadly than before.446 
As Chlapowski notes: 
The Lochner-era judiciary has been criticized for extending constitutional 
protection to the realm of economic affairs, thus assuming a role thought to be 
legislative rather than judicial. This criticism of Lochner implies that the Court 
usurps the legislature by subjecting economic laws to scrutiny in the absence of a 
clear constitutional prohibition.447 
The political and economic forces which were bom out of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s caused the eventual erosion and eventual downfall of 
Lochner. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation was in direct conflict with Lochner 
dogma. In 1934, Nebbia v. New York448 began a trend of decisions that eventually 
445 Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court invalidated the maximum hours 
provision for bakers on the theory that it violated the bakers’ liberty of contract. 
446 See, e.g.. Allgever v, Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897). The Court invalidated a 
state law that prohibited insurance companies which did not comply with state regulations from 
selling policies to persons on property within the state and from selling policies to state residents, 
reasoning that the law unconstitutionally interfered with liberty of contract. 
447 Chlapowski at 136. 
448 Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934). The Court upheld a New York Milk 
Board price-fixing statute as neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and “reasonably deemed to promote 
public welfare.'’ 
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lead to the 1949 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal449 
decision which explicitly rejected Lochner. 
From Lincoln Fed. Labor Union on, the Supreme Court became “reluctant to 
use substantive due process analysis to invalidate non-economic regulations, or at 
least reluctant to describe its reasoning as substantive due process analysis.”450 
Chlapwoski contends that the due process clauses of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments apply: 
when an individual's interests conflict with the majority's interests, a constitutional 
dilemma arises. If the government, in its exercise of majoritarian values, infringes 
upon the interests of any individual or minority group of individuals by controlling 
an aspect of their personal lives, the constitutional guarantee of liberty may be 
invoked to protect their interests from the tyranny of the majority. The Court's 
function is to decide which interests the Constitution protects.451 
So, too, should a university’s AUP establish and maintain a balance between 
the reasonably expected rights of the user and the rights of the management to insure 
that its systems function efficiently and properly. 
A Review of Existing Acceptable Use Policies 
If we had a reliable way to label our toys good and bad, it would be easy to regulate 
technology wisely. But we can rarely see far enough ahead to know which road 
leads to damnation. Whoever concerns himself with big technology, either to push 
it forward or to stop it, is gambling in human lives.452 
449 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.. 335 U.S. 525, 535-37 
(1949). The Court stated that Nebbia introduced the Court’s “rejection of] the due process 
philosophy enunciated in the ILochnerl line of cases.” 
450 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union at 538. 
451 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union at 539. 
452 Freeman Dyson. (1979). Disturbing the Universe. New York: Harper and Row, part 1, 
chap. 1. 
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Introduction 
To this point, the dissertation has attempted to build a basis of wisdom from 
which will flow Acceptable Use Policy documents. Previously, AUP’s tended to be 
developed by those who believed that they were mechanical-operational policies. 
AUP’s developed in this manner were more like auditing tools or car owner’s 
manuals. There should be a shift in the paradigm to include the issues which have 
been addressed in the previous pages (e.g., privacy, search and seizure, due process) 
and issues which will be suggested in the following pages (e.g., managing shared 
resources, solving social dilemmas). At this point, this dissertation will review 
existing AUP statements, and hopefully, the reader will apply the concepts from the 
previous pages. 
When reading these AUP statements, one should not assume that any or all of 
the following statements/principles need to be part of a University’s AUP. Based 
upon the components a University wishes to have in its AUP, some of the following 
statements may be appropriate—some may not be. 
The statements/principles which follow appear to be the most effective in that 
they legally, and, fairly clearly state their intent. 
Review of Selected Acceptable Use Policy Statements 
Public policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the habits 
and fashion of the day, with the growth of commerce and the usages of trade, that 
it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree of exactness. It has never been 
defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition, in the same 
manner as fraud. This rule may, however, be safely laid down, that whenever any 
contract conflicts with the morals of the time, and contravenes any established 
interest of society, it is void, as being against public policy.453 
453 William W. Story. (1847). A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (2nd ed.). City: Publisher, 
pp. 480-81. 
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Acceptable Use Policy is presently generated in two basic forms: dictatorial 
and democratic. 
• dictatorial 
Many of the first AUPs are a list of do and don't statements - in the style of 
the Ten Commandments. The term dictatorial was not viewed as especially negative. 
Users ‘back then’ were comfortable with knowing what the system administration had 
set down as the rules. They did not disagree with these dictatorial rules, as they 
acceded with them. 
The computer network was the center of the universe for many early users. 
But as the population of computer network users grew (see Figures 1 and 2), not all 
the new comers were comfortable with the rules. 
Today most AUPs which are in force can be identified as dictatorial. 
In short, the dictatorial AUP will state what the user will do and what will not 
do, and what will happen to the user for violation. Very few AUPs developed in this 
manner had any sense of the basic rights of the individual (e.g., due process, privacy). 
• democratic 
The new wave of AUPs can be categorized as democratic. Generally this 
means that the system administrators have stated what they will do in regard to a 
user’s behavior, and, have also stated what the user’s rights are. The democratic AUP 
creates a balance between a user’s expected right to privacy, due process, freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure, and the administration’s right to insure the 
continued operation of its systems. 
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While reading the following selected statements454 from existing AUP’s, bear 
in mind that virtually all existing AUP’s were crafted in a time where the document 
was, due to the nature and capability of the network, metaphorically like a ‘Chevrolet 
Owner’s Manual.’ This was due to the fact that the computer user only needed to be 
aware of the mechanical and operational aspects of the network. Today, there is a 
need for the AUP to address the societal needs of the user. Virtually all AUPs 
surveyed appeared to be in the formative stages of dealing with societal needs of the 
user. AUP statements are attempting to address social issues (e.g., privacy, 
harassment, due process), but the statements tend to be vague and overly broad. 
Dealing with the societal needs of the user is a non-trivial change in the drafting of 
AUP’s. This change is a radical adjustment in the existing paradigm which drives 
AUP construction. The development of an AUP should shift paradigms to also 
address community issues that are now inherent on computer networks. The AUP 
should now be a social contract in addition to being the ‘owners manual.’ 
The following AUP’s are reflective of existing documents. 
The Ohio State University455 
The AUP states: 
It is recognized that computer files are a new form of property separable from the 
media with which they are recorded, and that close analogies can be found between 
the uses of computer files and of various other forms of physical property. The 
Department shall use these analogies in making decisions about the appropriate 
use of computer files and the protection of their privacy, extending as nearly as 
possible exactly the same protection to computer files as is traditionally extended to 
the analogous physical property. 
The spirit of this policy is that the file space provided by the University to 
individuals has exactly the same status as analogous, more tangible facilities also 
provided by the University. Such facilities as private library carrels, dormitory 
454 This study surveyed a large number of AUP’s and selected those which seemed to be 
typical of those available. 
455 Ohio State University AUP [Online]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher.eff.org /11/CAF/policies. 
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rooms, and gym lockers are technically owned by OSU, and may be entered only 
for “administrative” purposes such as building maintenance. Similarly, the 
computers and computer files of students, staff, and faculty members, being 
electronic extensions of their personal work areas, may not be inspected, copied, 
changed, or otherwise tampered with without the permission of the owner, except 
for purposes relevant to the administration of the computer system. Notice that 
copying (i.e., stealing or “pirating”) computer software is also prohibited under 
this policy. 
Ohio State has done an excellent job in defining how they view the computer 
system. It provides helpful guidance to users of its systems and is not at all 
authoritarian. Users who violate this policy would be hard pressed to argue that they 
did not understand what they were doing was wrong, as OSU has provided both 
policy and education about the policy. 
The only criticism of the OSU AUP is that it makes vague comments about 
which analogies apply to “physical property.” This vagueness, however, seems to be 
due to a vagueness in legal precedent. The policy appears to be workable as such 
vagueness may need to be clarified by the courts before Universities can follow suit. 
It may also be in the University’s best interest to leave this intentionally vague so that 
issues can be handled on a case by case basis. 
McGill University, Montreal, Canada456 
The AUP states: 
Within the Department of Electrical Engineering, personal files, including files 
stored on computer, electronic mail, and other electronic communications are to be 
considered private. 
This is a very straight forward statement which clearly states what McGill 
intended to say. It is, nevertheless, a bit too brief It establishes that privacy exists 
and is applicable to the computer system and its contents. But McGill is overly broad 
in its pronouncement. Taken as read, NetNews would also fall into the same category 
456 McGill University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
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as does ‘files stored on the computer system [and] electronic mail.’ Such is not the 
case, NetNews is public, and, electronic mail is private. 
Michigan State University457 
The AUP states: 
Staff should at all times respect the privacy of user files, mail, and printer listings 
On the real campus, it seems to go without saying that ‘staff should . . . 
respect the privacy of the students and other staff members. But in cyberspace, that 
notion needs to be repeated quite often, as the concept is not yet ingrained in us. 
This AUP does not actually seem to say anything that can be enforced. They 
essentially ask staff members to be courteous to others. While this is a positive goal, 
it is far too vague and unenforceable. 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign458 
The AUP states: 
Network and system administrators are expected to treat the contents of electronic 
files as private and confidential. Any inspection of electronic files, and any action 
based upon such inspection, will be governed by all applicable U. S. and 
Illinois laws and by University policies. 
UI’s policy is clear and well stated. This policy statement is on a par with that 
of Ohio State University1 s AUP. However, given a lack of appreciation of the nature 
of cyberspace which the typical user has, it would be advantageous for the University 
of Illinois to provide some educational wording so that the user could better 
understand ‘the rules.’ 
457 Michigan State University AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
458 University of Illinois-Urbana Champagne AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher://gopher.efif.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
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Dalhousie University459 
The AUP states: 
Nothing in this Guide diminishes the responsibility of system administrators of 
computing services to take remedial action in the case of possible abuse of 
computing privileges. To this end, the system administrators with the approval of 
the President and with due regard for the right of privacy of users and the 
confidentiality of their data, have the right, to suspend or modify computer access 
privileges, examine files, passwords, accounting information, printouts, tapes, and 
any other material which may aid in an investigation of possible abuse. Whenever 
possible, the cooperation and agreement of the user will be sought in advance. 
Users are expected to cooperate in such investigations when requested. Failure to 
do so may be grounds for cancellation of computer access privileges. 
Dalhousie University has crafted a number of poor statements in their AUP. It 
is uncertain about Canadian law, but if this AUP were implemented in the USA, it 
would tread on several Constitutional rights. The AUP indicates that due process is to 
be followed, but the authoritarian tone of this statement leads one to believe 
otherwise. 
Also this AUP requires computer users to cooperate in investigations. While 
this is a fine notion, “failing to cooperate” is a vague concept. It is also worth noting 
that “[f]ailure [to cooperate] ... may be grounds for cancellation of computer access 
privileges”, seemingly, without due process. 
James Madison University460 
The AUP states: 
Students, faculty and staff who use the computer have the right to privacy and 
security of their computer programs and data. Computer users should not tamper 
with files or information that belongs to other users or to the operating system. 
James Madison has a fairly good AUP. The only criticism is that the 
statements seem skewed toward the user’s rights and responsibilities and do not 
459 Dalhousie University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher://gopher.eff.org /11/CAF/policies. 
460 James Madison University AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher.eff.org /11/CAF/policies. 
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provide the same clarity in respect to the administration’s rights and responsibilities. 
More needs to be said about what the administration can and can do. 
University of California at Berkeley461 
The AUP states: 
Privacy - Individuals’ rights of privacy shall not be violated without reasonable 
cause. 
This is a sound general statement. It might be an very good opening sentence 
in a paragraph. But it surely cannot be left to stand unclarified. 
University of Michigan462 
The AUP states: 
The University characterizes as unethical and unacceptable, and just cause for 
taking disciplinary action up to and including non-reappointment, discharge, 
dismissal, and/or legal action, any activity through which an individual: 
[.. .] 
(e) without authorization invades the privacy of individuals or entities that are 
creators, authors, users, or subjects of the information resources, 
AUPs should refrain from setting an authoritarian tone. As the overwhelming 
number of users on a system will be virtual novices, is best to adopt an educational 
rather than an authoritarian posture. 
The AUP leads one to believe that a casual intrusion of another’s privacy (not 
that this is acceptable) could lead one to be dismissed from the University. While this 
may be true as a practical matter, stating it here sets an unwanted tone for an AUP. It 
is even more of a problem since ‘privacy’ itself is not generally well defined in regard 
to computer systems. Charging a person with a violation of policy where the act is 
not defined seems to be a conundrum. 
461 University of California at Berkeley AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher:// gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
462 University of Michigan AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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This policy is applicable to any member of the University community, whether at 
the University or elsewhere, and refers to all information resources whether 
individually controlled, or shared, stand alone or networked. 
It may not be judicious to lump University employees and students into the 
same legal kettle. A University has an employer-employee relationship with its faculty 
and staff which is legally different than its relationship with the students. 
New Mexico State University463 
The AUP states: 
All computer users have two basic rights—privacy and a fair share of resources. 
This statement, and the one which follows, are included to show how concise 
a statement can be. Granted it may be too concise, but it does impart two ideas (aside 
from ‘privacy4 and ‘fair share of resources’). The user is given the sense that the 
University is concerned with their rights, and the rights of others. 
University of Pittsburgh464 
The AUP states: 
Eveiy member of the University of Pittsburgh has two basic rights regarding 
computing—privacy and a fair share of resources. 
This statement, while supporting privacy and a fair share of the computing 
resources, is unworkably vague and overbroad. The is also no explanation of what 
privacy means. Nor is it clear as to what a fair share of the computing resources 
means. 
463 New Mexico State University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
464 University of Pittsburgh AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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Washington University465 
The AUP states: 
Privacy 
All user accounts are considered the private domain of the user who owns them. 
All users should expect that, regardless of the protections set on their files, they 
will not be read by others. System Management personnel will only view users’ 
files under exceptional circumstances. 
This statement seems to assume a level of expertise which the typical user 
does not initially possess. What percentage of users are aware of‘file permissions’, 
let alone how to set them. Given the level of knowledge of the typical user, it can 
NOT be argued that a violator ‘knew, or should have known’ that what they were 
doing was wrong.. 
It is also questionable whether the University should turn ownership of a 
computer account over to the user. A different legal standard is applied to those who 
‘own’ property as opposed to those who are given access to the property of another. 
University of New Mexico466 
The AUP states: 
UNM recognizes that files and mail messages are confidential. Appropriate UNM 
employees may access computer users’ files during normal maintenance and will 
report unlawful activities to the proper authorities. 
The University of New Mexico categorizes mail messages and user files as 
‘confidential.’ It is not clear what this term means. It is not clear if‘confidential’ 
equates to ‘private’, or refers to some lesser degree of seclusion. But the concept of 
‘confidential’ does enable UNM employees to access the user’s account and snoop 
about without any cause. 
465 Washington University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
466 University of New Mexico AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher.eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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Purdue University467 
The AUP states: 
Don’t inspect private user files and mailboxes unless the administration of a 
Computing Center system requires it. 
This statement is unenforcably vague. It does indicate who can ‘inspect 
private user files and mailboxes.’ Also, simply because the administration ‘requires’ 
inspection of a user’s account, that does not make it legal. 
Kansas State University468 
The AUP states: 
The third category is access to another user’s account and/or files or electronic 
mail for the purpose of invading an individual’s privacy. This is considered breach 
of privacy and is prosecutable under Kansas law. 
This is a poor statement and does not seem to have an actual basis in law. 
Privacy, as Constitutionally defined, is not tied to a place. It is a personal right. There 
may be an interpretation in the future which embodies specific places with privacy 
rights, But such does not exist today. This AUP seems to contend, or intentionally 
lead one to believe, that laws and decisions mean other than what they state. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation469 
Note: This document is based, in part, upon policies of the American Library 
Association and the American Civil Liberties Union. 
The AUP states: 
The principles of academic freedom apply to academic computer systems. 
Computer polices should be consistent with general university codes and widely 
467 Purdue University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.eff.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
468 Kansas State University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
469 Electronic Freedom Foundation AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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accepted statements on academic freedom such as the Joint Statement on Rights 
and Freedoms of Students. 
Interpretation: “Academic institutions exist for the transmission of knowledge, the 
pursuit of truth, the development of students, and the general well-being of society. 
Free inquiry and free expression are indispensable to the attainment of these goals. 
As members of the academic community, students should be encouraged to develop 
the capacity for critical judgment and to engage in a sustained and independent 
search for truth.” 
Principle: The principles of intellectual freedom developed by libraries should be 
applied to the administration of information material on computers. These 
principles are explained in such American Library Association documents as the 
Library Bill of Rights, the Freedom to Read Statement, and the Intellectual 
Freedom Statement. 
Interpretation: Computer sites that offer newsgroups should select newsgroups the 
way that traditional libraries select magazines and books. 
Interpretation: “Every [academic computer] system should have a comprehensive 
policy on the selection of [information] materials.” (ALA Workbook for Selection 
Policy Writing. 
Interpretation: “Materials should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan 
or doctrinal disapproval” (Article 2, Library Bill of Rights). 
Principle: The principles of academic freedom applicable to student and faculty 
publication in traditional media, apply to student and faculty publication in 
computer media. 
Interpretation: An article or note posted by a student to a newsgroup is a student 
publication. 
Interpretation: “Student publications [and the publications of other users] are a 
valuable aid in establishing and maintaining an atmosphere of free and responsible 
discussion and of intellectual exploration on the campus. They are a means of 
bringing [. . .] concerns to the attention of the faculty and the institutional 
authorities and of formulating [. ..] opinion on various issues on the campus and 
in the world at large.” 
Interpretation: “The institutional control of campus facilities should not be used as 
a device of censorship.” “[User publications] should be free of censorship and 
advance approval of copy ...” 
Interpretation: “All university published and financed [user] publications should 
explicitly state [. . .] that the opinions there expressed are not necessarily those of 
the college, university, or student body. 
The EFF has provided policy statements, education as to the reasons behind 
each statement, interpretations of the policy statements, and they cite many time 
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honored customs of organizations who have similar policies (such as the American 
Library Association, and the ACLU). This is unmistakably an excellent creation. It 
provides a balance between the rights and responsibilities, of the users, and, of the 
system administrators. 
One caveat is worth noting here. The American Library Association has done 
an excellent job creating and refining their policies (which are cloned into EFF‘s 
policies). Many of these policies give rise to understanding what policies need to be 
in place on a computer system. However, we should always realize that ALA’s 
policies are aimed at books. Books are inanimate objects—they are lifeless. 
NetNews is somewhat analogous to books and as such ALA policy may be 
metaphorically applicable to a certain degree. On the whole however NetNews is not 
an inanimate object - it has a human being attached to it in a manner of speaking - a 
book does not have this link. Setting policy for NetNews based upon ‘books’ may 
have pitfalls in the long term. 
A review of quite a number of AUPs did not seem to reveal ‘one best AUP‘ 
that all universities might adopt. There are a number of university AUPs which have 
specific policy statements that are well crafted and bear review. The statements that 
have been included here should provide a sound foundation for developing the basic 
philosophy for a University’s AUP. 
While the previous section of this paper dealt with general philosophies and 
components of selected AUPs, the next section will pose specific AUP statements. 
Poor Privacy Protection 
What qualifies these as the ‘Poor’ statements is that they do not: 
1. consider the human condition and/or the capabilities of computer system, 
2. conform with federal statutes and/or campus policy. 
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3. state their intent clearly and unambiguously, and, 
4. account (when appropriate) for the social nature of the network. 
Boston University470 
The AUP states: 
Boston University reserves the rights to: limit or restrict any account holder’s 
usage, inspect, copy, remove or otherwise alter any data, file, or system resources 
which may undermine the authorized use of that system with or without notice to 
the user. The University also reserves the right to periodically check the system 
and any other rights necessary to protect the University computer facilities. 
While the AUP appears to protect the privacy of users and the integrity of the 
system,471 this policy attacks privacy. It inflicts speech restrictions that would be 
ridiculed if applied to the campus as a whole. It is vague, and seemingly illegal472 
when it indicates that a user may not “make accessible offensive [or] annoying 
material.”473 
Professor Carl Kadie of the University of Illinois imagines what an uproar 
there would be if this policy were generalized to the University as he notes below: 
• The University has the power to, without notice, inspect any assigned office space 
or dorm room. 
• Members of the University community may NOT distribute or make 
accessible offensive or annoying material. 
• Members of the University community may be punished for infractions 
against rules that are NOT listed here. 
470 Boston University AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.eff.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
471 Boston University AUP [Online]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.eff.org 
/II /CAF/policies. This document states: “The University disclaims responsibility for loss of data or 
interference with files resulting from its efforts to maintain the privacy and security of the 
University’s computer facilities.” 
472 Brandenberg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) is a decision which expressed the view that 
there was no right to speech that advocated violence. Thus, the Supreme Court‘s standard is that 
speech may not be suppressed or punished unless it is intended to produce “imminent lawless action ” 
and it is “likely to produce such action.” 
473 Boston University AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.eff.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
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• Members of the University community must not “misuse University 
property,” where “misusing University property” is defined as misusing 
University property. 
• The University has the power to “amend the Conditions and Policies at 
any time without prior notice.”474 
Poor Freedom of Speech and Privacy Protection 
University of Texas475 
The AUP states: 
Users of electronic mail and bulletin boards should avoid sending messages that 
are libelous, patently offensive, or that intimidate, threaten, demean, or harass 
individuals or groups, or that would otherwise bring discredit to the University or 
the Department. 
This policy is somewhat better than most, but due process procedures should 
be detailed, privacy should be better protected, and unconstitutional speech 
restrictions should not be imposed. In these three areas, the policy is overly broad. 
1. The procedure for computer expulsion should be detailed. It is not clearly 
defined who decides to apply expulsions, how a punishment/judgment 
might be appealed, or how a formal hearing is requested. 
2. The Texas AUP also requires users to acknowledge the policy statements 
by a signing a release form which authorizes the University to “examine 
the user’s files if required as part of their official duties.” Mandating that a 
user sign a statement does not make an unreasonable search reasonable, or 
legal. 
474 Dr. Carl Kadie (personal e-mail. May 20, 1994). 
475 University of Texas AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.eff.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
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3. This AUP is vague. It does not define who authorizes a search or 
determines the reasons for it, and it fails to indicate if the user is notified 
before or after the search.476 
This AUP goes on to state that “[u]sers of electronic mail and bulletin boards 
should avoid sending messages that are libelous, patently offensive, or that intimidate, 
threaten, demean, or harass individuals or groups, or that would otherwise bring 
discredit to the University or the Department.”477 This rule likely violates United 
States law (Brandenberg v, Ohio478T Most offensive speech, demeaning speech, and 
speech that brings discredit to the department is protected by academic freedom and 
the Constitution. The rule likely also violates the University’s general policy on 
freedom of expression. 
476 David Rubin. (1984). The Rights of Teachers: The Basic ACLU Guide to Teacher’s 
Constitutional Rights. New York: Bantam Books, page 92. It states that there are legal limits to what 
a (public) school can ask its teachers to sign. [Some of these same limits might apply to what a 
school can ask a user to sign as a condition of getting (or keeping) a computer account.]; Gillard vs. 
Schmidt. 579 F.2d 828 (1978) is a court ruling that the school board could not search the desk of a 
school counselor without a search warrant. A School guidance counselor sued a school board 
member under civil rights statute alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
at Newark, Lawrence A. Whipple, J., dismissed the complaint, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Rosenn, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) the action of school board member in searching the 
school guidance counselor’s desk during evening, having gained access to locked counselor’s suite 
by aid of janitor with passkey, in search of identity of person who had drawn cartoon ridiculing 
financial and personnel policies of school board constituted a Fourth Amendment violation, and (2) 
the search was an action under color of state law within meaning of civil rights statute; United States 
v. Nasser. 476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (1973). The Internal Revenue Service of the US searched an 
employee’s office to determine the employee’s proper performance at work. United States v. Hagartv, 
388 F.2d 713 (1968). This case involved the search of a government employee’s office to secure 
criminal evidence against him was held to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
477 University of Texas AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.eff.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
478 Brandenberg vs. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) is a decision which expressed the view that 
there was no right to speech that advocated violence. Thus, the Supreme Court‘s standard is that 
speech may not be suppressed or punished unless it is intended to produce “imminent lawless action” 
and it is “likely to produce such action.” 
143 
Poor Due Process, Privacy, Freedom of Expression Protection 
University of Hawaii at Manoa479 
The AUP states: 
Those who cannot fulfill their responsibilities as users of a multiuser system will 
have their accounts suspended or terminated, thus it is essential that you 
understand what is expected of you. Please remember that an account on Wiliki is 
a privilege granted to you as a student, faculty, or staff member in the College of 
Engineering, not a right, and its continued use is dependent upon responsible 
behavior on the part of you, the user. 
Several parts of the policy seemingly violate legal and moral requirements for 
due process, privacy, free expression, and user participation. 
The policy asserts, several times, that computer use is a privilege not a right. 
This has been held to be a “wooden argument”480 as privileges and rights are often 
Constitutionally the same. Even if you believe that computer usage is not a right, 
certainly ‘due process’ is. 
In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court said a “student’s legitimate entitlement 
to a public education is a property interest which is protected by the Due Process 
Clause and . . . may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the 
minimum procedures required by that Clause.”481 
The Court went on to say that “the Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty. ‘Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor or integrity is 
at stake because of what the government is doing to him,’ the minimal requirements 
of the Clause must be satisfied.”482 
4 /9 University of Hawaii at Manoa AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
480 Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) states that in “most cases U.S. courts no 
longer recognize the wooden distinction between privileges and rights.” 
481 Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), 42 L.Ed.2d. 725, 95 S.Ct. 729. 
482 Goss v. Lopez, at 582. 
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This policy allows the system administrator to summarily suspend a user’s 
access before anything has been proven, and even, before ‘due process’ is begun. 
The system administrator is allowed to search a user’s mail box and other 
account space at his/her own discretion. This seems to violate the ECPA bar against 
warrantless snooping. 
Mankato State University483 
The AUP states: 
The faculty/staff of the University reserves the right to examine files and 
accounting system information generated through student use of the University 
computing facilities.” 
Academic computing resources on the Mankato State University Campus are for 
use in the instructional, research, and outreach activities of the University only. 
One comment suggests that part of the policy is “so vague as to be 
unenforceable. . Other critiques say: “These statements lead me to believe that the 
philosophy behind the policy is that students are only allowed to use the computers 
for specific class projects . . . students may not send e-mail, read news, write 
programs other than those assigned, experiment with the OS or languages, use word 
processors except as required for the assignments. Also anyone can search my 
account!” 
As applies to “using userids to play games or send messages to another,” 
David Zuhn (zoo@cygnus.com) remarks “What? I can’t send mail? Or use talk(l)? 
This is so vague as to be unenforceable, I’d imagine.” 
483 Mankato State University AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher.eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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This policy also states that: 
academic computing resources on the Mankato State University Campus are for 
use in the instructional, research, and outreach activities of the University only. 
Student users are authorized use of the resources only under their own userids, 
and only for those purposes authorized by their instructor or projects under which 
they have authorized access. 
Dan Zabetakis contends that: 
these statements lead me to believe that the philosophy behind the policy is that 
students are only allowed to use the computers for specific class projects. In other 
words, an instructor will say ‘write a program that does_and the class will 
use the machines to compose and debug their assignments, and for no other 
purpose. 
Generally the Mankato policy is good but there are several severely flawed 
statements that need revision. 
Poor Netnews Policy 
Iowa State University484 
The AUP states: 
While most of these newsgroups provide a wealth of technical, research-based, and 
collateral material, a few groups may contain material whose use may be illegal 
under state or federal law, e.g., laws governing child pornography or sexual 
harassment statutes governing hostile environments. 
Carl Kadie notes “that The Iowa State University policy should better reflect 
intellectual freedom by more accurately reflecting library policy (and the law).” 485 
The AUP also bans newsgroups as they “may be illegal” 486 under state or federal law. 
These kinds of comments indicate a lack of knowledge of existing law. 
According to this NetNews AUP, users are limited as to what newsgroups 
they can access. It would seem that a requirement for a person to sign a form in order 
to have access to controversial newsgroups is a violation of the Library Bill of Rights. 
484 Iowa State University AUP: Critique [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher.eff.org/ll/CAF/policies/iowa_state_critique. 
485 Iowa State University AUP: Critique [On-line], 
486 Iowa State University AUP Critique [On-line. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico. 
457 U.S. 853, 866-67. has recognized that: 
the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment 
right to send them ... More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary 
predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights such as speech, 
press, and political freedom. 
Apparently this AUP regards the electronic forums which are created at Iowa 
State University as the sole property of the University and appears to liken them to a 
very private office space. Carl Kadie notes that the “Supreme Court calls created 
forums, such as a student newspaper or campus mail systems, limited public forums'’ 
The Court states that the government can limit who may access these forums and/or 
what topics may be discussed. But otherwise, it is bound by the same standards as 
apply in a traditional public forum...content-based prohibition should be narrowly 
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. 
Best Privacy Protection Statements 
What qualifies these as the Best statements is that they: 
1. consider the human condition and/or the capabilities of computer system, 
2. conform to federal statutes and/or campus policy, 
3. state their intent in a clear and unambiguous way, and, 
4. account (when appropriate) for the social nature of the network. 
Many of the following AUP statements are cited here without comment. This 
should be interpreted to mean that those statements are fulfill the above criterion. 
While there is great room for improvement in most of these statements, they are the 
best existing statements. These best statements are generally breaking new ground— 
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they address the issue of the need for social-legal constructs in the development of 
AUP’s. 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign487 
The AUP states: 
Network and system administrators are expected to treat the contents of electronic 
files as private and confidential. Any inspection of electronic files, and any action 
based upon such inspection, will be governed by all applicable U. S. and Illinois 
laws and by University policies. 
Computer and Academic Freedom Statement from EFF488 
The AUP states: 
Personal files on university’s computers (for example, files in a user’s home 
directory) should have the same privacy protection as personal files in university- 
assigned space in an office, lab, or dormitory (for example, files in a graduate 
student’s desk). Private communications via computer should have the same 
protections as private communications via telephone. 
Best Prohibitions Statements 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst489 
The AUP states: 
Clients must only access information that belongs to them, is permitted to them, or 
is public. Clients must not attempt to decode, crack, or discover passwords that 
belong to others. UCS may remove clients who are found to possess programs 
that could be used to access private information that belongs to others. 
This part of the AUP is clear and concise. The expectations of the 
administration have been well stated. However the statements are in terms that a 
novice computer user may not understand. This AUP also appears to presume guilt 
487 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaene AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 
1996: gopher:// gopher.eff.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
488 Computer and Academic Statement from the Electronic Frontier Foundation AUP [On¬ 
line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.eff.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
489 University of Massachusetts at Amherst AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher:// gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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on the part of the user—the user is guilty until proven innocent (e.g., “[The system 
administrators] may remove clients who are found to possess programs that could be 
used to access private information that belongs to others”490). 
Electronic Frontier Foundation491 
The AUP states: 
2. No use of this or any other EFF system as a staging ground to crack other 
systems... 
4. No use of this or any other EFF system for illegal or criminal purposes... 
9. Obstructing [other people’s] work by consuming gratuitously large amounts of 
system resources (disk space, CPU time) or by deliberately crashing the machine(s) 
will not be tolerated... 
11. Attempts to read another person’s electronic mail or other protected files will 
be treated with the utmost seriousness” 
Best NetNews Statement 
University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee492 
The AUP states: 
That the same standards and principles of intellectual and academic freedom 
developed for university libraries be applied to material received from the news 
network. . . That the same standards of intellectual and academic freedom 
developed for faculty and student publication in traditional media be applied to 
publication in computer media. 
490 University of Massachusetts at Amherst AUP [On-line], Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher:// gopher, efif.org/11/CAF/policies. 
491 Electronic Frontier Foundation AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// 
gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
492 University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher:// gopher, eff.org/11/CAF/policies. 
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Best Due Process Statements 
DTF Draft Statement493 
The AUP states: 
B. Redress Principles - Individuals should be protected from harm resulting from 
inaccurate or improperly used personal information. Therefore, individuals should, 
as appropriate: 
1. Be given means to obtain their information and be 
provided opportunity to correct inaccurate 
information that could harm them; 
2. Be informed of any final actions taken against 
them and what information was used as a basis for 
the decision; 
3. Have a means of redress if harmed by an improper 
use of their personal information. 
Computer and Academic Freedom Draft Statement of the EFF494 
The AUP states: 
Suspension or expulsion from a computer is a serious penalty. Users facing these 
penalties should be given due process protection similar to that given to those 
facing other serious penalties such as a formal disciplinary warning, a failing 
grade for cheating, or suspension from class. 
Interpretation: Pending action on the charges, the status of a [user] should not be 
altered, or his [or her] right to be present on the campus and to attend classes [and 
use computers] suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or emotional 
safety and well being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of 
students, faculty, or university property. 
493 Information Infrastructure Task Force’s Working Group on Privacy Statement [On¬ 
line], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.efif.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
494 Computer and Academic Freedom Statement of the EFF [On-line]. Available as of July 
1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
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Iowa State University495 
The AUP states: 
Violations of the University Code of Computer Ethics are treated like any other 
ethical violation as outlined in the Student Handbook and applicable faculty and 
staff handbooks. 
Best Participation in Policy Making and Enforcement Statement 
American Association of University Professor’s Joint Statement on Rights and 
Freedoms of Students496 
The AUP states: 
As constituents of the academic community, students should be free, individually 
and collectively, to express their views on issues of institutional policy and on 
matters of general interest to the student body. The student body should have 
clearly defined means to participate in the formulation and application of 
institutional policy affecting academic and student affairs...the actions of the 
student government within the areas of its jurisdiction should be reviewed only 
through orderly prescribed procedures. 
The Issues of Privacy, Expression, and Due Process 
Policies are often created by computer people not academic-policy experts.497 
Privacy 
One of the most important concepts in an AUP is that of privacy of the users. 
At most universities, computer files are protected with the same rights as normal 
property on that campus, and computer accounts are treated as other private space on 
campuses. “The issue of privacy for computer information is more important than for 
purely physical goods, as the ease of copying data makes invasions of privacy 
495 Iowa State University AUP [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
gopher://gopher.eff.org /11/CAF/policies. 
496 American Association of University Professor’s Joint Statement on Rights and Freedom 
of Students [On-line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher:// gopher.efif.org/ll/CAF/policies. 
497 Michael Godwin (personal e-mail July 15, 1996). 
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synonymous with theft.”498 Many universities regard privacy as a critical component 
on their computer networks. In the AUP’s which have been reviewed, universities 
endow their systems with privacy in order to provide protection for all their users. 
These universities have also balanced the concept of privacy with the needs of 
administering the system. 
Universities have recognized that computer files and a user’s account space 
(the $HOME directory) “are a new form of property separable from the media with 
which they are recorded, and that close analogies can be found between the uses of 
computer files and of various other forms of physical property.”499 Scholarly thinking 
and some university policy extends, as nearly as possible, the same protection to 
computer files as is extended to the analogous physical property. 
Similarly, the computers and computer files of students, staff, and faculty 
members, being electronic extensions of their personal work areas, may not be 
inspected, copied, changed, or otherwise tampered with without the permission of 
the owner, except for purposes relevant to the administration of the computer 
500 
system. 
Most university computer systems have philosophically similar clauses which 
endow the user’s files and e-mail with a large degree of privacy. The privacy 
statements are a step in the proper direction—toward an awareness of the 
social/community aspects of the Net. However, many universities lack an 
understanding of the scope and nature of the balance between the user’s right to 
498 Aidan Low (1995V Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. Available as of 
July 1, 1996: http://swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/readings-crime.html/low-rule.html. 
499 Aidan Low (1995). 
500 Aidan Low (1995). 
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privacy and the university’s right to violate that privacy. Thus, AUP’s have vague 
policy statements addressing the concept of privacy. The issue is a complicated one, 
as, clearly, to maintain the system, users' files must sometimes be accessed, but it is 
unclear when this should happen. 
Freedom of Expression 
There are those who believe that freedom of speech is a right that is critical in 
an online world. Yet many universities do not acknowledge that First Amendment 
rights extend into the electronic world in the same way they do on the real campus 
and in the real world. 
For example, Boston University users must not “transmit or make accessible 
offensive, annoying or harassing material.”501 “North Dakota State University has a 
similar policy forbidding offensive material,”502 Vague policies like this have 
traditionally been used by authorities to control speech almost at whim. Anything 
could be interpreted as “offensive” by someone, and so almost all speech is outlawed 
by this policy. A number of AUPs have freedom of speech policies which endorse 
free speech and an open computer system, but, yet, their AUP does not tolerate it. 
Accountability is an important issue in regard to freedom of expression on the 
Internet. While it is reasonable to expect that a message which falls into the category 
of‘hate mail’ be traceable to its author, it is just as reasonable to expect that posting 
to an Alcoholics Anonymous-type group would not find its way to a user’s local 
501 Boston University AUP [Online]. Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org 
/II /CAF/policies. 
502 Aidan Low (1995). 
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newspaper or his/her employer. A reality of networked computers is that 
conversations between and among people in regard to, for example; sex, religion, or a 
substance abuse discussion group are not nearly as private as they would be if they 
happened in the real world. On the Net, they are open to a very large number of 
other people. Conversations within UseNet and on mailing lists are more like a 
television talk show than they are like semi-private counseling sessions. 
As it centers of higher learning, universities should not adopt a policy that 
restricts free speech nor should they adopt a policy which fosters, for example, the 
unrestricted sending of hate mail. 
Due Process 
Similar to freedom of speech, due process is a constitutionally protected right 
“that often does not survive the transition into the world of cyberspace.”503 The 
difficulty with the proper administration of the concept of due process on the Internet 
is that the first duty of many system administrators is the continued proper functioning 
of the network. Endowing the system administrator(s) with responsible for 
disciplining users who violate the system rules seems to facilitate the judge, jury, and 
executioner model of AUP enforcement. Certainly it is important when the need for 
disciplinary action arises that the system administrator(s) follow proper procedure. 
However, given the work load of system administrators and their possible lack of 
mediation/supervision background, the possibility of due process procedures being 
followed properly seems to have but a moderate probability of occurring. 
503 Aidan Low (1995). 
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In regard to due process procedures in actual AUPs, there is a seeming lack of 
even-handedness for infractions. 
The most common penalty for violating rules is the suspension of the account, 
followed by whatever penalty is judged appropriate. However, the suspension is 
most often conducted before the investigation of the allegation has even begun. 
This is clearly a violation of due process, as this gives system administrators the 
ability to exile people from the system without any sort of review whatsoever.504 
The Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students indicates that the 
most equitable procedure to follow when there is an alleged violation of an AUP is as 
follows: 
Pending action on the charges, the status of a student should not be altered, or his 
right to be present on the campus and to attend classes suspended, except for 
reasons relating to his physical or emotional safety and well being, or for reasons 
relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty, or university property.505 
Suspending students from the university computer system before their guilt 
has been determined is contrary to the policy just cited when system administrators 
are given this level of power, they are endowed with “more authority than professors 
have”506 to take action for a similar violation occurring, not on the computer network, 
but in a real classroom. 
While many institutions have clearly stated due process procedures for 
investigations involving alleged AUP violations, many do not. For example, SeasNet 
(at UCLA) states that an investigation cannot begin without the probability that a 
given user may be guilty of an offense. 
At Northwestern, the policy makes it clear that user files can be examined and 
investigations into user accounts begun, but such investigations require the 
504 Aidan Low (1995). 
505 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students IQnlinel. Available as of July 1, 
1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org/ll /CAF/policies. 
506 Carl Kadie, the managing editor of the Computers and Academic Freedom Archive for 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Kadie, in his review of the University of Hawaii. 
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authorization of the Director of the computer system or another clearly defined 
person. This specification of exactly who can and cannot make these decisions 
creates an established procedure for the prosecution of offenses against the 
school.507 
Due process is an essential right in cyberspace that allows users to know what 
they can and cannot expect from the systems in which they exist, and is essential for 
an online society that fosters freedom and openness. 
The Future 
Where will rules of use policies be in effect in the future? At present, not all 
universities provide free speech, privacy protection, and adequate due process for 
all users, but this will change. As the Internet becomes more and more of a part of 
everyday life, the overly constrictive policies will be tested again and again, and 
those without firm support will fall. In time, policies of universities will ensure 
these three principles of computer rights for citizens of their particular domain of 
cyberspace.508 
Explicit Right of Privacy and the Erosion of Privacy Protection 
As there is an ever increasing use of technology, an expansion of the legal 
theory of the intrusion upon privacy is important in order to protect a person’s 
privacy rights in cyberspace. There are legal remedies available when one’s privacy 
rights are violated—when an unwanted person intrudes upon one’s seclusion.509 De 
May v. Roberts510 exemplifies the typical case of a physical intrusion where privacy 
rights may have been violated. In Nader v. General Motors Corporation,511 the 
507 Aidan Low (1995). 
508 Aidan Low (1995). 
509 Arthur R. Miller. (1971). The assault on privacy: Computers, data banks, and dossiers. 
Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, page 175. 
510 DeMav v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (date), 46 Mich. 160. 
511 Nader v. General Motors, 25 N.Y. 2d 560 (date). 
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intrusion theory expanded to include non-physical intrusion as well as physical 
intrusion.512 
However, Miller observes that due to the “unpromising growth capacity of the 
common-law theories”513 there is little immediate prospect for privacy right 
protection—the technology is advancing far too rapidly for the law to keep pace. As 
noted in Chapter IV, the right to privacy has evolved quite slowly and often in 
negative directions since Pavsich v. New England Life Insurance Co.514 
Repeatedly, the courts have asked for more legislation in light of the new 
technology. Unwilling to act as the legislature in a highly technical field, the 
courts want clearer statutes defining guidelines on the boundaries of privacy of 
individuals with respect to telecommunication.515 
Since the right to privacy in common law remains a weak resource for 
protection, the next alternative seems to call for legislation. Institutions themselves 
should craft policy to fairly and equitably govern their computer systems. But it seems 
to be a historical fact of life that “while technology races, legislation crawls,”516 and, 
at times, legislation goes in a reverse direction.517 
Universities need to craft an explicit definition of the scope and nature of 
privacy for their computer network. This should be done by a broad based committee 
512 See also. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
513 Arthur Miller. (1971). The assault on privacy: Computers, data banks, and dossiers. Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, page 220. 
514 Pavsich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (1905). 
515 Aidan Low (1995). 
516 Edward V. Long. (1966). The intruders: The invasion of privacy by government and 
industry. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, page 183. Also see. Note. The Message in the Medium: 
The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
517 Compare Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (stating 
that motion pictures “[are] not to be regarded ...as part of the press of the country”) with United 
States v. Paramount Pictures. Inc.. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (observing that “moving pictures...are 
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment”). 
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consisting of system administrators, policy formulation experts, campus 
administrators, faculty, staff and students. This wide-based committee should define: 
• What a reasonable expectation of privacy consists of, and, 
• What portions of the computer network should be totally public. 
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Cyberspace 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is 
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and. second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, 
a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the 
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.518 
In order to apply the Fourth Amendment to computer information which 
exists in a user’s account or in common/public places in cyberspace it is essential to 
determine the privacy expectations implicit in a search of a user’s account or other 
computer space. In other words, the task at hand is to essentially determine who owns 
the data/files. 
There are three key factors in determining who owns data/files on a computer 
system. Sergent suggests these factors are “ownership of the computer, ownership of 
the information involved, and control of or access to the computer and 
information.”519 The owner of a computer system has the right to possession 
(Possessory interest) of it. If that computer system is seized for any length of time the 
owner’s Possessory rights will come into play. The owner of the computer system 
(which would seem to include the stored data) has the right to challenge any searches 
518 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (John Harlan, J„ concurring). 
515 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995) at 1195. 
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of the contents due to his/her privacy interest in those contents.520 This has been 
substantially clear for computer systems where there has been a one-owner situation. 
The difficulty arises in determining privacy interests when the computer system has 
multiple users. The primary issue that arises on multiple-user computer systems is the 
question as to whether it is possible to have a privacy interest on a computer system 
that is separate from having ownership or control of the underlying storage media. 
For examples, in Walter v. United States.521 United States v. Turk.522 United States 
v. David.523 and Commonwealth v. Parker524 the Fourth Amendment has been 
applied to ‘searches’ involving intangible information. In the cited cases, the searches 
were treated as searches of the underlying media rather than of the information itself. 
The Court did not deem these as searches of the data itself. This sidesteps the issue 
of ownership of the data as a separate issue from ownership of the hardware. Fourth 
Amendment analysis has typically focused on the search being conducted on a 
tangible object. The Courts have not addressed the reality that searches of computer 
spaces can be searches for/of the information that is stored thereon (which is 
intangible). 
As Umar notes, this creates several problems for a search of a multiple user 
computer system. 
First, one of the goals of modem computer networking is to make the actual 
physical storage medium or location of information irrelevant to the user of the 
520 United States v. Powell. 929 F.2d 1190, 1196 (1991). The owner of truck has standing in 
court to challenge a search and the of the truck’s contents even if the owner was not present at scene. 
521 Walter v. United States. 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In this case, 
FBI agents were required to obtain a search warrant before viewing films that had been turned over 
to them by a third party. 
522 United States v, Turk. 526 F.2d 654, 666 (1976), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 823 (1976). 
This case involved the legal seizure of a cassette tape, but playing tape without a warrant was mled 
an impermissible search. 
523 United States v. David. 756 F.Supp. 1385, 1392-93 (1991) Law enforcement officials 
legally seized an electronic databook, but warrant was required to access its contents. 
524 Commonwealth v, Parker, 619 A.2d 735, 742 (1993) The Court mled that a search 
warrant was required to listen to a cassette tape which was legally seized. 
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system. A legal focus upon the physical media may create difficult line drawing 
problems, because a logically unitary group of information may be strewn across 
multiple computer systems and different types of storage media. 
Second, the development of software protection for user privacy does not affect 
physical control of the computer system’s storage media; the computer’s owner or 
manager can access anything stored on the system. By the same token, the user has 
no control over where or how her data is physically stored. If control of the 
physical media is the important criteria, the owner might be able to object to a 
search of a computer, but no one else could.525 
In this situation, Sergent notes, there would be conflict when applying a 
metaphor where a telephone search was the target. 
A telephone user does not control the transmission facilities. The telephone 
company has as much of an opportunity to record conversations as the system 
manager of a multiple-user computer system has to investigate user files. Lack of 
control of the underlying media, however, has not [deprived] the telephone user of 
an expectation of privacy in the contents of her conversation. Although a computer 
user has no control over where data is physically stored, his data is conceptually 
stored in a unitary area under his control. By focusing on characteristics of this 
conceptual data area, courts can create rules to apply to a broad spectrum of 
physically divergent computer systems.526 
Privacy Interests on a University Computer System 
It would appear that users of a university’s on-line computer network should 
have some expectation of privacy. In order for a user to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, “two conditions need to exist: 1) the data or file(s) must not 
have knowingly been exposed or given to another person, and, 2) the system 
manager’s ability to access that data/file(s) cannot constitute an illegal disclosure if 
the contents of the data/file(s) were given/disclosed to another person.”527 
Information placed in areas which are generally accessible by other users of a 
multi-user system appear to lose all protection of privacy as so many other people will 
have access to that data. Just as there can be no expectation of privacy in a cordless 
telephone conversation (where the broadcast can be intercepted and listened to by 
525 Amjad Umar. (1993). Distributed computing. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, page 
201. 
526 Sergent at 1196-1197. 
527 Sergent at 1197-1198. 
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anyone), there can be no expectation of privacy on a multi-user computer system 
when data is stored in an area that is accessible to other average system users.528 
Existing laws are relevant to the issues inherent in crafting a university’s AUP, 
but they are, at times, ambiguous and seemingly in conflict with each other. The mere 
fact that an intrusion, under certain circumstances, could be a legal invasion of privacy 
does not automatically obviate the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court has required more than just legal protection exist in order to 
generate an expectation of privacy.529 
In a university setting, given the number of users that have legitimate access 
rights, it is advisable to deploy a stated social convention in regard to acceptable use 
of the system. The university can determine how much or how little privacy is 
appropriate/suited to their needs. What is important is the strength and pervasivness 
of the convention. This strength of statement is important, as it will determine the 
reasonableness of expecting users to adhere to it. If the convention is inherently 
weak, the courts will view the policy statements as not much more than suggestions 
(which are generally unenforceable).530 If a convention is drafted which defines 
privacy and establishes the degree to which it exists, in order to be legally effective 
528 United States v. Smith. 978 F.2d 171, 179 (1992). The Court stated that, “Courts should 
bear in mind that the issue is not whether it is conceivable that someone could eavesdrop on a 
conversation but whether it is reasonable to expect privacy.”, cert, denied. 113 S. Ct. 1620 (1993); 
State v. Howard. 679 P.2d 197, 206 (1984). The Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy 
for owners of cordless phones where owner’s manual explained the nature of the phone, and 
therefore allowing police to monitor and record conversations. 
529 Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984). The Court held that even though 
law enforcement officers committed trespass to search defendant’s property, there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation because defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in an open 
field; California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (quoting Oliver. 466 U.S. at 178. The 
Greenwood court declared that the “Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on ... our societal 
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.” 
530 California v. Greenwood at 40 nn.2-4 (1988). This case involved a the belief, on the part 
of but a few, that a general convention exists which prohibits snooping in other people’s garbage 
(which is at the curbside awaiting pickup by the refuse collection company). The Court took great 
pains to minimize any convention-based argument by emphasizing the variety of ways any such 
convention could be violated. 
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that convention should be generally (widely) known to the users of the computer 
system. As demonstrated in Greenwood and Oliver, the Supreme Court relies on 
underlying social norms/expectations531 in order to determine if a law is to stand or be 
struck down. 
Sergent notes that the courts will not want to endow law enforcement 
agencies with the responsibility to determine the explicit and implicit privacy 
relationships among the users of a computer system, and between the users and the 
system administrator(s) therefore, the convention (law, policy, etc.) should be firmly 
and clearly stated, and should be widely available to those who are impacted.532 
Lacking stated policy (or convention) establishing the notion that privacy does 
in fact exists on a computer system, one should assume no expectation of privacy, 
even given the presence of leveled access and passwords. Sergent notes that “[i]t also 
can be argued that because computer networks are so new, there has not been time 
for any privacy conventions to evolve.”533 
Thus the social convention appears to be that lacking any stated policy in 
regard to privacy expectations on a computer system, one should assume that privacy 
does not exist. 
Even with the advent of software which allows computer users to have 
‘mailboxes’ and computer spaces that exclude other users from casually reading their 
531 California v. Greenwood at 44. The Court held that the existence of a state law 
conferring a right of privacy unto a person’s garbage (at curbside awaiting disposal) was irrelevant 
and the right did not exist. The Court called the laws “no less than a suggestion that concepts of 
privacy under the laws of each State are to determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment [emphasis 
added].” 
532 Sergent at 1199; Oliver. 466 U.S. at 181 (quoting New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454, 
458 (1981) (quoting Wayne LaFave, Case-Bv-Case Adjudication versus Standardized Procedures: 
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct. Rev. 127, 141)). The Oliver court, in rejecting a case by case 
approach to the Fourth Amendment, said it refused to impose ‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, 
qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions.’ 
533 Sergent at 1199 n.98. 
162 
mail or rummaging about in their files, this does not confer the user with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.534 
On the other hand, it could be argued that a computer system user does have a 
reasonably expectation of privacy as today’s software has firewalls and security such 
that in order to access the mailbox and account space of another, a person should 
attack and defeat those firewalls and security measures. Technology may not have 
reached to point where one can legally expect privacy on a computer system, but we 
are quickly approaching that time. Where cordless telephone communications still 
lack the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the Court in United States v. Smith 
noted that: 
Although we express no opinion as to what features or circumstances would be 
necessary to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, it should be obvious 
that as technological advances make cordless communications more private at 
some point such communication will be entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.535 
Thus far, the focus has been upon what reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in regard to other system users, and upon disclosures of data/files. The system 
manager, however, has the unique ability to access any and all areas of the system at 
will. It is Sergent’s belief that the “system manager’s ability to access user data does 
not constitute disclosure, because the manager is in a distinctive position not shared 
by other users of the computer system.”536 Sergentalso notes that it may be 
reasonable to believe that the mere fact that a third party (in this case the system 
534 Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984). The court’s reasoning was that: “It is 
true, of course, that... Oliver ... planted the marihuana upon secluded land and erected fences and 
“No Trespassing” signs around the property. And it may be that because of such precautions, few 
members of the public stumbled upon the marihuana crops seized by the police. Neither of these 
suppositions demonstrates ... that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense required by 
the Fourth Amendment; See also. Note. From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study 
of Fourth Amendment Protection. 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 968, 983 (1968). The expectation of privacy 
must be justified as well as reasonable in order to qualify for Fourth Amendment protection. 
535 United States v. Smith. 978 F.2d 171, 180 (1992). 
536 Sergent at 1200. 
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manager) is privy to information may relieve the user of any Fourth Amendment 
reasonable expectation of privacy protection. There are a number of instances where 
the disclosure of information to another person or organization (similar to a computer 
system manager) has been found not to substantiate a claim (by a user) that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed.537 For example, courts have found that 
persons in situations similar to a system administrator have disclosed information that 
was given to them and have not been held liable for those disclosures. Smith v. 
Maryland538 was involved with the disclosure of telephone numbers. United States v. 
Miller539 with bank deposit records, United States v. Willis540 with motel records, 
United States v. Choate541 with addresses on the outside on envelopes, People v. 
Perlos542 with medical records, and State v. Smith543 with social service records. From 
this, one may reasonably conclude that an individual has no expectation of privacy 
when any information is kept/maintained by any third party (with the exception of 
lawyer-client like situations). 
In contrast, it may be argued that the system operator is a neutral being, and 
that the data contained on the computer system was never disclosed to (or 
intentionally shared with) the system operator. Thus there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy on the part of the user in regard to the role of the system manager’s ability 
to read/view/disclose data. 
Sergent divides data into two categories: 
The first type includes information used to operate the computer system. By 
analogy to the disclosure cases, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
these records. 
537 Sergent at 1200. 
538 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979). 
539 United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
540 United States v. Willis. 759 F.2d 1486, 1498 (1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985). 
541 United States v. Choate. 576 F.2d 165, 175 (1978), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 953 (1978). 
542 People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 321 (1990). 
543 State v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 497 (1985). 
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The second type of users information consists of personal information the system 
manager has no need to access. The user can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in this information because “the operator is not an intended recipient of the 
information, nor is he expected to use the information for his own purposes.” 
Some information that a user may wish to keep private does not fit neatly into these 
categories. Courts have room to increase or decrease significantly the scope of 
privacy protection depending on how they draw the boundaries of these 
• S44 
categories. 
It would appear that there are areas and situations where a computer user has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy and that right should be respected. It also 
appears that there are many more areas on a computer system where a user may 
believe that privacy exists, but such is not the case. Whatever position is taken it is of 
primary importance that the university widely disseminate its policy. 
Cyberspace as a Totally Public Place 
Cyberspace could be viewed as though it is composed of 99% public terrain 
and 1% private property, and policy could be established with that in mind. To 
accomplish this, for the purposes of search and seizure, searches of cyberspace should 
be viewed as metaphorically akin to an airport baggage search or to a search of an 
occupied motel room. A university’s computer system should not, under any 
circumstances except for standing statutes, be viewed as the user’s private property. 
A university’s computer systems should be viewed as one views an airport. 
An airport and a border crossing point are critical zones in which special Fourth 
Amendment considerations apply. At an airport, security officials are allowed broad 
latitude in regard to what, who, and how they may search.545 Computer systems, like 
airports, are uniquely subject to terrorist attacks if extraordinary methods are not 
allowed. 
544 Sergent at 1202. 
545 United States v. Moreno. 475 F.2d 44 (1973), cert, den. 414 U.S. 840 (1973), 94 S.Ct. 
94. 
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Although airport statistics show that only six percent of the passengers frisked 
were found to have weapons, such probability nevertheless justifies the frisk in view 
of the substantial interest in preserving the integrity and safety of air travel.546 Given 
even this small percentage of ‘weapons possessions’ and even smaller likelihood of 
those weapons being used against passengers, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
airport officials are justified in conducting searches and seizures beyond the 
constraints normally imposed upon such actions.547 
For the purposes of search and seizure, a university’s computer system might 
also be viewed as a hotel or motel where registration as a guest constitutes implied 
consent5** to motel and hotel employees to enter occupied rooms in the performance 
of their duties. 
This chapter has presented the major issues and provided insight into these 
issues. The next chapter will summarize these findings and offer some suggestions for 
developing and managing Acceptable Use Policy documents. 
546 United States v. Bell. 335 F.Supp. 797 (1971), affd 464 F.2d 667 (1971), cert, den. 409 
U.S. 991 (1972), 93 S.Ct. 335 (An anti-hijacking system at an airport has been held to be 
constitutional). 
547 Krauss v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County,_(date), 96 Cal.Rptr. 455, 478 
P.2d 1023 (ovrld on other grounds by People v. Cook. 22 Cal.3d 67 (date), 148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 538 
P.2d 130). 
548 Massachusetts Fair Information Practices Act, M.G.L. Chapter 66A, § § 1-3. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter will present the author’s conclusions, recommendations and 
opinions based upon the foregoing research, and, will provide support for those 
conclusions, recommendations and opinions by citing other authors and publications. 
An Overview 
Originally, the Internet was 
... a smattering of university and military computers linked together in a 
nationwide network of networks. Policies at most of these nodes in this continental 
web were generally fairly open, as the only people who had access to these 
systems were a small group of people who knew each other well. Passwords were 
rare, and privacy was not an issue at many of these places ... Users trusted each 
other to act responsibly when using the system, and altercations between users 
were rare. However, there were extreme sanctions on use of the system, particularly 
on what could or could not be performed on the computer systems. The machines 
were extremely expensive, and even a small program could take days to run, so it 
was difficult to convince those in charge of the machine of the need to run a 
,,549 program. 
In the intervening years there have been significant changes in the Internet. 
Most noticeable have been the changes in the recent two to four year period. The 
universities that comprised the original Internet have grown, and now practically 
every college is connected to the Internet. Along with the expansion of the Internet, 
and of the use of computers in general, has come a dramatic growth in the number of 
549 Aidan Low (1995). Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. Available as of 
July 1, 1996: http://swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/readings-crime.html/low-rule.html. 
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people who use this global network. However, the rules, customs, and metaphors 
governing the use of university computer systems have not changed, either in nature 
or substance. But, they should change in response to the changed nature of the 
network user.550 
The society which inhabits the Internet and local area networks, like any 
emerging society, needs its own set of rules and customs. However, cyberspace does 
not have one set of rules, but, thousands. These ‘rules’ vary from “near-anarchistic 
code[s] of complete freedom to authoritarian [codes which deny] ... all rights.”551 
AUP’s generally lack content that would cause them to be more of a social contract. 
The AUP should set a philosophical guidepost for the community of users in the way 
the U.S. Constitution sets philosophical guideposts—in the way the student and 
faculty handbooks provide guideposts for the campus community. 
The social contract by which we live in our real world community is the U.S. 
Constitution. While many members of the U.S. community may not be able to identify 
Constitutional principles, they are well aware of them. Members of the U.S. 
community understand concepts of the Constitution, and tend to live by them. These 
Constitutional concepts are not meant primarily as rules for law enforcement officials 
but as foundational principles upon which our entire U.S. community is based. So, 
too, should an AUP be a philosophical guidepost for the community of users on the 
Internet and on university computer networks. The Internet and the university 
computer network have become social instruments. The university AUP should reflect 
550 Bruce Sterling. (1995). The hacker crackdown. New York: Bantam Books, page 247. 
551 Aidan Low (1995). Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. 
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that paradigm shift. To accomplish this, AUP’s should address social issues (e.g., 
privacy, freedom of speech, access, overuse of the resources), not merely the 
pragmatic and operational issues (e.g., change your password frequently, do not share 
your password with anyone, do not run wasteful computation-intensive programs) of 
computer networks. 
Universal Similarities of Computer Use Policy 
The policy statements which have been identified in Chapter IV as being in the 
‘best’ category appear (philosophically) in many other university AUP statements. 
These statements are worthy of emulation as they appear to: 
1. consider the human condition and/or the capabilities of computer system, 
2. conform to federal statutes and/or campus policy, 
3. state their intent in a clear and unambiguous way, and, 
4. account (when appropriate) for the social nature of the network. 
Commercial activity not related to the instutition’s mission was banned on 
almost every system surveyed and reviewed in this dissertation. However, the 
statements which forbade ‘commercial use’ of the network were generally over¬ 
broad. For example, the University of Miami’s AUP forbids commercial use of their 
network, but School of Law students are required to serve an internship (often in the 
commercial sector) which requires the students to, de facto, use the network for 
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commercial purposes. The university administrators and the law school 
administrators are in the process of revising the ‘no commercial use’ statement.552 
In a number of cases, institutions have statements that appear to be based 
upon a lack of understanding of the appropriate uses of certain computer 
applications (software). For example, many institutions prohibit needless waste of 
their system’s resources by logging into MUDs, playing games, or running wasteful 
computation-intensive programs. For an education major, using, exploring, and 
running MUD software may be a legitimate use of system resources, while, if a 
finance major were doing this, it might not be a legitimate use of system resources. 
Some aspects of policy statements make sense, should be used widely, and 
should be accepted as they are. These statements, for the most part, are ones that 
deal with operational and mechanical issues of the computer and the network. 
Many other aspects of policy statements also make sense, but the universities 
tend to state them in a vague and overly broad manner. These statements tend to deal 
with the social and community aspects of the computer networks. This is an area of 
great concern as this appears to be the area where the greatest conflict will occur 
(e.g., harassment complaints, invasions of privacy, fair use of resources). This may be 
attributed to the situation that many institution’s computer policy committees are still, 
usually, composed exclusively of computer operations experts. 
Another common theme among university AUP’s is the formulation of policy 
statements fashioned in ignorance of: a. the actual workings of computer systems, 
and, b. the human condition. For example: 
552 Dr. Michael Froomkin (personal e-mail. June 12. 1996). 
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[A]n old policy at Rice University forbade “running file commands on large 
filesystems.” Under this ruling, a student looking at her partition of a large 
fileserver would be in violation of this rule. At the University of South Florida, the 
rules forbid running a computer program on the network which “interferes” or 
“affects the performance of’ any other computer on the network. Rules phrased in 
this way are meaningless, as every computer program running on a network takes a 
little bit of bandwidth away from every other computer program, and so this rule 
outlaws all computer use on the network. Here, technical mistakes about the nature 
of the network are being made, because the authors of the policy do not understand 
the nature of the system that they are regulating.553 
Also, for example, the University of Massachusetts Computer Security and 
Usage Standards draft document states that authorized users must: 
not store their access passwords in batch files, in automatic login scripts, in 
terminal function keys, in computers without access control, or in other locations 
where another person might discover them554 
The human condition appears to be such that this AUP statement will be 
ignored by the users as, it: 1. creates a situation where users are informed that it is 
against policy to write their passwords down anywhere, and, 2. ignores the fact that 
virtually all terminal software allows for automatic login scripts and terminal key 
macro creation. 
Another difficulty occurs when the computer policy of a school conflicts with 
the policy that governs the real campus. For example, Northwestern University’s 
AUP advises the victims of harassment to speak to their Information Systems’ 
representatives. However, the school policy on sexual harassment makes it quite clear 
that, in such cases, complaints should be directed to the dean. Policy statements 
should be consistent with the rules and regulations within the campus community at 
553 Aidan Low (1995). Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. 
554 Information Technology Subcommittee. (1996, July). Computer security and usage 
standards [In-press]. Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, page 3. 
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large. It would also be a wise first step to explore the possibility that computer use 
policy is identical to real life statutes and campus policy whenever possible. 
Ownership of the Computer System and the Computer Network 
A common misconception among university administrators is that, since the 
physical network and the actual computers and fileservers belong to them, all the data 
stored on them belongs to them as well. 
This is an extremely dangerous policy, largely because of its implications on 
intellectual property. If a student writes a paper on a school computer, does the 
school then own the paper? If that student then compiles a computer program on 
that computer, does it then belong to the university?555 
There are a few universities that have policies based on the ‘ We own the 
physical equipment, therefore, we own everything stored on it’ philosophy. For 
example, Boston University “reserves the rights to: limit or restrict any account 
holder’s usage, inspect, copy, remove or otherwise alter any data, file, or system 
resource.”556 This policy allows the institutional personnel to do anything they desire 
with a user’s account and the information in that account.557 Such policies are clearly 
contrary to the standards found on real life campuses. 
A far more logical policy is to regard the computer accounts of a university as the 
dorm rooms of students or office space of faculty, belonging to the university but 
yet the private space of the individuals who live there.558 
555 Aidan Low (1995). Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. 
556 Boston University AUP [Online], Available as of July 1, 1996: gopher://gopher.efif.org 
/11/CAF/policies. 
557 Dr. Carl Kadie (personal e-mail. May 20, 1996). 
558 Aidan Low (1995). Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication. 
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Recommendations for Crafting an AUP 
The following items are taken from the text of this dissertation. They are 
noted here as they are important principles given the philosophy of dissertation. 
These points will, hopefully, serve as the basis for an institution’s senior administrator 
‘charge’ to an AUP committee as they embark on the task of creating policy. 
1. From page 56. Thus, it seems appropriate that the university can define 
what a computer user’s expectations of privacy are through its Acceptable Use Policy 
(AUP). 
From page 79. There are a number of elements which must be present in order 
for an invasion of privacy to be actionable. The information accessed must otherwise 
be private, secluded, or secret,559 there must be lack of consent by the owner of the 
facts,560 and/or the intrusion must involve public disclosure561 of facts which are 
otherwise private. Some authorities have also held that a physical intrusion or 
something analogous to a trespass must occur.562 
From page 81. There are a number of flavors of privacy, and a University 
community should come to a consensus on which flavor it desires. 
From page 82. When crafting an AUP, a foundation issue will be the 
determination of the scope and limits of privacy on a given computer system. A 
clarification of privacy as a global principle for computers, as a principle for individual 
systems, as a non-existent principle, or as some combination of these needs to be 
established before other concerns are addressed. Deciding this will facilitate the 
559 Dortch v. Atlanta Journal. 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991), 261 Ga. 350. 
560 Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 1083 (1987), 86 Or.App. 523. 
561 Dortch v. Atlanta Journal. 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991), 261 Ga. 350; Steele v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding. 867 F.2d 1311 (1989), rehden 874 F.2d 821 (1989) and McCullough v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding. 874 F.2d 821 (1989). 
562 Gamer v. Triangle Publications, 97 F.Supp. 546 (1951), Hogin v. Cottingham, 533 
So.2d 525 (1988), McDaniel v, Coca-Cola Bottling. 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), 60 Ga.App. 92. 
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process of developing a basis of thought upon which other issues (e.g., computer as a 
newspaper, office desk, common carrier, broadcaster, etc.) will rely. Establishing the 
basic notions of public and private in regard to on-line computer systems is critical in 
order to build a foundation upon which resolution of other issues will be based. 
2. From page 83. Lacking legal clarity on a number of issues, a University 
needs to establish policy—its AUP—in order to clarify the ‘ground rules’ for the 
entire community of users. Furthermore, as a chief source of litigation is failure to 
properly prepare for legal eventualities, having an AUP in place will greatly aid in 
reducing potential exposure to litigation. 
3. From page 86. The University administration has been established to 
protect everyone’s rights and to insure that everyone’s rights and responsibilities are 
properly addressed and protected. The stakeholders in the creation of policy should 
be constantly reasserting, in their minds, that crafting policy is a positive activity and 
should benefit and protect all. 
4. From page 107. There should be a balance between a user’s expected right 
to privacy and the administration’s right to insure the continued operation of its 
systems. This balancing should be crafted into an AUP in order for it to be effective. 
5. From page 104. For the purposes of crafting a university AUP, the notion 
should be established throughout the AUP that ‘personal property rights’ as we know 
them in the real world do not necessarily apply to a university computer system. 
6. From page 112. It is important, on the part of a university, to establish its 
position that a computer account is not a private secluded place. Establishing private 
places would create a situation where users have a reasonable expectation that their 
space will not be invaded. If the situation is such that the computer users have an 
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expectation of privacy in their accounts, then any rummaging about or intermeddling 
with privacy is searching within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.563 
A university should establish the belief (policy) that computer accounts and 
disk space are not immune from observation by appropriate university employees 
conducting tasks related to the rendition of service to the computer system and its 
users. 
7. From page 112. So, too, will the ‘privacy’ area of the AUP play against the 
‘freedom from unreasonable search and seizure4 area of the AUP. These antithetical 
positions force balance, and this tension will provide a sounding board to assure that 
the ‘privacy’ principles and statements in the AUP are valid and reasonable. It is an 
advantage when developing an AUP to craft the Search and Seizure statements in 
concert with the ‘privacy’ area as the First and Fourth Amendments are built and 
measured on mutual ground.564 
563 State of Maine v. Barclay. 398 A.2d 794, 796 (1979); State v. Richards. 269 A.2d 129, 
134 (date). 
564 Harvey A. Silverglate and Thomas C. Viles. (1991, May). Constitutional, legal, and 
ethical considerations for dealing with electronic files in the age of cyberspace. Paper presented at 
the 1991 Federal Enforcement Conference, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC. 
The courts recognize that the First and Fourth Amendments grew from the same historical source, 
for the struggle for press freedom was energized by the struggle against the license to print, and 
against the prior restraints imposed by the Crown to enforce the license. In the Supreme Court4 s 
words, “the struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the 
licensor ... And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish ‘without a license what 
formerly could be published only with one.’” While this freedom from previous restraint upon 
publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint 
was a leading purpose in the adoption of that constitutional provision. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 
Ga.. 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). The Supreme Court commands that special care be taken when 
authorizing or reviewing a search involving any entity engaged in the publication or dissemination 
of ideas. “Freedom of the press” long has been interpreted broadly to protect not only newspapers 
publishers and pamphleteers, e.g., Lovell. Id., 303 U.S. at 452, but also motion pictures, Roaden v, 
Kentucky. 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Burstyn v. Wilson. 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), and even computer bulletin boards, Legi-Tech v. 
Keiper. 766 F.2d 728, 734-35 (1985), from prior restraints and general searches. In order to avoid 
prior restraints on speech, the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment “is to be accorded 
the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things [to be seized]’ are books, and the basis for their 
seizure is the ideas which they contain.” Stanford v. State of Texas. 379 U.S. 476 (1965) reh den. 
380 U.S. 926 (1965), citing Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). 
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8. From page 126. The university should deal with the concept of 
‘information privacy’ in its AUPs ‘due process’ statement, or should clearly specify a 
‘due process’ philosophy in its AUP. 
9. From page 131. The AUP should now be a social contract in addition to 
being the ‘owners manual.’ 
10. From page 158. Universities need to craft an explicit definition of the 
scope and nature of privacy for their computer network. This should be done by a 
broad based committee consisting of system administrators, policy formulation 
experts, campus administrators, faculty, staff and students. This wide-based 
committee should define: 
• What a reasonable expectation of privacy consists of, and, 
• What portions of the computer network should be totally public. 
Important Thoughts and Considerations 
The following items are taken from the text of this dissertation. They are 
noted here as they are important thoughts and considerations given the philosophy of 
dissertation. 
• From page 110. This rationale of‘knowing exposure’ is problematic in that it has 
been extended such that even disclosure of a bit of information causes one to 
completely loose Fourth Amendment protection of the information in question. It 
should not be that a person’s privacy protection rights under the Fourth 
Amendment are totally lost merely due to law enforcement’s ability to procure 
(otherwise protected) information from a third party (by any means). 
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• From page 112. So, too, will the ‘privacy’ area of the AUP play against the 
‘freedom from unreasonable search and seizure4 area of the AUP. These 
antithetical positions force balance, and this tension will provide a sounding board 
to assure that the ‘privacy’ principles and statements in the AUP are valid and 
reasonable. It is an advantage when developing an AUP to craft the Search and 
Seizure statements in concert with the ‘privacy’ area as the First and Fourth 
Amendments are built and measured on mutual ground.565 
• From page 158. In order to apply the Fourth Amendment to computer 
information which exists in a user’s account or in common/public places in 
cyberspace it is essential to determine the privacy expectations implicit in a search 
of a user’s account or other computer space. In other words, the task at hand is to 
essentially determine who owns the data/files. 
• From page 162. Lacking stated policy (or convention) establishing the notion that 
privacy does in fact exists on a computer system, one should assume no 
expectation of privacy, even given the presence of leveled access and passwords. 
Sergent notes that “[i]t also can be argued that because computer networks are so 
new, there has not been time for any privacy conventions to evolve.”566 
• From page 165. A university’s computer systems should be viewed as one views 
an airport. An airport and a border crossing point are critical zones in which 
special Fourth Amendment considerations apply. At an airport, security officials 
are allowed broad latitude in regard to what, who, and how they may search.567 
Computer systems, like airports, are uniquely subject to terrorist attacks if 
extraordinary methods are not allowed. 
565 Harvey A. Silverglate and Thomas C. Viles. (1991, May). Constitutional, legal, and 
ethical considerations for dealing with electronic files in the age of cyberspace. 
566 Sergent at 1199 n.98. 
567 United States v. Moreno. 475 F.2d 44 (1973), cert, den. 414 U.S. 840 (1973), 94 S.Ct. 
94. 
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• From page 166. For the purposes of search and seizure, a university’s computer 
system might also be viewed as a hotel or motel where registration as a guest 
constitutes implied consent to motel and hotel employees to enter occupied 
rooms in the performance of their duties. 
• From page 179. The Net is a growing and evolving community, and this 
dissertation suggests that the paradigm for AUP creation/revision should change 
to reflect the views the Net as a shared community resource. 
• From page 182. Drawing models of privacy and search and seizure with the 
intent of applying them to Acceptable Use Policies may not be realistically 
possible.569 Easterbrook570 and de Sola Pool571 suggest that looking to our legal 
system for guidance is not yet possible. The legal community is still in the process 
of analyzing the phenomenon known as cyberspace. They are in the process of 
setting doctrine which will legally define actions in cyberspace. Even with clear 
legal foundational guidance from the legislature and the courts, there may be 
specific concerns that will not be addressed by courts examining privacy and 
other Constitutional questions, but which will apply to the development of 
Acceptable Use Policies. 
568 Massachusetts Fair Information Practices Act, M.G.L. Chapter 66A, § § 1-3. 
569 David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto 
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (And Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?. 38 
Villanova L. Rev. 487, 488 (1993). 
570 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. Paper 
presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace, 
Chicago, Illinois. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www-law.lib.uchicago.edu /forum 
/easterbrook. doc. 
571 Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1983). Technologies of freedom. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
page 7. 
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Transformation of the Paradigm for Crafting Acceptable Use Policy 
Existing Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) primarily regulates user-to-computer 
behavior. But there has been a radical change and a demographic shift in both the 
nature of the clientele and the physical capability of the Internet. The Net is fast 
becoming a mirror of a real world community, rather than an information resource or 
an information superhighway. Those who craft policy should adjust their paradigm 
for formulating policy—a paradigm which currently seems to be based upon the 
construct of the network as a mechanical entity. The Net is a growing and evolving 
community, and this dissertation suggests that the paradigm for AUP 
creation/revision should change to reflect the views the Net as a shared community 
resource. In order to reformulate the paradigm to one which addresses social and 
communal needs, those who craft AUP’s should have a foundational understanding of 
the legal concepts of privacy, search and seizure, and due process. They should also 
have a working understanding of the principles and theories of managing and setting 
policy for commonly shared resources (figure 4). 
Overview 
An on-line computer system is too often viewed as an area where students and 
employees have few, if any, rights and responsibilities. Many University AUPs 
declare that the students and employees are liable to be summarily removed (from the 
computer system) without due process for trivial violations of the rules. An AUP 
should instill and, to a large degree, explain the philosophy that a person who violates 
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the University rules while using the on-line computer system will be treated in the 
same manner as a person who violates the rules on the physical campus. 
The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process before a governmental entity, 
such as a public institution, may deprive one of life, liberty, or property. In a 
college setting, a student’s good name and reputation are considered a ‘liberty’ 
right, and a student’s right to attend college is considered a ‘property’ right. Due 
process would be required before a student is deprived of either at a public 
institution. 
Substantive processes require, essentially, that policies and rules must be related to 
the basic government purpose at hand that basic fairness be employed. For 
instance, college rules should be related to educational matters and applied fairly. 
Procedural due process generally refers to the requirement of notice and hearing 
before being deprived of a right. For example, before being expelled for 
misconduct, students should have notice of what they have done wrong and a 
chance to tell their side of the story.572 
And it continues to note that: “[T]he degree of specificity required [in codes 
of conduct] is that which would allow a student to adequately prepare a defense 
against the charge. [The University] should make plain the prohibited conduct, the 
procedure for determining whether a student is engaged in such conduct, and what 
the penalty is.”573 
Privacy 
Technological change often outpaces the law. Examining the legal implications of 
emerging technologies can help narrow this gap. Although the precise contours of 
the new media technologies are not yet known, certain radical evolutions in the 
way we receive, transmit, and utilize information have already become apparent.574 
572 Patricia A. Hollander, D. Parker Young, and Donald D. Gehring. (1985). A practical 
guide to legal issues affecting college teachers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
573 Patricia A. Hollander ., D. Parker Young, and Donald D. Gehring. (1985). 
574 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). See generally, Anne M. Fulton, Cyberspace 
and the Internet: Who Will Be The Privacy Police?, 3 Comm. Law Conspectus 63 (1995). 
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The possibilities engendered by the Information Superhighway will evolve in 
many ways. “Two evolutions—infinite choices and interactivity—will have profound 
Acceptable Use Policy Committee 
T 
Acceptable Use Policy Document 
Figure 4 - Model for AUP Creation 
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impact 575 on, inter alia, the need to revisit Constitutional issues in order to reassess 
their application to user policy issues. This reality is beginning to impact federal 
legislators. This is a positive event and we can look forward to a coherent national 
policy regarding the nature of cyberspace. But until that time, those who must create 
institutional Acceptable Use Policy should develop their own understanding of what 
constitutes fair and equitable policy in this environment which has warped our sense 
of the law. 
Privacy is a major issue of our day. 
There seems to be no legal issue today that cuts so wide a swath through conflicts 
confronting American society [as Privacy]. From AIDS tests to wiretaps, 
polygraph tests to computerized data bases, the common denominator has been 
whether the right to privacy outweighs other concerns of society ...576 
A Louis Harris poll (figure 3) supports the position that Privacy, the root of a number 
of present issues, is a significant concern of the American people. 
Drawing models of privacy and search and seizure with the intent of applying 
them to Acceptable Use Policies may not be realistically possible.577 Easterbrook578 
and de Sola Pool579 suggest that looking to our legal system for guidance is not yet 
575 Note. The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062 (March 1994). 
576 Robert Ellis Smith. Quoted in Andre Bacard. (1995). The computer privacy handbook. 
Berkeley, CA: Peachpit Press, page 17. 
57' David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto 
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (And Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?. 38 
Villanova L. Rev. 487, 488 (1993). 
578 Frank H. Easterbrook. (1995, November). Cyberspace and the law of the horse. Paper 
presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace, 
Chicago, Illinois. Available as of July I, 1996: http://www-law.lib.uchicago.edu /forum 
/easterbrook. doc. 
579 Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1983). Technologies of freedom. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
page 7. 
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possible. The legal community is still in the process of analyzing the phenomenon 
known as cyberspace. They are in the process of setting doctrine which will legally 
define actions in cyberspace. Even with clear legal foundational guidance from the 
legislature and the courts, there may be specific concerns that will not be addressed by 
courts examining privacy and other Constitutional questions, but which will apply to 
the development of Acceptable Use Policies. 
There is a need for universities to craft local rules for a computer network. 
There may also be compelling reasons for universities to craft their own AUP, 
because the AUP may, even for public institutions, “boil down to a matter of 
contract,”580 as they are in private institutions. Thus universities should research the 
issue of privacy as it applies to on-line computer systems. Even if an Acceptable Use 
Policy is eventually deemed to be a contract, there still remains a need to base the 
AUP upon the same concepts which are inherent in the U.S. Constitution. 
Search and Seizure 
The Computer—technology’s latest tool in communications—has forced us to 
re-engineer our policy in regard to the balance between individual privacy and 
society’s need for information. This new communications technology has ushered in 
a new era of global access where even the least powerful in society have a significant 
voice. However, the technology has generated the possibility that corporations and 
580 Daniel Burk (personal e-mail, April 6, 1996). 
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the government will be the beneficiaries of Orwellian powers. The outcome of this 
will be determined by the underlying societal values, and not by the technology itself 
Sergentnotes that this is an “apparent... clash between data privacy [concerns] and 
law enforcement’s need to gather evidence in criminal investigations.”581 
In recent years, it has become apparent that we have an ever diminishing 
degree (and amount) of control over what personal information of ours is available - 
and available to just about anyone.582 Neither the law enforcement establishment nor 
society in general seems to have kept fully abreast of the changing technological 
times. As a result, our privacy has been severely eroded. Unless a better 
understanding is achieved in regard to the relationship of cyberspace to our real world 
paradigms, we may soon find that ‘privacy’ is non-existent. 
Sergent advocates for a “framework by which the Fourth Amendment can be 
applied to a range of activities involved in computer investigation without hampering 
583 
the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”' To develop these frameworks, Sergent 
suggests that the Supreme Court should extend its current analysis: 
[0]f the scope and content of the Fourth Amendment to [include] searches and 
seizures of computer information. Because the level of privacy we enjoy in personal 
information depends upon value choices made by our society, examining legal 
norms is an important part of the process of making those choices. As new 
technology evolves, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment methodology is likely 
581 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995). 
582 Larry Tye. (1993, September 5). Privacy lost in high-tech era. Boston Sunday Globe. 
page 18-19. This article detailed the extent to which supposedly private information was actually 
publicly available in this day in age. 
583 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995). 
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to favor security over pnvacv. The model [put in place should involvel more 
, . . 584 
emphasis to privacy. 
Kapor and Godwin585 warn of computer searches and seizures based upon the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section suggested search and 
seizure guidelines. Kapor and Godwin are concerned that the ABA’s position 
amazingly seems to be based upon three publications586 from the Department of 
Justice’s National Institute of Justice. Kapor and Godwin note that: 
1. There was no guidance to the magistrate as to when the computer or related 
equipment should not be seized, either because it is not necessary as evidence or 
because such a seizure would intolerably chill the lawful exercise of First 
Amendment rights or abridge a property owner’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
2. There was inadequate recognition of the business or individual computer 
owner’s interest in continuing with lawful commercial business, which might be 
hindered or halted by the seizure of an expensive computer. 
3. There was no effort to measure the likelihood that investigators would find 
computers equipped with such justice-obstructing measures as automatic erasure 
software or degausser booby-trapped hardware, the presence of which might justify 
a no-knock search and seizure, among other responses.587 
584 Randolph S. Sergent, Note: A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy. 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181 (1995). 
585 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line]. Available as of July 1, 1996: http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Mike_Godwin 
/searchandseizureguidelines.eff. 
586 J. McEwan. (1989). Dedicated computer crime units. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice.; D. Parker. (1989). Computer crime: Criminal justice resource manual. 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; C. Conly. (1989). Organizing for computer crime 
investigation and prosecution. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
587 Mitchell Kapor, and Michael Godwin. (1994). Civil liberties implications of computer 
searches and seizures: Some proposed guidelines for magistrates who issue search warrants [On¬ 
line], 
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Tragedy of the Unmanaged Common 
“Since the barrier between the natural and computer sciences is often high 
and opaque, it is best to first discuss the tragedy of the commons”588 as Hardin589 
outlined the concept. This will be followed by a discussion of the possible 
implications of the tragedy for online computer systems. 
In 1968, biologist Garrett Hardin brought to science’s attention a little-known work 
by the nineteenth century amateur mathematician William Forster Lloyd on 
population growth and control. Lloyd examined the fate of a common pasture 
shared among rational, utility-maximizing herdsmen.590 
Shepherds grazed sheep on the individual parcels of land they owned. But there was 
another pasture, a large public stretch of land held in reserve, owned in common by 
the villagers and known, logically enough, as the Common. Then, some shepherds 
became greedy. They began guiding their sheep to the Common each day, preferring 
to wear out the public pasture because they thought it cost them nothing and saved 
their own small patches. Soon, others joined in, unwilling to deplete their lands while 
a few neighbors took advantage of the public lands. It wasn't long before the Common 
was turned into a muddy wasteland—useless to anyone. And as the shepherds 
watched their individual pastures fall to overgrazing, they realized that their village 
had been sacked by its own people. They’d stolen their shared livelihood, economic 
588 Roy M. Turner. (1991, January). The tragedy of the commons and distributed AI systems 
[Online]. Paper presented at the 12th International Workshop on Distributed Artificial Intelligence, 
University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH. Available as of July 1, 1996: 
http://cdps.umcs.maine.edu /Papers /1993/TofCommons/TR.html. 
589 Garret Hardin. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science. (162), page 1243-1248. 
590 Roy M. Turner. (1991, January). The tragedy of the commons and distributed AI systems 
[Online]. 
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security, cultural center, and much of their village’s beauty from themselves and their 
children.591 
Once a resource is being utilized at a rate near its carrying capacity, additional 
utilization will degrade its value to its current users. Users then will enter into a cycle 
of additional use of the resource to gain or to try to break even, as others use it. Since 
all users engage in this behavior, the resource is ultimately and inevitably doomed. 
For example, the Ogallala Aquifer, once known as the largest body of fresh 
water on earth, stretches under West Texas and as far north as Nebraska. Each year, 
farmers pump out five trillion gallons of water more than the rains put back into the 
aquifer. Recent conservation measures and heavy rains have helped reverse the fall in 
groundwater levels, but the Ogallala Aquifer is still so low that the next generation 
may find the costs to pump it are prohibitive. The depletion of the largest of nine 
major aquifers underlying the state is just one of the serious environmental challenges 
facing West Texas and many other mid-Westem states.592 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the common.593 
The inexorable working out of the resource’s ruin is Hardin's tragedy of the 
common. In human affairs, the tragedy of the common has never been more evident 
than it is today. Its effects are pollution, global warming, ozone depletion, 
overfishing and extinction of species, abuse of aquifers, and destruction of the rain 
forests. 
591 Garret Hardin. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science. (162). page 1243-1248. 
592 _. (1991). Where breakdown and bankruptcy play. The Economist, page 21. 
593 Garret Hardin. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science. (162). page 1243-1248. 
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But what relevance does this have for Acceptable Use Policy? 
Relating this to the creation of Acceptable Use Policy creation is relatively 
easy as, at the heart of these models/research projects, is the problem of the free-rider 
or the overgrazer, and the issue of regulating use of a shared resource. 
As Ostrom notes, the challenge becomes how a group can “organize and 
govern themselves to obtain collective benefits in situations where the temptations to 
free-ride and/or to break commitments are substantial.”594 Ostrom595 studied a “wide 
range of communities which had a long history of successfully producing and 
maintaining collective goods. She also studied a number of communities which had 
failed partially or completely in meeting this challenge.”596 In comparing the 
communities, Ostrom found that groups which are able to organize and govern 
themselves are marked by the following design principles: 
• Group boundaries are clearly defined 
• Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and 
conditions 
• Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules 
• The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external 
authorities 
• A system for monitoring member’s behavior exists; this monitoring is undertaken by 
the community members themselves 
• A graduated system of sanctions is used 
597 
• Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms 
594 Elinor Ostrom. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for 
collective action, page 27. 
595 Elinor Ostrom. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for 
collective action, page 30. 
596 Peter Kollock and Marc Smith. (1994). Managing virtual communities: Cooperation and 
conflict in computer communities [On-line], Available as of November 1, 1996: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/csoc/vcommons.htm. 
597 Peter Kollock and Marc Smith. (1994). Managing virtual communities: Cooperation and 
conflict in computer communities [On-line]. 
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Applying Ostrom’s observations along with a foundational understanding of 
the legal principles of privacy, search and seizure, and due process seems to provide a 
powerful model upon which the crafting of a public higher education’s AUP can be 
based (see Figure 4 - page 181). 
The AUP as a Social Contract - A Transformational Approach 
The social contract reflects the agreement between the people and the government 
on how much power the people consent for the government to have and exert. The 
social contract between the people and the government exists so long as the 
government uses its powers within the due process of law and the people agree to 
the outcome of the due process of law. With the due process of law as a vehicle for 
maintaining the social contract, the government uses its power without 
compromising certain natural and inalienable rights of the individuals in a way 
unspecified by the Constitution, our social contract. Hence, by allowing the 
government to expand its power at the expense of the right to privacy breaches the 
contract between the people and the government because such action compromises 
the individual rights without the consent from the people.598 
Currently, an Acceptable Use Policy tends to be a Ten Commandment-like 
document which, at various levels of friendliness, informs the users what is expected 
of them in regard to user-to-computer actions and, in a vague and overly broad 
manner, what is expected in regard to user-to-user behavior. These Ten 
Commandment-like AUP’s were apropos, however, with the changing demographics 
of the typical university, and the increasing social use capability of the Net, the 
computer user policy (the AUP) should also change. The AUP should become more 
of a social contract. The AUP should be crafted, as other social contracts are (e.g., 
the US Constitution, a faculty handbook, a student handbook). Those who craft the 
AUP should certainly consider the logistical needs inherent in maintaining a secure 
598 Right to privacy in the age of telecommunication [On-line]. (1996, March 26). 
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and functional computer network. In addition, those who craft the AUP should also 
come to the realization the computer network is much more than a place where 
hackers and pomographers roam freely,599 or where the primary focus is the 
survivability and functionality of the system. They should view the network as a 
community of people who congregate to seek and/or exchange information, 
knowledge, and, wisdom. 
For many people, the Internet has been like a worldwide, multimillion member 
think-tank, available 24 hours a day to answer any question, from the trivial to the 
scholarly. This magical knowledge-multiplying quality comes from the ongoing 
cooperative effort of many thousands of people, who freely contribute their 
expertise in response to questions. That precious power of a large group of people 
to act as a collective thinktank for each other is vulnerable to human folly. A 
relatively small number of malefactors hold the power to mess up a good thing for 
a far larger number of cooperative citizens.600 
The Acceptable Use Policy can be a way to manage the electronic common 
that will preserve the power of cooperation without infringing on individual freedom 
or the growth of knowledge and wisdom of which the Net is capable. “The collective 
intelligence of the Net ought to get a chance to activate a social immune response 
before too many people who don’t know exactly what they are panicking about call 
for a police force we don’t need.”601 
There is a more-or-less subtle, but none the less, transformational change that 
those who craft a university’s AUP should undergo. Those who craft AUP’s should 
shift their paradigm from one which views a computer usage policy (the AUP) as a 
document that informs the user primarily of what the technical and logistical 
599 Howard Reingold. (1996, June 15). Federal judges defend free speech on the Internet 
[Online]. Posted to the Virtual Communities Conference on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic 
Link), San Francisco, CA. 
600 Howard Reingold. (1996). The tragedy of the electronic commons [Online]. 
601 Howard Reingold. (1996). The tragedy of the electronic commons [Online]. 
190 
requirements of computer network usage are to one which includes the view that an 
AUP—a computer usage policy—is also a social contract: 
1. that is crafted by a demographically representative committee of 
campus community members, 
2. that will facilitate the development of community, which will, in turn, 
facilitate the establishment of community-endorsed ethics and values. 
To accomplish this, it is necessary that those who comprise an AUP 
development committee be familiar with the issues that have been put forth in this 
study (see figure 4 - page 181). Familiarity with the issues of privacy and search and 
seizure will provide a scholarly understanding of how the legal system views such 
issues in the real world. This understanding will hopefully assist those who craft 
AUP’s in: 
• creating statements that treat computer network actions in the same 
manner that they would be treated if they occurred in the real world, and, 
• providing a foundational basis for addressing social issues/dilemmas which 
may develop. 
This study also supports the concept of a basic paradigm shift in AUP’s toward 
becoming social contracts. This author believes that the first step toward creating 
AUPs that are social contracts is an understanding of basic social/community issues 
which all appear to flow from the right to privacy. 
This dissertation concludes that regulations need to be in place to govern the 
acceptable use of computer networks. These AUP’s should be locally developed by 
those who have a foundational understanding of: 
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• legal principles of privacy, search and seizure, and due process, and, 
• theory of management of commonly shared resources and the inherent 
questions of social order. 
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